GHSA-49PJ-52X6-8GPJ
No brute-force limit on password re-authentication; TOTP can be disabled with the password alone
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-49PJ-52X6-8GPJ divulgada · CVSS 5.9 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
The authenticated password re-check endpoints apply no rate limit and no lockout,
so a holder of a valid session (e.g. a stolen JWT) who does not know the account
password can guess it with unlimited, silent attempts. The sharpest sink is
`POST /user/settings/totp/disable` (v1 and v2), which removes 2FA on the **password
alone** (no current TOTP code) — so a successful guess also strips the second
factor. Account deletion and data export use the same bare check. Password change
and email change count failures and email the user, but never lock out, so they are
unlimited oracles too. Default configuration (`ratelimit.enabled` is `false` by default).
Details
The TOTP-disable handler checks only the password, via the bare
`user.CheckUserPassword` — a plain bcrypt compare with no failed-attempt counter
and no lockout:
// pkg/routes/api/v2/user_totp.go — totpDisable
if err := user.CheckUserPassword(u, in.Body.Password); err != nil { ... } // :228
// pkg/routes/api/v1/user_totp.go — UserTOTPDisable
err = user.CheckUserPassword(u, login.Password) // :169// pkg/user/user.go — CheckUserPassword (no counter, no lockout, no notification)
func CheckUserPassword(user *User, password string) error { // :500
err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(user.Password), []byte(password))
...
}By contrast, wrong TOTP codes are protected: `HandleFailedTOTPAuth` locks the
account after 10 attempts. The dedicated brute-force protection exists for the
second factor, but not for the password re-check that can remove it:
// pkg/user/totp.go — HandleFailedTOTPAuth
if attempts < 10 { return }
...
if err := user.SetStatus(s, StatusAccountLocked); err != nil { ... } // :276No app-layer limiter stands in by default: `RateLimitEnabled.setDefault(false)`
(`pkg/config/config.go:473`); the always-on `noAuthRateLimit` covers only the
*unauthenticated* routes. Even enabled, the limiter is a per-key throughput cap,
not a failed-auth lockout. The existing `basicAuthRateLimit`
(`pkg/routes/rate_limit.go:137,153-188`) can't be reused as-is either: it is keyed by
IP and counts only 401s, while a wrong password here returns 403
(`pkg/user/error.go:225`).
The same unthrottled `CheckUserPassword` guards account deletion and data export
too: `user_deletion.go` (v1 `:70,:171`, v2 `:108,:157`), `user_export.go`
(v1 `:60`, v2 `:99`), `user_totp.go` (v1 `:169`, v2 `:228`). The login,
password-change, email-change and CalDAV paths instead use `CheckUserCredentials`,
which counts failures and emails the user at 3, but never locks the account
(`pkg/user/user.go:449`). So password change (`pkg/models/user_settings.go:76`) and
email change (`pkg/user/update_email.go:53`) are also unlimited guessing oracles for a
session holder; they are just not silent.
Proof of concept
Stock Docker image `vikunja/vikunja:unstable` (`v2.7.0-16-g58f7cf47`), SQLite,
default config. A victim registers, enables TOTP, and re-logs in with a TOTP code;
that session token is the one an attacker is assumed to hold (the attacker does not
know the password):
[setup] enable TOTP with a valid code -> HTTP 200 (TOTP was enabled successfully.)
[setup] victim re-login with TOTP -> HTTP 200
[setup] TOTP status before attack -> enabled=TrueWith that session, 50 wrong-password guesses are sent to the disable endpoint:
POST /api/v1/user/settings/totp/disable {"password":"123456"}
-> HTTP 403 {"code": 1011, "message": "Wrong username or password."}
... (50 guesses) ...
[attack] 50 wrong guesses, status codes: {403: 50} (429 seen: False)
[attack] after 50 failures: session valid (HTTP 200), TOTP enabled=True => NOT locked, NOT throttledNo `429`, no lockout, the session stays valid and 2FA stays on. The winning guess
(the real password) then removes 2FA with no second factor:
POST /api/v1/user/settings/totp/disable {"password":"<correct>"}
-> HTTP 200 {"message": "TOTP was disabled successfully."}
[attack] TOTP status after attack -> enabled=None => 2FA REMOVED with password alonebcrypt (default cost 11) is the only throttle; there is no attempt cap. The same
holds on `/api/v2/user/settings/totp/disable`.
Impact
Improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts (CWE-307). An attacker
who has obtained a victim's session but not their password can brute-force the
password with no limit and, on success, disable the victim's 2FA — turning a
transient session into full, persistent account takeover and defeating the second
factor. Deletion and export re-auth share the same unthrottled check; password change and
email change are throttled by nothing but a warning email. Requires an
authenticated session and a guessable password; default configuration (rate
limiting off).
Fix
- An always-on failed-attempt limiter, keyed by user, on TOTP disable/enable/enroll,
- Require a current TOTP code to disable TOTP, counted via `HandleFailedTOTPAuth`.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gocode.vikunja.io/api |
Sin parche | — | — | v0.24.6 afectada |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-49pj-52x6-8gpjLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
