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Advisory · GitHub · npm · probe-image-size

GHSA-5JH3-W3FJ-6758

probe-image-size SVG doctype regex is quadratic (incomplete fix of GHSA-gjj5-9665-rwrc)

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
3.7
Baja
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche el mismo día de la divulgación
Exposición25 dDesde la divulgación, 26 oct 2026, 5:44 p. m.
Detección23 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Si esta te quita el sueño, no es por el CVSS.Riesgo bajo: puedes terminar tu café.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 7.5.0
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
26 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
26 oct 26
2 nov 26
8 nov 26
15 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-5JH3-W3FJ-6758 divulgada · CVSS 3.7 (GitHub)
Remediación Parche 7.5.0 probe-image-size · 0 d desde divulgación
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Filed here at the maintainer's request, in reply to our email of 2026-10-21: one GitHub report per issue. This is one of four separate reports split out of that email, and it stands alone.

Found with AploSec, our security scanner, and confirmed by execution.

## Summary
The SVG header parser rewrite that fixed GHSA-gjj5-9665-rwrc (CVE-2026-104861) introduced a different quadratic regex, in the doctype alternative. An SVG that opens a doctype internal subset and never closes it costs about 120 ms of event-loop time per probe at the 10 KiB input cap, against under 1 ms for a normal SVG.

## Affected versions
- probe-image-size 7.4.0 (npm latest, published 2026-08-15). Default-branch HEAD 64565c3c ("7.4.0 released") is identical to the release, and it is still the latest commit and version as of 2026-10-22.
- 7.3.0 does not have this pattern (it had the parent issue instead). This is a regression introduced by the 7.4.0 fix.

## Details
`lib/common/svg_header.js:32`. The doctype alternative of `PROLOG_RE` is `<![A-Za-z][^[>]*(?:\[[\s\S]*?\][^>]*)?>`. On `<!a[` followed by many `]` and no `>`, the lazy `[\s\S]*?\]` stops at each `]` in turn, and `[^>]*` then rescans the rest of the input before failing, so the match is O(n^2). The other prolog constructs (processing instructions, comments, CDATA, root attributes, whitespace) are linear in the same test.
Reachable through `probe.sync` (`lib/parse_sync/svg.js`) and `probe(stream)` / `probe(url)` (`lib/parse_stream/svg.js`). Both cap the input at `MAX_DATA_LENGTH = 10240`, which bounds the cost per call.

Attacker model: remote and unauthenticated. The attacker supplies an SVG (bytes or URL) to a service that calls probe-image-size.

Proof of concept

const probe = require('probe-image-size')
const hdr = require('probe-image-size/lib/common/svg_header')
const ms = f => { const s = process.hrtime.bigint(); try { f() } catch (e) {} return (Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - s) / 1e6).toFixed(1) }
const attack = n => '<!a[' + ']'.repeat(n - 4)        // unterminated doctype internal subset, no '>'
const control = n => '<!a[' + ']'.repeat(n - 4) + '>'  // same bytes, terminated
for (const n of [2500, 5000, 10000, 20000, 40000])
  console.log('svg_header.parse', n, 'attack', ms(() => hdr.parse(attack(n))), 'ms, control', ms(() => hdr.parse(control(n))), 'ms')
for (const n of [2500, 5000, 10000, 10240, 50000])
  console.log('probe.sync', n, 'attack', ms(() => probe.sync(Buffer.from(attack(n), 'latin1'))), 'ms')

Test environment: Docker `node:22-slim` (Node 22.23.4), `npm i probe-image-size@7.4.0` (and 7.3.0 in `./old` where noted), runs with `docker run --rm --network none`.

Controls:
- The same bytes with a closing `>` parse in 0.0 to 0.1 ms at every size.
- The parent payload `'<a'.repeat(n / 2)` takes 1,794 ms at 50 KB on 7.3.0 and 0 to 1 ms on 7.4.0, so the parent fix works and the harness can detect slowness.

Results (7.4.0):

svg_header.parse  n=2500 7.2 ms | 5000 28.2 ms | 10000 115.5 ms | 20000 453.4 ms | 40000 1816.3 ms   (4x per doubling)
probe.sync        2500 B 8 ms | 5000 B 30 ms | 10000 B 121 ms | 10240 B 123 ms | 50000 B 124 ms (plateau at the cap)
5 sequential probe.sync calls on the 10240 B payload: 611 ms
probe(stream), single 10240 B chunk: 129 ms

A rerun of the exact script above on 2026-10-22, on a faster host (Docker on Apple Silicon), gave the same quadratic growth: 3.2 / 12.9 / 42.6 / 215.7 / 623.3 ms for `svg_header.parse`, and 41 ms for `probe.sync` at the 10240 B cap.
Feeding the stream parser one `>` per chunk does not multiply the cost: a `>` right after the first `]` ends the doctype, so only short, linear re-parses happen (137 ms at 10 KiB with 1-byte chunks).

## Impact
Low. The 10 KiB cap limits each probe to about 120 ms of blocked event loop, roughly 1000x a normal parse. It matters for services that probe many untrusted SVGs, where a sustained request rate turns it into a denial of service.

## Suggested fix
Make the internal subset scan linear, for example `(?:\[[^\]]*\][^>]*)?` in place of `(?:\[[\s\S]*?\][^>]*)?`, or scan the doctype with indexOf instead of a regex.

Zachariah Mithani (zachariah@aplosai.com)
AploSec (aplosec.si)

Credit: Zachariah Mithani (@zachariah-mithani, AploSec)

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
7.1/ 10Alto
Vector 7.1 (fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
probe-image-size≤ 7.4.0
7.4.0
7.5.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmprobe-image-size
Corregida 7.5.0 0 d 7.5.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas7.5.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/nodeca/probe-image-size/security/advisories/GHSA-5jh3-w3fj-6758

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.