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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · redaxo/source

GHSA-5M63-C3QX-WQ8V

Slice operations do not verify that the slice belongs to the permission checked article

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS 4.0
7.1
Alta
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición108 dDesde la divulgación, 3 ago 2026, 8:57 a. m.
Detección108 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
3 ago 26
20 nov 26
3 ago 26
30 ago 26
26 sept 26
24 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-5M63-C3QX-WQ8V divulgada · CVSS 7.1 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Root cause

The writing slice operations derive the required permission from the article that is passed in the request, while the operation itself acts on an independent slice reference from the same request. Nothing verifies that the addressed slice actually belongs to the article — and therefore to the category — that the permission check was based on.

This decouples the authorization gate from the mutation: a reference to an article the user is allowed to edit is combined with the id of a slice they are not. The check passes on the own article, the change hits the foreign slice.

The same pattern exists in several code paths — deleting, changing the status, moving and, with a matching module/template constellation, overwriting content. The underlying service layer only receives the slice id and performs no ownership or permission check of its own.

For comparison: on article level the authorization is implemented correctly. There the category is derived from the loaded target object. In the slice paths it is derived from the freely chosen article parameter instead of from the addressed slice.

Affected code paths (verified against 5.21.3)

  • Content page, slice delete (`content/edit`, `function=delete`) — the category permission is checked against the article from the request, then `rex_content_service::deleteSlice()` is called with the independent slice reference. Requires the module permission for the module of the addressed slice; module permissions default to "all".
  • Content page, slice edit (`content/edit`, `function=edit`) — same check, then the slice row is updated through `WHERE id = <slice_id>`. Additionally requires that the module of the addressed slice is allowed in the template and ctype of the attacker's own article, which is the "matching module/template constellation" mentioned above.
  • API `content_slice_status` — requires the global `publishSlice[]` permission. The category permission is checked against the request article, the status change acts on the independent slice reference. No module permission involved.
  • API `content_move_slice` — requires the global `moveSlice[]` permission and the module permission for the addressed slice. The category permission is again checked against the request article.
  • Service layer — `rex_content_service::deleteSlice()`, `sliceStatus()` and `moveSlice()` receive only the slice reference and contain no ownership or permission check, so every caller has to get this right on its own.

Impact

Integrity and availability of other editors' content. An editor with content permission on at least one category can delete, take offline or online, move and — with a matching module/template constellation — overwrite slices in categories they have no permission for. Confidentiality is not primarily affected: none of the paths returns the content of the addressed slice, the editing form only renders slices of the requested article.

The attack requires neither a victim nor a cross-site vector. It is carried out entirely within the attacker's own, regularly authenticated session. The most direct effects are deletion and (de)activation, since those need the fewest additional permissions.

Vector CVSS 4.0

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
Requisitos de ataqueAT:N
NingunoPresentes
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaPasivaActiva
Confid. (sistema)VC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (sistema)VI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (sistema)VA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Confid. (posterior)SC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (posterior)SI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (posterior)SA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
redaxo/source≤ 5.21.3
5.21.3
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistredaxo/source
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/redaxo/core/security/advisories/GHSA-5m63-c3qx-wq8v

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