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Advisory · GitHub · Maven · org.omnifaces:omnifaces

GHSA-4W3G-H8RH-9HWJ

Session and view scoped WebSocket push channels are not bound to their owning HTTP session

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
5.9
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche4 versionesPrimer parche a -25 d de la divulgación
Exposición95 dDesde la divulgación, 17 ago 2026, 6:27 a. m.
Detección94 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 2.7.33 +3
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
23 jul 26
17 ago 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
23 jul 26
22 ago 26
21 sept 26
21 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 2.7.33 org.omnifaces:omnifaces · -25 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 3.14.23 org.omnifaces:omnifaces · -25 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 4.7.12 org.omnifaces:omnifaces · -25 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 5.4.2 org.omnifaces:omnifaces · -25 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-4W3G-H8RH-9HWJ divulgada · CVSS 5.9 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The `<o:socket>` WebSocket handshake accepted any client presenting a channel ID which is registered anywhere in the application, without checking that the calling HTTP session owns that channel. A leaked session or view scoped channel ID could therefore be connected to from a foreign HTTP session, or from no HTTP session at all, and would receive every message subsequently pushed to that channel.

Details

A session or view scoped channel ID is minted as the channel name plus a random UUID and registered in an application scoped, session agnostic registry. The handshake's only gate was membership of that registry, which answers "does this channel ID exist" and not "does this caller own it". The documented guarantee that a session scoped channel is restricted to the current session was therefore not enforced.

The channel ID is a UUID and is not guessable, so this is replay after the ID has been exposed to a third party, for example through a shared link, a proxy log, a referrer, or client side script. It is not brute forceable.

Application scoped channels are shared by design and are unaffected.

The same gap exists in the SSE transport (`<o:sse>`, `@since 5.2`), which is tracked separately in GHSA-w3w6-9m25-g88p and fixed in 5.4.3.

Patches

Session and view scoped channel IDs are now recorded on the HTTP session which registered them, and the handshake is refused when the calling session does not own the presented channel ID. Application scoped channels stay unbound.

The same change makes two push limits operator configurable, each defaulting to the previous behavior:

  • `org.omnifaces.SOCKET_ENDPOINT_IDLE_TIMEOUT` (default `0`, no timeout)
  • `org.omnifaces.SOCKET_MAX_SESSIONS_PER_CHANNEL` (default unbounded)

These are hardening rather than part of this fix. Deployments which expose push to untrusted clients should set both.

Upgrade to 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12 or 5.4.2. On Quarkus, upgrade to 5.4.4 or newer: this fix regressed `<o:socket>` on Quarkus in 5.4.2, corrected by #975 in 5.4.4.

Workarounds

None. Application scoped channels are not affected, but switching a channel to application scope in order to avoid this removes the isolation the fix restores.

Related advisories

Four further weaknesses affecting the same releases are tracked separately, each with its own affected range and fix:

  • GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92 — forged combined resource IDs accepted without authenticity check
  • GHSA-7qfp-gggj-2fv4 — script injection through the URL fragment value of `o:hashParam`
  • GHSA-w3w6-9m25-g88p — the same weakness on the SSE transport, fixed in 5.4.3
  • GHSA-3r7q-f6gv-vv3q — unbounded source map cache
Credits

Reported by Daniel Birtwhistle.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
org.omnifaces:omnifaces≥ 2.3 < 2.7.33
org.omnifaces:omnifaces≥ 3.0 < 3.14.23
org.omnifaces:omnifaces≥ 4.0 < 4.7.12
org.omnifaces:omnifaces≥ 5.0 < 5.4.2
2.3
2.7.33
3.0
3.14.23
4.0
4.7.12
5.0
5.4.2
5.5.7
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
mavenorg.omnifaces:omnifaces
Corregida 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12, 5.4.2 -25 d · -25 d · -25 d · -25 d 5.5.7 no afectada
Versiones corregidas2.7.333.14.234.7.125.4.2
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/security/advisories/GHSA-4w3g-h8rh-9hwj

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.