llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · paymenter/paymenter

GHSA-5GMM-HJFJ-8FF7

Paymenter has a credit-refund double-spend race condition in service downgrade (doUpgrade)

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión1.5.7
Exposición63 dDesde la divulgación, 18 sept 2026, 12:58 p. m.
Detección59 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (media) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Agenda, parchea y celebra con un mate.Mi diagnóstico: un ticket y una sonrisa.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
18 sept 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
18 sept 26
4 oct 26
20 oct 26
5 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-5GMM-HJFJ-8FF7 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The service downgrade implementation in `app/Livewire/Services/Upgrade.php::doUpgrade()` executes a proration calculation and a subsequent user credit refund without any transactional safety or database locks. The only concurrency check relies on an unisolated database query checking for existing pending upgrades. Because there is no active database transaction or pessimistic row-level lock spanning this validation and the subsequent credit update, concurrent downgrade requests can bypass the guard simultaneously. This allows a user to trigger multiple refunds for a single service downgrade.

Technical Details

The issue occurs because the application verifies eligibility using an unlocked read operation (`Service::upgradable`) which checks if a pending upgrade row exists. Since there is no enclosing `DB::transaction` or `lockForUpdate()`, multiple requests sent in parallel can all query the database at the same millisecond, observe that no pending upgrade exists, and pass the safety check.

Once passed, each concurrent request inserts its own pending upgrade record and executes `$credit->increment('amount', abs($price))`. Because the balance updates are not serialized against the initial check, the user's credit balance is cumulatively inflated by $N$ times the refund amount for a single legitimate downgrade.

Impact

This race condition allows any authenticated customer with an active, downgradable service to inflate their spendable credit balance to an arbitrary multiple of their legitimate refund amount.

Because the newly granted balance acts as real, spendable store credit, it can be immediately leveraged to settle future platform invoices or provision additional services, resulting in direct financial and resource loss to the operator.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
paymenter/paymenter< 1.5.7
1.5.7
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistpaymenter/paymenter
Corregida 1.5.7 — —
Versiones corregidas1.5.7
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/Paymenter/Paymenter/security/advisories/GHSA-5gmm-hjfj-8ff7
Otrahttps://github.com/Paymenter/Paymenter/commit/a42e7f8bafce054ad70de3a2c2ac94d13579f41b
Otrahttps://github.com/Paymenter/Paymenter
Otrahttps://github.com/Paymenter/Paymenter/releases/tag/v1.5.7

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.