GHSA-5G9X-QWH5-33X4
djangocms-versioning: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key and Missing Authorization
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-5G9X-QWH5-33X4 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
The `discard` and `edit_redirect` version transitions did not enforce a per-object change-permission check, while the sibling transitions (`archive`, `publish`, `unpublish`, `revert`) all did. As a result a low-privileged staff user could discard (delete) any draft version — and thereby the underlying content object — of content they have no change permission on, and could create an editable draft off any published version, by supplying a version primary key they should not have access to (an insecure direct object reference).
Details
Version state transitions are guarded by `Conditions` objects declared on `djangocms_versioning.models.Version`. Every transition that mutates content carries the `user_can_change` condition, which delegates to the *content* object's own permission check (`Version.has_change_permission` → `content.has_change_permission` / `has_placeholder_change_permission`, with a final fallback to the Django `change_<model>` permission).
Two conditions were missing that check:
# Before (vulnerable)
check_discard = Conditions([
in_state([constants.DRAFT], not_draft_error),
is_not_locked(lock_error_message),
])
check_edit_redirect = Conditions([
in_state([constants.DRAFT, constants.PUBLISHED], _("Version is not in draft or published state")),
draft_is_not_locked(lock_draft_error_message),
])The corresponding admin views authorize only through these conditions:
- `VersionAdmin.discard_view` / `VersionAdmin.edit_redirect_view` fetch the target with the stock `ModelAdmin.get_object`, which is backed by the unfiltered default queryset — no per-user or per-grouper scoping.
- The views are registered with `admin_site.admin_view`, which enforces only `is_staff`.
- `discard_view` deletes the version directly via `version.delete()` and never consults `VersionAdmin.has_delete_permission` (which otherwise delegates to the content admin and honors `ALLOW_DELETING_VERSIONS`).
Because the only per-object gate for these two operations was the `Conditions` list, and that list omitted `user_can_change`, any staff user could invoke the operation on any version by its primary key. The changelist action buttons are disabled in the UI via `check_discard.as_bool` / `check_edit_redirect.as_bool`, but that is a client-side affordance only and does not protect the directly reachable admin URLs.
Impact
- Type: Broken access control / missing authorization (IDOR).
- Who is affected: Multi-editor deployments where staff users hold differentiated per-object permissions.
- Under `CMS_PERMISSION = True`, authorization for these two operations was effectively reduced to `is_staff`, so any staff user could discard or edit-redirect any version.
- Under the default `CMS_PERMISSION = False`, it degrades to the global `change_<model>` permission (e.g. `cms.change_page`) — weaker than the intended per-object check, but not absent.
- Consequence: Unauthorized deletion of draft versions and their content objects (integrity/availability of content), and unauthorized creation of drafts from published content.
Patches
Fixed by adding the `user_can_change` condition to both `check_discard` and `check_edit_redirect`, restoring parity with the other content-mutating transitions:
# After (fixed)
check_discard = Conditions([
in_state([constants.DRAFT], not_draft_error),
user_can_change(change_permission_error),
is_not_locked(lock_error_message),
])
check_edit_redirect = Conditions([
in_state([constants.DRAFT, constants.PUBLISHED], _("Version is not in draft or published state")),
user_can_change(change_permission_error),
draft_is_not_locked(lock_draft_error_message),
])`discard` intentionally requires change permission (not delete): it is treated as undoing changes to a draft.
Upgrade to `djangocms-versioning` `2.6.1` or later.
Workarounds
There is no configuration-only workaround. Operators who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict staff accounts to trusted users, since the missing gate reduces to `is_staff` under `CMS_PERMISSION = True`.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
PyPIdjangocms-versioning |
Corregida | 2.6.1 | — | — |
2.6.1Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/security/advisories/GHSA-5g9x-qwh5-33x4https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/pull/573https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/commit/d8c570daa5f7805e8be51f15545fe77b24c44dafhttps://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioninghttps://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/releases/tag/2.6.1Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
