GHSA-4672-HWV6-GQ62
Trigger.dev: Cross-environment deployment cancel
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 4.5.6 | trigger.dev · -73 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-4672-HWV6-GQ62 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
Trigger.dev isolates each project into multiple environments (`dev`, `staging`, `prod`, and per-PR `preview` branches), each with its own secret API key — the environment is a trust boundary (a `dev`/preview/CI key is lower-trust than a `prod` key). Most API routes enforce this by scoping resource lookups to the authenticated key's environment (`where: { friendlyId, runtimeEnvironmentId: auth.environment.id }`).
The deployment cancel path does not. `DeploymentService.getDeployment()` scopes the lookup by `projectId` only — never `environmentId` — so a secret key for *any* environment in a project can cancel a deployment belonging to *any other* environment of the same project, including production. The deployment GET route, by contrast, *is* env-scoped — so the same key that is 404'd when trying to read a prod deployment can nonetheless cancel it. That asymmetry is the bug.
Affected
`apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current `main`). Affects self-hosted and cloud.
Root cause
`apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v1.deployments.$deploymentId.cancel.ts` authenticates to an environment and calls `deploymentService.cancelDeployment(authenticatedEnv, deploymentId, ...)`.
`apps/webapp/app/v3/services/deployment.server.ts`:
public cancelDeployment(authenticatedEnv: Pick<AuthenticatedEnvironment,"projectId">, friendlyId, ...) {
return this.getDeployment(authenticatedEnv.projectId, friendlyId) // projectId only
.andThen(validateDeployment) // rejects only FINAL statuses
.andThen(cancelDeployment); // updateMany -> status CANCELED
}
private getDeployment(projectId: string, friendlyId: string) {
return this._prisma.workerDeployment.findFirst({
where: { friendlyId, projectId }, // <-- NO environmentId filter
});
}`cancelDeployment` accepts `authenticatedEnv` but its type is literally `Pick<AuthenticatedEnvironment,"projectId">` — it discards the environment identity. `validateDeployment` blocks only `FINAL_DEPLOYMENT_STATUSES`, so any in-progress deployment (`PENDING`/`INSTALLING`/`BUILDING`/`DEPLOYING`) is cancellable.
Contrast — the correctly env-scoped sibling `api.v1.deployments.$deploymentId.ts` (GET):
const deployment = await prisma.workerDeployment.findFirst({
where: { friendlyId: deploymentId, environmentId: authenticatedEnv.id }, // env-scoped
});Reads are env-scoped; the cancel mutation is not. The same `getDeployment(authenticatedEnv.projectId, …)` helper also backs the deployment *progress* methods (`deployment.server.ts:172,329`), so the projectId-only scope is a small class.
Runtime PoC (proven on the self-host stack)
Seeded one project with a `prod` env (key `tr_prod_…`) and a `dev` env (key `tr_dev_…`) and one `WorkerDeployment` (`deployment_pocvictim`, status `DEPLOYING`) in the prod env. As the dev key:
status BEFORE : DEPLOYING
GET /api/v1/deployments/deployment_pocvictim (dev key) -> 404 (env-scoped read DENIES it)
POST /api/v1/deployments/deployment_pocvictim/cancel (dev key) -> 204
status AFTER : CANCELED (prod deploy canceled by the dev key)
CONTROL: same cancel with a DIFFERENT project's key -> 404 (projectId scope blocks cross-project)The dev key cannot *read* the prod deployment (404) yet *cancels* it (204 → CANCELED); a different project's key is correctly 404'd — so the gap is precisely cross-environment within a project.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npmtrigger.dev |
Corregida | 4.5.6 | -73 d | 4.8.7 no afectada |
4.5.6Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4316https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/6997aeb05e27d2db47f9eda01fdc8a17c81a1ae0https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.devhttps://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.6Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
