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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav

GHSA-4V9Q-P283-QC2M

Grav: Unauthenticated Path Traversal via Missing Directory-Boundary Check in `plugin-asset-map.php` Static Asset Server (`index.php`)

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión2.0.15
Exposición64 dDesde la divulgación, 17 sept 2026, 3:43 p. m.
Detección60 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (alta) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Medio riesgo, cero excusas.Revisa si tu versión cae en el rango. Te espero.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
17 sept 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
17 sept 26
4 oct 26
20 oct 26
5 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-4V9Q-P283-QC2M divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Verified against: `getgrav/grav` devel branch, `GRAV_VERSION = "2.0.15"`, file `index.php

## Title
Unauthenticated Path Traversal via Missing Directory-Boundary Check in `plugin-asset-map.php` Static Asset Server (`index.php`)

## Product / Affected Versions
- Product: `getgrav/grav`
- File: `index.php` (top-level front controller, runs before Grav itself boots)
- Confirmed present in: devel branch, 2.0.15
- Precondition: requires `user/config/plugin-asset-map.php` to exist and contain at least one route-prefix mapping ,this is an opt-in mechanism (per the code comment: "Fast static asset serving for plugins that bundle SPA apps"). No core mechanism generates this file automatically; it's created by a plugin that opts into this fast-path. Not reachable on a stock Grav install with no such plugin. Where reachable, it requires zero authentication.

## CWE
CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') , specific mechanism: a path-prefix containment check performed with plain string comparison (`str_starts_with`) instead of a directory-boundary-aware comparison, allowing escape into any sibling path whose name happens to extend the base directory's name as a string.

Description

`index.php` implements a fast-path static file server that runs *before* Grav's own routing/security stack, gated on the presence of an asset-map file:

$assetMapFile = __DIR__ . '/user/config/plugin-asset-map.php';
if (is_file($assetMapFile)) {
    $assetMap = require $assetMapFile;
    foreach ($assetMap as $routePrefix => $diskPath) {
        if (str_starts_with($path, $routePrefix)) {
            $relPath = substr($path, strlen($routePrefix));
            $filePath = __DIR__ . '/' . ltrim($diskPath, '/') . $relPath;
            $realFile = realpath($filePath);
            $realBase = realpath(__DIR__ . '/' . ltrim($diskPath, '/'));
            if ($realFile && $realBase && str_starts_with($realFile, $realBase) && is_file($realFile)) {
                // ... serves $realFile directly, with Content-Type inferred from extension
                readfile($realFile);
                exit;
            }
        }
    }
}

`realpath()` correctly resolves `..` sequences, so a naive `../../etc/passwd`-style traversal that leaves the filesystem entirely is blocked (it wouldn't share the `$realBase` string prefix). But the containment check itself, `str_starts_with($realFile, $realBase)`, has no directory-boundary awareness it's a plain string-prefix test, not "is `$realFile` inside the `$realBase` directory." Any resolved path whose string representation merely *begins with* the same characters as `$realBase` passes, including sibling directories that extend the base directory's name (`assets` → `assets-secret`, `assets.bak`, `assets_old`, `assets2`, etc.) a very common real-world directory-naming pattern (backup dirs, versioned dirs, disabled/legacy dirs sitting alongside the active one).

Live Proof of Concept

Setup: the exact code block above, extracted verbatim from `index.php`, executed with PHP 8.3.6 against a realistic directory layout (a plugin's active `assets/` dir sitting next to an unrelated `assets-secret/` dir containing a fake secret):

user/plugins/myplugin/assets/app.js            <- intended, public
user/plugins/myplugin/assets-secret/config.php <- NOT intended to be served
user/config/plugin-asset-map.php:
    return ['/myplugin-assets' => 'user/plugins/myplugin/assets'];

Legitimate request (`/myplugin-assets/app.js`):

realFile: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets/app.js'
realBase: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets'
>>> WOULD SERVE FILE <<<
>>> Content: public asset content

Traversal request (`/myplugin-assets/../assets-secret/config.php`):

realFile: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets-secret/config.php'
realBase: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets'
>>> WOULD SERVE FILE <<<
>>> Content: SECRET_API_KEY=sk_live_totally_secret_12345

`str_starts_with('.../assets-secret/config.php', '.../assets')` evaluates `true` because `assets-secret` literally begins with the characters `assets` there is no separator-boundary check (e.g. requiring `$realBase . '/'` as the actual prefix) to prevent this.

## Trust-boundary framing (per Grav's own SECURITY.md)
This code path requires no Grav account , it runs before Grav even initializes, directly off the raw request path. Per Grav's own stated criteria: *"An unauthenticated attacker can achieve RCE, exfiltrate site data, or gain admin-equivalent control. No Grav account required"* → this matches the CRITICAL bar exactly, for any deployment where the `plugin-asset-map.php` mechanism is in active use.

## Suggested Fix
Append a trailing directory separator before the prefix comparison, or use a proper containment check:

if ($realFile && $realBase && (
    $realFile === $realBase ||
    str_starts_with($realFile, $realBase . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR)
) && is_file($realFile)) {

This is the standard fix for this exact bug class
, ensuring the matched prefix ends exactly at a directory boundary, not partway through a longer sibling name.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav< 2.0.15
2.0.15
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav
Corregida 2.0.15 — —
Versiones corregidas2.0.15
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74907
Otrahttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-4v9q-p283-qc2m
Otrahttps://github.com/getgrav/grav
Otrahttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-path-traversal-via-plugin-asset-map-php

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.