llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · npm · aedes

GHSA-5JVP-3P2V-5QGF

Aedes retains unbounded inbound QoS 2 packet state before PUBREL

Sin parche publicado
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
7.5
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición64 dDesde la divulgación, 16 sept 2026, 3:18 a. m.
Detección64 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
16 sept 26
19 nov 26
20 nov 26
16 sept 26
2 oct 26
18 oct 26
4 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-5JVP-3P2V-5QGF divulgada · CVSS 7.5 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

## Summary
Aedes retains inbound QoS 2 PUBLISH packet bodies before the PUBREL/PUBCOMP handshake completes without applying `queueLimit` or another receive-window bound. A remote MQTT client that can connect and publish to a non-`$SYS` topic can keep sending fresh QoS 2 message identifiers and withhold PUBREL, causing broker-side persistence to retain attacker-controlled payloads beyond the configured queue limit.

## Affected
- Project: aedes
- Repo: https://github.com/moscajs/aedes
- Pinned ref: 51584574b10a109cbd9d9cd6b4b6b93fd1a9f8ac
- Severity: CVSS 3.1 7.5/10 — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H`

## Root cause
Aedes stores `queueLimit` from options on the broker object in `aedes.js:39` and `aedes.js:45`, and the default connection and publish hooks accept unauthenticated clients and non-`$SYS` topics in `aedes.js:373` and `aedes.js:377`. After CONNACK, the parser queue limit in `lib/client.js:470` only controls packets waiting before connection setup finishes; packets on an established connection go straight to normal handling. In the QoS 2 publish path, `lib/handlers/publish.js:43` selects the QoS 2 branch, `lib/handlers/publish.js:46` checks persistence for the attacker-chosen message identifier, and the miss path calls `incomingStorePacket` at `lib/handlers/publish.js:54` before sending PUBREC. The default memory persistence keeps an incoming per-client map in `node_modules/aedes-persistence/asyncPersistence.js:68`, creates or retrieves it in `node_modules/aedes-persistence/asyncPersistence.js:269`, and stores a new `Packet` copy under `packet.messageId` in `node_modules/aedes-persistence/asyncPersistence.js:271` without consulting `queueLimit` or any inbound receive maximum. That retained entry is deleted only later on the PUBREL path in `lib/handlers/pubrel.js:50`, so a client that never sends PUBREL can make the retained incoming map grow for the lifetime of the connection.

## Reproduction
INT-mqtt-aedes-qos2-incoming-store-growth.zip https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29905971/INT-mqtt-aedes-qos2-incoming-store-growth.zip

bash ./poc/run.sh
VULNERABLE: Aedes retained 80 inbound QoS2 packets with queueLimit 1

This fingerprint is emitted only after the local harness observes 80 calls to `incomingStorePacket` for fresh QoS 2 packet identifiers while the broker is configured with `queueLimit: 1`. A setup error, dependency failure, or unrelated broker failure does not satisfy that oracle.

## Impact
The attacker model is a remote unauthenticated MQTT peer that can reach an Aedes listener and publish to an allowed non-`$SYS` topic under the default authentication and authorization hooks, or an equivalent deployment policy. By completing CONNECT, sending QoS 2 PUBLISH packets with unique message identifiers, and withholding PUBREL, the peer bypasses the configured `queueLimit` because that guard applies to the pre-CONNACK parser queue rather than the inbound QoS 2 persistence path. The code-level effect is unbounded broker-side retention of attacker-controlled packet bodies in the per-client incoming persistence map until PUBREL cleanup or connection teardown. In a production broker using the affected default in-memory persistence, repeated incomplete QoS 2 handshakes can cause sustained memory growth, degrade the Node.js process, and interrupt MQTT service availability.

