GHSA-5M63-C3QX-WQ8V
Slice operations do not verify that the slice belongs to the permission checked article
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-5M63-C3QX-WQ8V divulgada · CVSS 7.1 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Root cause
The writing slice operations derive the required permission from the article that is passed in the request, while the operation itself acts on an independent slice reference from the same request. Nothing verifies that the addressed slice actually belongs to the article — and therefore to the category — that the permission check was based on.
This decouples the authorization gate from the mutation: a reference to an article the user is allowed to edit is combined with the id of a slice they are not. The check passes on the own article, the change hits the foreign slice.
The same pattern exists in several code paths — deleting, changing the status, moving and, with a matching module/template constellation, overwriting content. The underlying service layer only receives the slice id and performs no ownership or permission check of its own.
For comparison: on article level the authorization is implemented correctly. There the category is derived from the loaded target object. In the slice paths it is derived from the freely chosen article parameter instead of from the addressed slice.
Affected code paths (verified against 5.21.3)
- Content page, slice delete (`content/edit`, `function=delete`) — the category permission is checked against the article from the request, then `rex_content_service::deleteSlice()` is called with the independent slice reference. Requires the module permission for the module of the addressed slice; module permissions default to "all".
- Content page, slice edit (`content/edit`, `function=edit`) — same check, then the slice row is updated through `WHERE id = <slice_id>`. Additionally requires that the module of the addressed slice is allowed in the template and ctype of the attacker's own article, which is the "matching module/template constellation" mentioned above.
- API `content_slice_status` — requires the global `publishSlice[]` permission. The category permission is checked against the request article, the status change acts on the independent slice reference. No module permission involved.
- API `content_move_slice` — requires the global `moveSlice[]` permission and the module permission for the addressed slice. The category permission is again checked against the request article.
- Service layer — `rex_content_service::deleteSlice()`, `sliceStatus()` and `moveSlice()` receive only the slice reference and contain no ownership or permission check, so every caller has to get this right on its own.
Impact
Integrity and availability of other editors' content. An editor with content permission on at least one category can delete, take offline or online, move and — with a matching module/template constellation — overwrite slices in categories they have no permission for. Confidentiality is not primarily affected: none of the paths returns the content of the addressed slice, the editing form only renders slices of the requested article.
The attack requires neither a victim nor a cross-site vector. It is carried out entirely within the attacker's own, regularly authenticated session. The most direct effects are deletion and (de)activation, since those need the fewest additional permissions.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistredaxo/source |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/redaxo/core/security/advisories/GHSA-5m63-c3qx-wq8vLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
