GHSA-45GV-9WJV-XH7P
Nginx UI: Authentication bypass: password login does not enforce a passkey-only second factor (2FA bypass)
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-45GV-9WJV-XH7P divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
nginx-ui supports two second-factor methods — TOTP (OTP) and WebAuthn passkeys —
and reports an account as 2FA-enabled when either is configured. However, the
password login endpoint (`POST /api/login`) only enforces a second factor when a
TOTP secret is present. An account that has registered a **passkey but no
TOTP** is logged in after password verification alone — the passkey is never
requested. This silently downgrades a passkey-protected account to single-factor
(password-only) authentication.
Details
The account's 2FA policy treats passkeys as a valid factor (`model/user.go`):
func (u *User) EnabledOTP() bool { return len(u.OTPSecret) != 0 }
func (u *User) EnabledPasskey() bool { /* true if a passkey row exists */ }
func (u *User) Enabled2FA() bool { return u.EnabledOTP() || u.EnabledPasskey() }
func (u *User) AfterFind(_ *gorm.DB) error {
u.EnabledTwoFA = u.Enabled2FA() // exposed to the UI as `enabled_2fa`
return nil
}But the login handler only checks `EnabledOTP()` (`api/user/auth.go`, `Login`):
u, err := user.Login(json.Name, json.Password)
...
if u.EnabledOTP() { // <-- only TOTP is enforced
if json.OTP == "" && json.RecoveryCode == "" {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, LoginResponse{Message: "The user has enabled 2FA", Code: Enabled2FA}) // 199
user.BanIP(clientIP)
return
}
if _, err = user.VerifyOTP(u, json.OTP, json.RecoveryCode); err != nil { /* ... */ }
secureSessionID = user.SetSecureSessionID(u.ID)
}
// Passkey-only accounts fall through to here and receive a full session token:
accessToken, err := user.GenerateJWT(u)No branch requires a WebAuthn assertion during password login when
`EnabledPasskey()` is true. The root cause is the mismatch between the
policy definition (`Enabled2FA()` = OTP or passkey) and the
enforcement check (`EnabledOTP()` only).
The same `EnabledOTP()`-only gating in `RequireSecureSession()`
(`internal/middleware/secure_session.go`) means passkey-only users are also
exempted from step-up on sensitive actions.
Proof of Concept
Tested against nginx-ui built from source (`go build -tags unembed`) on
`127.0.0.1:9000`, with WebAuthn configured and a victim account that has a
registered passkey and no TOTP. The vulnerable code is identical on the
production `main` branch (`api/user/auth.go` `Login` gates on `u.EnabledOTP()`
only; verified at commit `6c86e5a`, 2026-05-17).
Account state advertised by `GET /api/2fa_status`:
{"enabled":true,"otp_status":false,"passkey_status":true, ...}Attacker logs in with password only (`POST /api/login`, encrypted params as
the client normally sends):
HTTP 200
{"message":"ok","code":200,"token":"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...."}`code: 200` + a valid JWT = an authenticated session, with the passkey never
used. For comparison, the identical account with a TOTP secret instead correctly
returns the second-factor challenge:
HTTP 200
{"message":"The user has enabled 2FA","code":199}| Account state | `POST /api/login` (password only) |
|---|---|
| Passkey registered, no TOTP | `code 200` + JWT — 2FA NOT enforced |
| TOTP registered | `code 199` — 2FA challenge enforced |
This isolates the defect: the login path enforces OTP but ignores passkeys.
Impact
- Any account protected only by a passkey is reduced to password-only
- In nginx-ui all authenticated users are effectively administrators and the
- Users are given a false sense of security: the UI shows the account as
Remediation
- Gate the second-factor decision on `u.Enabled2FA()` (not `u.EnabledOTP()`) in
- For a passkey-only user logging in with a password, return a
- Centralize session-token issuance so no login entry point can skip the 2FA
Affected components
- `api/user/auth.go` — `Login`
- `model/user.go` — `EnabledOTP`, `EnabledPasskey`, `Enabled2FA`, `AfterFind`
- `api/user/2fa.go` — `get2FAStatus`
- `internal/middleware/secure_session.go` — `RequireSecureSession`
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
Sin parche | — | — | v1.9.9 no afectada |
commit 95cd21bArsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-45gv-9wjv-xh7phttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/95cd21b70814e5d9a48a359aa238aeea1ac97429https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-uihttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.5.0Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
