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Advisory · GitHub · Maven · com.arcadedb:arcadedb-grpcw

GHSA-4MMV-84CQ-WPC5

ArcadeDbGrpcAdminService.getDatabaseInfo reads schema and per-type record counts without binding the authenticated principal, the shape the sibling handler's own comment forbids

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CVSS
—
low
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a 2 d de la divulgación
Exposición15 dDesde la divulgación, 4 nov 2026, 4:25 p. m.
Detección13 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 26.11.1
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
4 nov 26
6 nov 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
4 nov 26
8 nov 26
12 nov 26
16 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-4MMV-84CQ-WPC5 divulgada
Remediación Parche 26.11.1 com.arcadedb:arcadedb-grpcw · 2 d desde divulgación
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Found during a routine audit of main at 0d9d8ce189. Reported privately per SECURITY.md.

Scoped honestly up front: this discloses AGGREGATE COUNTS ONLY, not type contents or record data, so it is an information disclosure across the per-type ACL boundary and not an escalation. It is a code reading, not a run; we did not drive a gRPC client against it.

ArcadeDbGrpcAdminService.getDatabaseInfo reads the schema and counts the records of every type without binding the authenticated principal, which is the shape the sibling handler's own comment forbids

SEVERITY: LOW to MEDIUM (aggregate information disclosure across a per-type ACL boundary)

The neighbouring handler in the same file states the rule and the reason:

// This reproduces the ACCESS-CONTROL half of checkAuthorizationOnDatabase and not its other half,
// which binds the authenticated principal onto the database's DatabaseContext so the engine's
// per-type ACL layer enforces (GHSA-c23x-pqcj-7hfm). Safe here, and only here, because progress is
// answered from the OperationProgressRegistry: no database is opened, no record or type is read, so
// there is no per-type decision for a bound principal to inform. DO NOT copy this shape into a gRPC
// handler that touches data - that handler needs the binding too, or it reopens that advisory.

grpcw/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/server/grpc/ArcadeDbGrpcAdminService.java:428-441 (getProgress).

getDatabaseInfo, lines 340-396 of the same file (declared at line 340), has exactly that shape and does touch data: it
opens the database (line 357, getDatabaseForClient), reads Schema.getTypes() and
Schema.getIndexes(), and counts the records of every type through
approximateRecordCount/LocalDatabase.countType. Its only gate is
user.canAccessToDatabase(name) at line 350. There is no DatabaseUserContext.runAs and no
DatabaseContext.setCurrentUser anywhere in the file; a grep for both names across grpcw/src/main
returns only ArcadeDbGrpcService:5830 and :6308, both in the data plane service.

Why that matters, in the data plane service's own words
(grpcw/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/server/grpc/ArcadeDbGrpcService.java:6282-6296 (lines 6291-6292)): the engine's
per-user gates "are deliberate no-ops when no user is bound ... A command-executing thread that
never binds therefore runs entirely ungated (GHSA-p29f-345w-4qwf)".

Consequence, scoped honestly: the response carries aggregate numbers only (classes, indexes,
records, graph/document), not type names or record contents. So an account granted a database but
restricted by a per-type read ACL learns the total record count and type count including the types
it may not read. For a TIMESERIES type the gap is explicit, since
LocalTimeSeriesType.requireEngine(ACCESS) exists precisely to apply the per-type check that
countType would otherwise skip, and nothing here is in a position to apply it. This is an
information disclosure across the ACL boundary, not an escalation: no handler in this file writes
through the unbound context.

Fix: wrap the body of getDatabaseInfo in DatabaseUserContext.runAs for the authenticated
principal, as SchemaInfo and the HTTP handlers do. Note that this alone is not enough, because the
four catch(Throwable ignore) blocks documented in the third finding above would then convert each
per-type refusal into a silently smaller number. Both have to change together.

Guarantee: the invariant is that no gRPC handler reaches a database without a bound principal. The
structural change is to make the binding the only way to get a Database in this service, that is,
to replace the openDatabase(name) helper at lines 1478-1480 with one that returns the database
only inside a runAs scope, so a handler that wants a database cannot obtain an unbound one. The
census test should enumerate the service's RPC methods by reflection over the generated base class
and assert that each one that resolves a database does so through that helper, rather than
checking a hand-written list of handler names.

Reproduction status: not executed. I read the two handlers, confirmed the absence of any binding
call in the module by grep, and read the two advisory comments quoted above. I did not stand up a
gRPC server with a restricted account.

Dedup: #7304 gave getDatabaseInfo its canAccessToDatabase gate; GHSA-c23x-pqcj-7hfm and
GHSA-p29f-345w-4qwf are the two advisories the comments name. Nothing in alltitles.txt covers the
missing binding in this handler.

One note on the fix order

Adding the principal binding alone is not sufficient. The same handler counts behind four catch(Throwable ignore) blocks, which we are reporting separately and publicly as an ordinary diagnosability defect. With the binding added and those catches left in place, every per-type refusal would be converted into a silently smaller number rather than an error, so the two changes belong together.

---

Update, 2026-10-31, re-checked at main 4e6cd888f7

Unchanged at HEAD. A separate audit pass reached this handler independently and added one thing we did not have when we first reported it, which narrows the claim rather than widening it.

The blast radius, checked rather than assumed

We said this discloses aggregate counts only. That is right, and the reason is worth stating because it bears on how you fix it: `LocalDatabase.countType` applies no per-type check for a regular document type. So today the only concrete disclosure to a caller denied read on a type is a TimeSeries type's sample count, which goes through `requireEngine` and is the one count that is gated. We did not reproduce that case.

Why that makes it worth fixing rather than closing

The handler's correctness currently rests on the engine happening not to enforce a per-type check on that path, not on anything the handler does. If a future change gives `countType` a per-type gate, as the TimeSeries path already has, this handler starts disclosing counts across the ACL boundary without anyone editing it. The comment eighty lines below it already says the binding is what stands between this shape and the advisory it names; today that binding is simply absent and nothing has needed it yet.

So the ask is unchanged and the urgency is low: bind the principal here as the sibling handlers do, so the guarantee is a property of the handler rather than of what the engine currently does not check. And, as we noted when first reporting this, adding the binding alone is not sufficient while the catches in the same method convert a refusal into a silently smaller number.

Related advisories

This issue is tracked together with GHSA-vpxw-wqc5-hvvj https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/security/advisories/GHSA-vpxw-wqc5-hvvj, which carries the CVE identifier for the group.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
com.arcadedb:arcadedb-grpcw≤ 26.10.2
26.10.2
26.11.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
mavencom.arcadedb:arcadedb-grpcw
Corregida 26.11.1 2 d 26.11.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas26.11.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/security/advisories/GHSA-4mmv-84cq-wpc5

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