GHSA-47FC-CJ9R-GHPM
aws:SourceIp policy condition is spoofable via X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-Ip behind any private-looking peer
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-47FC-CJ9R-GHPM divulgada · CVSS 9.1 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
SeaweedFS's S3 gateway supports the `aws:SourceIp` bucket-policy and IAM-policy condition key for restricting access by client IP. Two independent implementations resolve this value: `weed/s3api/policy_engine/engine.go`'s `extractSourceIP` (bucket policies) and `weed/s3api/s3_iam_middleware.go`'s `extractSourceIP` (IAM role/session policies). Both trust `X-Forwarded-For`/`X-Real-Ip` whenever the connecting TCP peer's address looks private or loopback, with no admin-configured trusted-proxy allowlist. Any deployment where the gateway sits behind an in-cluster ingress, load balancer, or sidecar on the same private network, the default topology for containerized/Kubernetes deployments, treats every such connection as a trusted proxy hop and adopts the client-supplied header value as the resolved source IP.
Real AWS S3 evaluates `aws:SourceIp` from the requester's connecting IP, not a header. Both call sites here diverge from that guarantee, letting a caller who can reach the gateway (directly, or from another workload on the same private network segment) spoof any source IP and bypass an IP-restricted `Allow`/`Deny` statement.
Details
`weed/s3api/policy_engine/engine.go`, `extractSourceIP` (pre-fix): if `isPrivateIP(remoteIP)` (loopback, link-local, or RFC1918), it scanned `X-Forwarded-For` right-to-left for the first public-looking entry and returned it, falling back to `X-Real-Ip`. `weed/s3api/s3_iam_middleware.go` had a second, independent `extractSourceIP` with the same private-peer gate, taking the left-most `X-Forwarded-For` entry (client-prependable) or `X-Real-IP` directly.
Both feed a security decision. The bucket-policy path: `ExtractConditionValuesFromRequest` sets `values["aws:SourceIp"]`, consumed by `PolicyEngine.EvaluatePolicy`. The IAM path: `extractRequestContext` sets `context["aws:SourceIp"]`, consumed by `IsPrincipalActionExplicitlyDenied` (`weed/s3api/auth_credentials.go`) for role/session policy conditions.
The private-peer check is not a trusted-proxy allowlist; it accepts any connection whose address happens to fall in RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges. In a typical Kubernetes deployment the S3 gateway's pod IP, and every other pod's IP, is private, so the check cannot distinguish the cluster's own ingress from an attacker-controlled pod on the same network, or from a caller who reaches the gateway's ClusterIP/NodePort directly and skips the ingress entirely.
Proof of Concept
Against `weed/s3api/policy_engine/engine.go` (pre-fix), a bucket policy denying access outside `10.0.0.0/8`:
func TestExtractSourceIP_BypassesIPRestrictionPolicy(t *testing.T) {
engine := NewPolicyEngine()
policyJSON := `{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{"Effect": "Allow", "Principal": "*", "Action": ["s3:GetObject"],
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::secret-bucket/*"},
{"Effect": "Deny", "Principal": "*", "Action": ["s3:GetObject"],
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::secret-bucket/*",
"Condition": {"NotIpAddress": {"aws:SourceIp": ["10.0.0.0/8"]}}}
]
}`
engine.SetBucketPolicy("secret-bucket", policyJSON)
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/secret-bucket/secret-key", nil)
r.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.5:54321" // e.g. an in-cluster ingress
r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "203.0.113.99") // outside 10.0.0.0/8
result := engine.EvaluatePolicy("secret-bucket", &PolicyEvaluationArgs{
Action: "s3:GetObject", Resource: "arn:aws:s3:::secret-bucket/secret-key",
Principal: "*", Conditions: ExtractConditionValuesFromRequest(r),
})
// pre-fix: result == PolicyResultAllow (bug); expected PolicyResultDeny
}Result before the fix:
--- FAIL: TestExtractSourceIP_BypassesIPRestrictionPolicy (0.00s)
BUG: request outside the trusted 10.0.0.0/8 range was allowed by spoofing X-Forwarded-ForThe IAM-policy path (`weed/s3api/s3_iam_middleware.go`) has the identical bypass; the existing `TestIPBasedPolicyEnforcement` test already covered the code path and, before the fix, asserted the spoofable behavior as correct (RemoteAddr fixed at `127.0.0.1`, source IP taken from `X-Forwarded-For`).
Impact
Any operator relying on `aws:SourceIp` to restrict a bucket or IAM policy to a trusted network range gets no enforcement of that restriction once the gateway sits behind anything on a private network, the default for containerized deployments. An attacker who can reach the gateway, directly or from another workload sharing the private network, spoofs `X-Forwarded-For`/`X-Real-Ip` to satisfy the condition and reach whatever the policy would otherwise gate: read or write access to a bucket, or an IAM role/session action restricted to an office or VPC CIDR.
Affected: `github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs`, confirmed on commit `213f4c5d5c8ae866298b4a36e18e27fb0a903214` (current `master`).
Fix
`extractSourceIP` in both `weed/s3api/policy_engine/engine.go` and `weed/s3api/s3_iam_middleware.go` now always returns the direct TCP peer address (`r.RemoteAddr`), matching AWS's own `aws:SourceIp` semantics. The header-trust branch and the now-unused `isPrivateIP` helpers/private-CIDR tables were removed from both files.
-func extractSourceIP(r *http.Request) string {
- ...
- if isPrivateIP(remoteIP) {
- if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
- // scan for a public-looking entry and trust it
- ...
- }
- if xRealIP := ...; xRealIP != "" {
- return xRealIP
- }
- }
- return remoteIP.String()
-}
+func extractSourceIP(r *http.Request) string {
+ // aws:SourceIp is always the direct TCP peer; there is no trusted-proxy
+ // allowlist to tell a real proxy hop from the caller apart.
+ ...
+ return remoteIP.String()
+}Three pre-existing tests had encoded the spoofable behavior as its expectation and were updated to assert the fixed behavior instead: `TestExtractConditionValuesFromRequestSourceIPPrecedence` (`policy_engine/engine_test.go`), `TestRequestContextExtraction` and `TestIPBasedPolicyEnforcement` (`s3_jwt_auth_test.go`). New regression tests were added: `TestExtractSourceIP_IgnoresForwardedHeaders` and `TestExtractSourceIP_EnforcesIPRestrictionPolicy` (`policy_engine`), `TestUserInlinePolicySourceIpCondition_IgnoresForwardedHeaders` (`s3api`). `go test ./weed/s3api/...` passes across every package after the change.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gogithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-47fc-cj9r-ghpmLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
