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GHSA-4F6C-2VVP-GW82

Langflow: IP Spoofing Bypass via `X-Forwarded-For` Allowing Remote Configuration Write

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -76 d de la divulgación
Exposición44 dDesde la divulgación, 7 oct 2026, 11:18 a. m.
Detección40 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 1.10.3
Monitoreo
Detectada
23 jul 26
7 oct 26
15 oct 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
23 jul 26
22 ago 26
21 sept 26
21 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 1.10.3 langflow · -76 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-4F6C-2VVP-GW82 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Description:
### Summary
An IP spoofing vulnerability in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) configuration installation endpoint (`POST /api/v1/mcp/project/{project_id}/install`) allowed authenticated remote attackers to bypass the "local-only" access restriction. By sending a spoofed `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1` header, an attacker could make the server treat the request as originating from localhost, letting them write/overwrite an MCP client configuration file on the server's filesystem.

### Details
The vulnerability lived in the `get_client_ip` helper, used to enforce the local-only gate for `install_mcp_config`. It trusted the leftmost (fully client-controlled) entry of `X-Forwarded-For` unconditionally, with no check for whether the request had actually passed through a trusted proxy.

Vulnerable code (introduced by commit `d3d06be8e5`, first released in v1.5.0): `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/mcp_projects.py`

def get_client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
    # Check for X-Forwarded-For header (common when behind proxies)
    forwarded_for = request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For")
    if forwarded_for:
        # The client IP is the first one in the list
        return forwarded_for.split(",")[0].strip()
    if request.client:
        return request.client.host
    return "255.255.255.255"


@router.post("/{project_id}/install")
async def install_mcp_config(
    project_id: UUID,
    body: MCPInstallRequest,        # {client: str, transport: "sse" | "streamablehttp" | None}
    request: Request,
    current_user: CurrentActiveMCPUser,
):
    client_ip = get_client_ip(request)
    if not is_local_ip(client_ip):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="MCP configuration can only be installed from a local connection")
    ...

Correction vs. the original report: the request body accepted by this endpoint is `MCPInstallRequest {client: str, transport: str | None}` (`src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/schemas/__init__.py`). There is no `mcp_path` field, and the destination path is never attacker-supplied. `install_mcp_config` resolves the write target itself, via `get_config_path(body.client)`, to one of a fixed, small set of well-known per-OS developer-tool config paths under the server process's home directory: `~/.cursor/mcp.json` (Cursor), `~/.codeium/windsurf/mcp_config.json` (Windsurf), or the Claude Desktop config (`~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json` on macOS, `%APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json` on Windows/WSL). The impact is therefore "attacker-influenced content written into one of these fixed files," not an arbitrary-path write.

### PoC
1. Authenticate to obtain a valid access token.
2. Identify a `project_id` the attacker has access to.
3. Send:
```bash
curl -X POST "http://<server-ip>:7860/api/v1/mcp/project/<project_id>/install" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" \
-H "X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"client": "cursor"}'
```
4. The server returns `200 OK` and writes/overwrites `~/.cursor/mcp.json` on the host with an attacker-influenced MCP server entry, despite the request originating from a remote, non-local address.

### Impact
Authenticated Remote Configuration Write to one of a fixed set of IDE/MCP client config files on the host. Could be leveraged to:
- Inject a malicious MCP server definition into Cursor/Windsurf/Claude Desktop config, so a local developer who later opens that IDE on the host connects to an attacker-controlled MCP server.
- Disrupt or corrupt the existing MCP configuration for those tools.
- Bypass an intended network-boundary control ("local-only").

### Status: already fixed
This exact bypass (single-line, comma-separated `X-Forwarded-For` spoofing, default configuration) is fixed as of:
- Fix PR: langflow-ai/langflow#13915 — "fix(security): stop trusting X-Forwarded-For for the MCP install locality check", landed as part of the broader hardening effort in langflow-ai/langflow#13530.
- Fix: `get_client_ip` now uses the real TCP peer (`request.client.host`) by default and ignores `X-Forwarded-For` entirely unless the operator has explicitly opted in via the `rate_limit_trust_proxy` setting (default `False`); when opted in, it takes the rightmost entry, mirroring `langflow.services.rate_limit.service.get_client_ip`.
- Released in: v1.11.0, and backported to v1.10.3 (langflow-ai/langflow#14071).
- Related follow-up: a narrower, related bypass — reachable only when an operator has explicitly set `rate_limit_trust_proxy=true` behind a proxy that emits `X-Forwarded-For` as repeated header lines rather than a single comma-separated line (e.g. HAProxy's `option forwardfor`) — was separately closed by langflow-ai/langflow#14425, released in v1.11.3. This does not affect default deployments (`rate_limit_trust_proxy` defaults to `False`).
- This report is a near-duplicate of GHSA-qvvj-g573-9638, which describes the same root cause and is fixed by the same PR.

### Affected versions
- The vulnerable endpoint/helper was introduced in v1.5.0 (langflow-ai/langflow#8271, "add one click install to mcp servers on specific clients", 2025-07-08). Versions prior to v1.5.0 do not contain this endpoint and are not affected by this issue.
- Vulnerable: >= 1.5.0, < 1.10.3 (and < 1.11.0 on mainline).
- Fixed: v1.10.3 (backport) and v1.11.0 onward.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
langflow≥ 1.5.0 < 1.10.3
1.5.0
1.10.3
1.13.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypilangflow
Corregida 1.10.3 -76 d 1.13.2 no afectada
Versiones corregidas1.10.3
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105741
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-4f6c-2vvp-gw82
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/13915
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/1f39a4b9d62c9dfa1b21fa7f85e23a180c351b72
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/94859df33acd70b2a1f816e26d68f5e89a7e5639
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow
Otrahttps://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/v1.10.3

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