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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/obot-platform/obot

GHSA-57QX-69P6-3W3G

SSRF via OAuth token endpoint

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
7.6
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -11 d de la divulgación
Exposición21 dDesde la divulgación, 30 oct 2026, 7:36 p. m.
Detección19 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Tu yo del futuro te agradecerá revisarla hoy.Ponle fecha: las tareas sin fecha son leyendas.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v0.27.0
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
20 oct 26
31 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
20 oct 26
28 oct 26
5 nov 26
13 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche v0.27.0 github.com/obot-platform/obot · -11 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-57QX-69P6-3W3G divulgada · CVSS 7.6 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

When Obot exchanged or refreshed OAuth tokens for a remote MCP server, it sent the request to the token endpoint advertised by that server's OAuth metadata without applying Obot's outbound network protections. A user able to register a remote MCP server could advertise a token endpoint on an internal address, such as a cloud metadata service or a private-network host, and cause Obot to send requests to it. If the internal service answered with an error status, its response body was returned to the attacker in the resulting error message.

Am I affected?

You are affected if you run Obot <= v0.26.3. Exploiting it requires an account that can add remote MCP servers (Power User or higher), pointing at a host the attacker controls. The attacker can complete the OAuth flow themselves, and no action by another user is required.

Details

The fix for GHSA-jgh3-fggc-mcpm put egress checks on remote MCP connections and OAuth metadata discovery, but the OAuth token exchange and token refresh requests did not get them. They used an unrestricted default HTTP client, which also followed redirects. The token endpoint URL comes from the metadata document returned by the remote server and was never validated, so a server that passed the registration checks could still direct token requests to an internal address. Token refresh repeated the request each time a token expired. Releases before v0.23.0 had no outbound protections for these requests at all.

Impact

An attacker could make the Obot server send requests to hosts on its internal network or to a cloud instance metadata service. When the internal service responded with a non-success status, the attacker could read its response body in the error returned by the OAuth callback; successful responses were not returned. The attacker controls the full destination URL. The request is an OAuth token POST, but because redirects were followed, the attacker's endpoint could also redirect Obot into sending GET requests to internal addresses. The attacker cannot set arbitrary request headers.

Mitigation

Upgrade to v0.27.0 or later. In that release, all OAuth discovery, client registration, token exchange and token refresh requests go through Obot's egress-checked client, which applies the administrator's egress policy (or the server's tunnel, if one is configured) and blocks internal destinations by default. These requests also no longer carry the MCP server's configured headers or the backend-specific egress exceptions used for MCP connections. If a token request has no client configured, Obot uses a strict egress client instead of the default client.

Severity

CVSS v3.1 Score: 7.6/10 (High) — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N`

Credits

The Obot team would like to thank @manus-use https://github.com/manus-use for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with our security policy https://github.com/obot-platform/obot/?tab=security-ov-file.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:H
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
7.3/ 10Alto
Vector 7.3 (fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/obot-platform/obot≥ v0.8.0 ≤ v0.26.3
v0.8.0
v0.26.3
v0.28.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/obot-platform/obot
Corregida v0.27.0 -11 d v0.28.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidasv0.27.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/obot-platform/obot/security/advisories/GHSA-57qx-69p6-3w3g

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.