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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

GHSA-49GM-HH7W-WFVF

OliveTin: OS Command Injection via `password` argument type and webhook JSON extraction bypasses shell safety checks

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CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versióncommit 4bbd2ea
Exposición267 dDesde la divulgación, 25 feb 2026, 11:18 a. m.
Detección264 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
25 feb 26
28 feb 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
25 feb 26
3 may 26
9 jul 26
14 sept 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-49GM-HH7W-WFVF divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

OliveTin's shell mode safety check (`checkShellArgumentSafety`) blocks several dangerous argument types but not `password`. A user supplying a `password`-typed argument can inject shell metacharacters that execute arbitrary OS commands. A second independent vector allows unauthenticated RCE via webhook-extracted JSON values that skip type safety checks entirely before reaching `sh -c`.

Details

Vector 1 — `password` type bypasses shell safety check (PR:L)

`service/internal/executor/arguments.go` has two gaps:

// Line 198-199 — TypeSafetyCheck returns nil (no error) for password type
case "password":
    return nil  // accepts ANY string including ; | ` $()

// Line 313 — checkShellArgumentSafety blocks dangerous types but not password
unsafe := map[string]bool{
    "url":                      true,
    "email":                    true,
    "raw_string_multiline":     true,
    "very_dangerous_raw_string": true,
    // "password" is absent — not blocked
}

Shell execution at `service/internal/executor/executor_unix.go:18`:

exec.CommandContext(ctx, "sh", "-c", finalParsedCommand)

A user supplies a `password` argument value of `'; id; echo '` → `sh -c` interprets the shell metacharacters → arbitrary command execution.

This is not the "admin already has access" pattern: OliveTin explicitly enforces an admin/user boundary where admins define commands and users only supply argument values. The `password` type is the documented, intended mechanism for user-supplied sensitive values. The safety check exists precisely to prevent users from escaping this boundary — `password` is the one type it fails to block.

Vector 2 — Webhook JSON extraction skips TypeSafetyCheck entirely (PR:N)

`service/internal/executor/handler.go:153-157` extracts arbitrary key-value pairs from webhook JSON payloads and injects them into `ExecutionRequest.Arguments`. These webhook-extracted arguments have no corresponding config-defined `ActionArgument` entry, so `parseActionArguments()` in `arguments.go` finds no type to check against and skips `TypeSafetyCheck` entirely. The values are templated directly into the shell command and passed to `sh -c`.

Example: an admin command template `git pull && echo {{ git_message }}` with Shell mode enabled. A webhook POST with `{"git_message": "x; id"}` injects `id` into the shell command. The webhook endpoint is unauthenticated by default (`authType: none` in default config).

PoC
# Vector 1 — authenticated user with password-type argument
curl -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/StartAction \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"actionId": "run-command", "arguments": [{"name": "pass", "value": "'; id; echo '"}]}'

# Vector 2 — unauthenticated webhook
curl -X POST http://localhost:1337/webhook/git-deploy \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"git_message": "x; id #", "git_author": "attacker"}'

Confirmed on `jamesread/olivetin:latest` (3000.10.0), 3/3 runs. Both vectors produced `uid=1000(olivetin)` output and arbitrary file write to `/tmp/pwned`.

Impact
  • Vector 1: Any authenticated user (registration enabled by default, `authType: none` by default) can execute arbitrary OS commands on the OliveTin host with the permissions of the OliveTin process.
  • Vector 2: Unauthenticated attacker can achieve the same if the instance receives webhooks from external sources, which is a primary OliveTin use case.

Combined: unauthenticated RCE on any OliveTin instance using Shell mode with webhook-triggered actions.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin< 0.0.0-20260222101908-4bbd2eab1532
0.0.0-20260222101908-4bbd2eab1532
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Gogithub.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
Corregida commit 4bbd2ea — —
Versiones corregidascommit 4bbd2ea
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27626
Otrahttps://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/security/advisories/GHSA-49gm-hh7w-wfvf
Otrahttps://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/commit/4bbd2eab153287dc744ad061c58af7693f0c3ddc
Otrahttps://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
Otrahttps://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4547

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