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Advisory · GitHub · NuGet · OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol

GHSA-4625-4J76-FWW9

OpenTelemetry's disk retry default temp path enables local blob injection via OTLP Exporter

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -9 d de la divulgación
Exposición203 dDesde la divulgación, 30 abr 2026, 1:34 p. m.
Detección200 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 1.15.3
Monitoreo
Detectada
21 abr 26
30 abr 26
10 sept 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
21 abr 26
13 jun 26
5 ago 26
27 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 1.15.3 OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol · -9 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-4625-4J76-FWW9 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The OTLP disk retry feature in `OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol` silently fell back to `Path.GetTempPath()` when `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_RETRY=disk` was set but `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_DISK_RETRY_DIRECTORY_PATH` was not configured.

The exporter stored and loaded `*.blob` files under fixed, signal-named subdirectories (`traces`, `metrics`, `logs`) beneath that shared temporary root path.

On multi-user systems where the temporary directory is accessible to other local accounts, this exposed three attack surfaces:

  • Blob injection (integrity): an attacker could write crafted `*.blob` files into the predictable path; the exporter picks them up on the next retry cycle and forwards them to the configured OTLP endpoint under the application's identity.
  • Telemetry disclosure (confidentiality): an attacker reads `*.blob` files written by the application between export failures, recovering encoded telemetry payloads (spans, metric data points, log records).
  • Resource exhaustion (availability): an attacker deposits numerous or oversized blob files, degrading retry-loop performance or consuming disk space.
Details
Preconditions
  1. `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_RETRY` is set to `disk`.
  2. `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_DISK_RETRY_DIRECTORY_PATH` is not set, causing the exporter to resolve the blob storage root using the `System.IO.Path.GetTempPath()` API.
  3. A local attacker has read or write access to the process' temporary directory (e.g., `/tmp` on Linux, or `%TEMP%` on a multi-user Windows installation).
Exploit path
  1. A target application starts with `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_RETRY=disk` and no explicit blob directory. The exporter resolves the storage root to `Path.GetTempPath()`, producing paths such as `%TEMP%\traces`, `%TEMP%\metrics`, and `%TEMP%\logs` (or `/tmp/traces` etc. on Linux).
  2. Injection scenario: before or during the application's retry window, an attacker writes crafted `*.blob` files into one of those signal subdirectories. On the next retry interval (by default every 60 seconds), `OtlpExporterPersistentStorageTransmissionHandler` https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet/blob/c724f4bd6fd88e9a599af1668bf7af9487155b62/src/OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol/Implementation/Transmission/OtlpExporterPersistentStorageTransmissionHandler.cs scans the directory, loads the attacker-supplied blobs, and forwards them to the configured OTLP endpoint using the application's identity and transport credentials.
  3. Disclosure scenario: the attacker reads `*.blob` files that the application wrote after a transient export failure, recovering the full serialized telemetry payloads (spans, metric data points, or log records in Protobuf encoding).
  4. DoS scenario: the attacker deposits a large number of oversized blob files in the temporary subdirectories, causing the retry loop to consume excess CPU/IO processing them, potentially exhausting available disk space.
Mitigations

If an immediate upgrade to a patched version is not possible:

  1. Avoid enabling disk retry in shared environments.
  2. Configure a dedicated directory with strict ACL/ownership and least privilege.
  3. Ensure the directory is not shared across tenants/users.
  4. Monitor for unexpected `*.blob` files or abnormal retry backlog growth.
Resources
  • #7106 https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet/pull/7106

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol≥ 1.8.0 < 1.15.3
1.8.0
1.15.3
1.21.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
nugetOpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol
Corregida 1.15.3 -9 d 1.21.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas1.15.3
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42191
Otrahttps://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet/security/advisories/GHSA-4625-4j76-fww9
Otrahttps://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet/pull/7106
Otrahttps://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet/commit/78dffdc5ebdf3dc090fdb94e3f1a32d3d1e26dfd
Otrahttps://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet

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