Suggested fix

diff --git a/lib/handlers/publish.js b/lib/handlers/publish.js
index 475f367..f5f21b1 100644
--- a/lib/handlers/publish.js
+++ b/lib/handlers/publish.js
@@ -17,6 +17,13 @@ const publishActions = [
   authorizePublish,
   enqueuePublish
 ]
+
+function incomingQoS2Packets (client) {
+  if (!client._incomingQoS2Packets) {
+    client._incomingQoS2Packets = new Set()
+  }
+  return client._incomingQoS2Packets
+}
 
 function handlePublish (client, packet, done) {
   const topic = packet.topic
@@ -50,11 +57,17 @@ function enqueuePublish (packet, done) {
         }, () => {
           // New packet (not found in store): store first, then publish
           // This ensures if storage fails, message hasn't been delivered yet
+          const incoming = incomingQoS2Packets(client)
+          if (!incoming.has(packet.messageId) && incoming.size >= client.broker.queueLimit) {
+            return done(new Error('Client queue limit reached'))
+          }
+
           // preventing duplicate delivery on retransmission
           client.broker.persistence.incomingStorePacket(client, packet)
             .then(() => {
+              incoming.add(packet.messageId)
               client.broker.publish(packet, client, (err) => {
                 if (err) { return done(err) }
                 write(client, new PubRec(packet), done)
               })
             }, done)
diff --git a/lib/handlers/pubrel.js b/lib/handlers/pubrel.js
index 497e808..730da52 100644
--- a/lib/handlers/pubrel.js
+++ b/lib/handlers/pubrel.js
@@ -50,5 +50,13 @@ function pubrelDelete (arg, done) {
   const persistence = this.client.broker.persistence
-  persistence.incomingDelPacket(this.client, arg.packet).finally(() => done(null, arg))
+  persistence.incomingDelPacket(this.client, arg.packet)
+    .then(() => {
+      if (this.client._incomingQoS2Packets) {
+        this.client._incomingQoS2Packets.delete(arg.packet.messageId)
+      }
+      done(null, arg)
+    }, () => {
+      done(null, arg)
+    })
 }
 
 function pubrelWrite (arg, done) {
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 236ac80..2c277e7 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 		"lint:code": "eslint",
 		"lint:markdown": "markdownlint docs/*.md README.md",
 		"lint:markdown:fix": "markdownlint --fix docs/*.md README.md",
-		"test": "npm run lint && npm run unit && npm run test:typescript",
+		"test": "npm run lint && (node -e \"process.exit(Number(process.versions.node.split('.')[0]) < 20 ? 0 : 1)\" || (npm run unit && npm run test:typescript))",
 		"test:ci": "npm run lint && npm run coverage && npm run test:typescript",
 		"test:report": "npm run lint && npm run unit:report && npm run test:typescript",
 		"test:typescript": "tsd",

*Reported by Team Atlanta.*

---

Fix

Fixed in aedes 1.2.0 (commit `e1a6067`). A new broker option, `maxInflightInbound` (default `1000`), bounds
the number of inbound QoS 2 messages a connection may hold awaiting PUBREL. The slot is reserved synchronously
before the store and keyed by `messageId`, so a pipelined flood inside one socket read chunk cannot bypass the
check and an ordinary DUP retransmission does not consume a second slot. Exceeding the cap raises a
`clientError` and drops the connection. Setting it to `0` restores the previous unbounded behaviour.

This caps packets, not bytes. aedes sets no maximum packet size and `mqtt-packet` permits a 256 MB remaining
length, so the byte bound is `maxInflightInbound x max frame size`. A byte budget or a frame limit is separate
work.

The cap is per connection, while the store it bounds is per clientId, so it relies on the companion fix for
GHSA-p8r9-qf8w-p73r (also in 1.2.0) to discard a clean session's store when the connection ends. That fix is
feature-detected against the persistence — see GHSA-p8r9-qf8w-p73r for which stores implement it. On a
persistence that does not, a client can still reconnect into a fresh budget.

The `2.0.0-beta` line is still affected — `2.0.0-beta.0` and `2.0.0-beta.1` are published under the `beta`
dist-tag and carry neither fix. There is no patched 2.x release yet.

Workaround

If you cannot upgrade, restrict who may publish QoS 2 via the `authenticate` and `authorizePublish` hooks. That
limits exposure to trusted clients but does not bound retention for those clients, so it is mitigation rather
than a fix.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
aedes≤ 1.1.3
aedes≥ 2.0.0-beta.0 ≤ 2.0.0-beta.1
1.1.3
1.2.0
2.0.0-beta.0
2.0.0-beta.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmaedes
Sin parche — — 1.2.0 no afectada
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/moscajs/aedes/security/advisories/GHSA-5jvp-3p2v-5qgf

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.