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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav

GHSA-4QVF-3FR5-MPQ8

Publishers and read-only user managers can read account password hashes, 2FA secrets and reset tokens

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión2.2.18
Exposición21 dDesde la divulgación, 31 oct 2026, 4:05 p. m.
Detección18 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (alta) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
31 oct 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
31 oct 26
6 nov 26
11 nov 26
16 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-4QVF-3FR5-MPQ8 divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Grav hides account password hashes, 2FA secrets and pending reset tokens when it serializes an account to JSON, but several other ways of reading an account object still return them. A page editor (publisher) can put a Flex form on a page that prints the super admin's password hash and 2FA secret. An account that only holds `api.access` and `admin.users.read` can read other accounts' pending password reset tokens through the Flex API. Either is enough to take over the super admin account, the second whenever outgoing mail is configured. This is a gap left by the fix for GHSA-gq3g-666w-7h85, which filtered only `jsonSerialize()`.

Affected versions

Grav 2.x from 2.0.0 up to and including 2.2.17. The form path dates from Grav 1.6.0. Grav 1.7 has no `jsonSerialize()` filter at all, but the publisher and admin-grant routes are not eligible for a 1.7 release, and the reset token route depends on the Grav 2 API plugin.

Details

The Flex user object has no `getFormValue()` override, so a Flex form bound to an account takes its field values from the unfiltered object. `UserObject::jsonSerialize()` and `DataUser\User::jsonSerialize()` remove only `hashed_password`, `secret` and `twofa_secret`, so the pending `reset` token and the `email_change_cancel_token` stay in the output. `DataUser\User` also has no `toArray()` override, so the toolbox export returns the raw items. The Login plugin's profile template calls `form.setAllData(grav.user.toArray)`, and its `2fa_secret` field template reads `twofa_secret` straight from `form.object` and prints it whatever the form value is.

Two routes were confirmed. First, a publisher builds a page with a Flex form for the `user-accounts` directory and the super admin's bcrypt hash appears in the form. The reproducer shows this both for an account with `admin.users.read` and anonymously, because the Flex Objects plugin's `authorizePage()` returns early when the last Flex form on a page names a directory it does not know, which skips the access check. Second, the API plugin stores the plain `reset` token when a reset is requested (after the `plugins.email.from` check), and the Flex API returns the object's `jsonSerialize()` output, so `admin.users.read` yields the token and with it the super admin account. The second route was checked against the code but not run.

Impact

A publisher, or an account with only read access to the user directory, can read other accounts' password hashes, 2FA secrets and reset tokens. That is enough to take over the super admin account. The first route needs page edit rights and no mail, the second needs a granted `admin.users.read` and working outgoing mail.

Patches

Fixed in Grav 2.2.18. Core now strips a single list of secret fields (`hashed_password`, `secret`, `twofa_secret`, `reset` and `email_change_cancel_token`) from both `jsonSerialize()` implementations and from the values a Flex form reads, and `DataUser\User::toArray()` returns the filtered output. Update the Flex Objects plugin to 1.4.18 as well: `authorizePage()` now checks every Flex form on a page and denies a form whose directory is unknown or missing. Update the Login plugin to 3.11.2 too: the `2fa_secret` field renders the secret and its QR code only when the form's object is the account of the member viewing it.

Credits

Discovered by Anthropic's OSS Scanner (ANT-2026-BSAT03KM).

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav≥ 2.0.0 < 2.2.18
2.0.0
2.2.18
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav
Corregida 2.2.18 — —
Versiones corregidas2.2.18
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-4qvf-3fr5-mpq8

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