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Advisory · GitHub · npm · trigger.dev

GHSA-4672-HWV6-GQ62

Trigger.dev: Cross-environment deployment cancel

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -73 d de la divulgación
Exposición48 dDesde la divulgación, 2 oct 2026, 5:42 p. m.
Detección45 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 4.5.6
Monitoreo
Detectada
21 jul 26
2 oct 26
21 oct 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 jul 26
21 ago 26
20 sept 26
21 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 4.5.6 trigger.dev · -73 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-4672-HWV6-GQ62 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

Trigger.dev isolates each project into multiple environments (`dev`, `staging`, `prod`, and per-PR `preview` branches), each with its own secret API key — the environment is a trust boundary (a `dev`/preview/CI key is lower-trust than a `prod` key). Most API routes enforce this by scoping resource lookups to the authenticated key's environment (`where: { friendlyId, runtimeEnvironmentId: auth.environment.id }`).

The deployment cancel path does not. `DeploymentService.getDeployment()` scopes the lookup by `projectId` only — never `environmentId` — so a secret key for *any* environment in a project can cancel a deployment belonging to *any other* environment of the same project, including production. The deployment GET route, by contrast, *is* env-scoped — so the same key that is 404'd when trying to read a prod deployment can nonetheless cancel it. That asymmetry is the bug.

Affected

`apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current `main`). Affects self-hosted and cloud.

Root cause

`apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v1.deployments.$deploymentId.cancel.ts` authenticates to an environment and calls `deploymentService.cancelDeployment(authenticatedEnv, deploymentId, ...)`.

`apps/webapp/app/v3/services/deployment.server.ts`:

public cancelDeployment(authenticatedEnv: Pick<AuthenticatedEnvironment,"projectId">, friendlyId, ...) {
  return this.getDeployment(authenticatedEnv.projectId, friendlyId)   // projectId only
    .andThen(validateDeployment)                                      // rejects only FINAL statuses
    .andThen(cancelDeployment);                                       // updateMany -> status CANCELED
}
private getDeployment(projectId: string, friendlyId: string) {
  return this._prisma.workerDeployment.findFirst({
    where: { friendlyId, projectId },        // <-- NO environmentId filter
  });
}

`cancelDeployment` accepts `authenticatedEnv` but its type is literally `Pick<AuthenticatedEnvironment,"projectId">` — it discards the environment identity. `validateDeployment` blocks only `FINAL_DEPLOYMENT_STATUSES`, so any in-progress deployment (`PENDING`/`INSTALLING`/`BUILDING`/`DEPLOYING`) is cancellable.

Contrast — the correctly env-scoped sibling `api.v1.deployments.$deploymentId.ts` (GET):

const deployment = await prisma.workerDeployment.findFirst({
  where: { friendlyId: deploymentId, environmentId: authenticatedEnv.id },   // env-scoped
});

Reads are env-scoped; the cancel mutation is not. The same `getDeployment(authenticatedEnv.projectId, …)` helper also backs the deployment *progress* methods (`deployment.server.ts:172,329`), so the projectId-only scope is a small class.

Runtime PoC (proven on the self-host stack)

Seeded one project with a `prod` env (key `tr_prod_…`) and a `dev` env (key `tr_dev_…`) and one `WorkerDeployment` (`deployment_pocvictim`, status `DEPLOYING`) in the prod env. As the dev key:

status BEFORE                                                  : DEPLOYING
GET  /api/v1/deployments/deployment_pocvictim   (dev key)      -> 404   (env-scoped read DENIES it)
POST /api/v1/deployments/deployment_pocvictim/cancel (dev key) -> 204
status AFTER                                                   : CANCELED   (prod deploy canceled by the dev key)
CONTROL: same cancel with a DIFFERENT project's key            -> 404   (projectId scope blocks cross-project)

The dev key cannot *read* the prod deployment (404) yet *cancels* it (204 → CANCELED); a different project's key is correctly 404'd — so the gap is precisely cross-environment within a project.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
trigger.dev< 4.5.6
4.5.6
4.8.7
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmtrigger.dev
Corregida 4.5.6 -73 d 4.8.7 no afectada
Versiones corregidas4.5.6
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62
Otrahttps://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4316
Otrahttps://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/6997aeb05e27d2db47f9eda01fdc8a17c81a1ae0
Otrahttps://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev
Otrahttps://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.6

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