llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · azuracast/azuracast

GHSA-4H6M-RRXM-7W3M

SSRF via Station Remote Relay URL — no host/IP validation at all

Sin parche publicado
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
7.1
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición104 dDesde la divulgación, 7 ago 2026, 3:33 p. m.
Detección102 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
7 ago 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
7 ago 26
2 sept 26
28 sept 26
24 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-4H6M-RRXM-7W3M divulgada · CVSS 7.1 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

## Summary
A station "Remote Relay" URL (used by AzuraCast to periodically poll an external Icecast/Shoutcast-style server for Now Playing / listener statistics) is validated only for URL syntax and scheme (`http`/`https`). Unlike the Webhook feature (see companion advisory), there is no host/IP restriction whatsoever — not even the partial link-local check present elsewhere. A user holding only the station-scoped `RemoteRelays` permission can point this at any internal/loopback/private address and the server will automatically and repeatedly fetch it in the background.

## Details
`backend/src/Entity/StationRemote.php`:

public function getUrlAsUri(): UriInterface
{
    return Utilities\Urls::parseUserUrl(
        $this->url,
        'Remote Relay ' . $this->__toString() . ' URL'
    );
}

`Utilities\Urls::parseUserUrl()` (`backend/src/Utilities/Urls.php`) only checks that the scheme is `http`/`https` and normalizes the URI — no IP/hostname check of any kind is performed anywhere in this code path.

`backend/src/Radio/Remote/AbstractRemote.php`:

public function getNowPlayingAsync(StationRemote $remote, bool $includeClients = false): PromiseInterface
{
    $npAdapter = $this->adapterFactory->getAdapter($adapterType, $remote->url);
    ...
    return $npAdapter->getNowPlayingAsync($remote->mount, $includeClients)->then(...);
}

This is invoked as part of AzuraCast's periodic background sync for any station with a configured Remote Relay, meaning the SSRF request is issued automatically and repeatedly (not just once on save), without further interaction from the attacker.

Configuring a Remote Relay requires only the station-scoped `StationPermissions::RemoteRelays` permission (`backend/config/routes/api_station.php`: `Middleware\Permissions(StationPermissions::RemoteRelays, true)`), not a full/global administrator role.

## Proof of Concept
Verified via static code tracing (no live AzuraCast instance was started for this specific finding): `Urls::parseUserUrl()` was read in full and contains no IP/hostname-restriction logic of any kind — confirmed by inspection of `backend/src/Utilities/Urls.php` (reproduced in full below), which is the *only* validation function in the call chain from `StationRemote::getUrlAsUri()` to the outbound HTTP request.

public static function getUri(?string $url, bool $mustBeAbsolute = true): UriInterface
{
    // ... trims, defaults scheme to http/https, normalizes path/port ...
    if (!in_array($uri->getScheme(), ['', 'http', 'https'], true)) {
        throw new RuntimeException('Invalid URL scheme.');
    }
    return $uri;
}

No call to `IP::create()`, `isLinkLocal()`, or any equivalent appears anywhere in this file or in `StationRemote.php`. This can be confirmed by setting a Remote Relay URL to `http://127.0.0.1:<internal-port>/` or `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` on a test station and observing that it is accepted and the periodic sync task issues the request (background job `App\Sync\Task\*` invoking `AbstractRemote::getNowPlayingAsync`) rather than being rejected at save time.

## Impact
A user with only the narrow `RemoteRelays` station permission (not a full server administrator) can cause the AzuraCast server to repeatedly and automatically issue outbound HTTP requests to any loopback, internal-network, or cloud-metadata address, with no bypass technique required (unlike the Webhook SSRF, there is no filter to defeat at all). This enables internal network reconnaissance and interaction with internal-only services from a low-privilege, single-station-scoped account.

## Suggested Fix
Apply the same centralized SSRF protection recommended in the companion Webhook advisory to `Utilities\Urls` (or a shared validator used by both `StationRemote` and the Webhook connectors), covering loopback, RFC1918 private ranges, link-local, and IPv6 equivalents, with the check performed against the actually-resolved IP (not skipped for hostnames).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
azuracast/azuracasttodas
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistazuracast/azuracast
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-4h6m-rrxm-7w3m

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.