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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · djangocms-versioning

GHSA-5G9X-QWH5-33X4

djangocms-versioning: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key and Missing Authorization

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión2.6.1
Exposición1 dDesde la divulgación, 18 nov 2026, 4:19 p. m.
Detección52 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
04:19 p. m.
05:10 p. m.
02:30 a. m.
04:19 p. m.
12:51 a. m.
09:24 a. m.
05:57 p. m.
02:30 a. m.
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-5G9X-QWH5-33X4 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

The `discard` and `edit_redirect` version transitions did not enforce a per-object change-permission check, while the sibling transitions (`archive`, `publish`, `unpublish`, `revert`) all did. As a result a low-privileged staff user could discard (delete) any draft version — and thereby the underlying content object — of content they have no change permission on, and could create an editable draft off any published version, by supplying a version primary key they should not have access to (an insecure direct object reference).

Details

Version state transitions are guarded by `Conditions` objects declared on `djangocms_versioning.models.Version`. Every transition that mutates content carries the `user_can_change` condition, which delegates to the *content* object's own permission check (`Version.has_change_permission` → `content.has_change_permission` / `has_placeholder_change_permission`, with a final fallback to the Django `change_<model>` permission).

Two conditions were missing that check:

# Before (vulnerable)
check_discard = Conditions([
    in_state([constants.DRAFT], not_draft_error),
    is_not_locked(lock_error_message),
])
check_edit_redirect = Conditions([
    in_state([constants.DRAFT, constants.PUBLISHED], _("Version is not in draft or published state")),
    draft_is_not_locked(lock_draft_error_message),
])

The corresponding admin views authorize only through these conditions:

  • `VersionAdmin.discard_view` / `VersionAdmin.edit_redirect_view` fetch the target with the stock `ModelAdmin.get_object`, which is backed by the unfiltered default queryset — no per-user or per-grouper scoping.
  • The views are registered with `admin_site.admin_view`, which enforces only `is_staff`.
  • `discard_view` deletes the version directly via `version.delete()` and never consults `VersionAdmin.has_delete_permission` (which otherwise delegates to the content admin and honors `ALLOW_DELETING_VERSIONS`).

Because the only per-object gate for these two operations was the `Conditions` list, and that list omitted `user_can_change`, any staff user could invoke the operation on any version by its primary key. The changelist action buttons are disabled in the UI via `check_discard.as_bool` / `check_edit_redirect.as_bool`, but that is a client-side affordance only and does not protect the directly reachable admin URLs.

Impact

  • Type: Broken access control / missing authorization (IDOR).
  • Who is affected: Multi-editor deployments where staff users hold differentiated per-object permissions.
  • Under `CMS_PERMISSION = True`, authorization for these two operations was effectively reduced to `is_staff`, so any staff user could discard or edit-redirect any version.
  • Under the default `CMS_PERMISSION = False`, it degrades to the global `change_<model>` permission (e.g. `cms.change_page`) — weaker than the intended per-object check, but not absent.
  • Consequence: Unauthorized deletion of draft versions and their content objects (integrity/availability of content), and unauthorized creation of drafts from published content.

Patches

Fixed by adding the `user_can_change` condition to both `check_discard` and `check_edit_redirect`, restoring parity with the other content-mutating transitions:

# After (fixed)
check_discard = Conditions([
    in_state([constants.DRAFT], not_draft_error),
    user_can_change(change_permission_error),
    is_not_locked(lock_error_message),
])
check_edit_redirect = Conditions([
    in_state([constants.DRAFT, constants.PUBLISHED], _("Version is not in draft or published state")),
    user_can_change(change_permission_error),
    draft_is_not_locked(lock_draft_error_message),
])

`discard` intentionally requires change permission (not delete): it is treated as undoing changes to a draft.

Upgrade to `djangocms-versioning` `2.6.1` or later.

Workarounds

There is no configuration-only workaround. Operators who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict staff accounts to trusted users, since the missing gate reduces to `is_staff` under `CMS_PERMISSION = True`.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
djangocms-versioning< 2.6.1
2.6.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
PyPIdjangocms-versioning
Corregida 2.6.1 — —
Versiones corregidas2.6.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/security/advisories/GHSA-5g9x-qwh5-33x4
Otrahttps://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/pull/573
Otrahttps://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/commit/d8c570daa5f7805e8be51f15545fe77b24c44daf
Otrahttps://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning
Otrahttps://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/releases/tag/2.6.1

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