GHSA-5MJ8-GF6M-FHW8
9Router has an Authentication Bypass in Public LLM API via Spoofable X-9r-Real-Ip Header
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 0.5.8 | 9router · -93 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-5MJ8-GF6M-FHW8 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
9router determines whether an incoming request originates from localhost by trusting the X-9r-Real-Ip HTTP request header. This header is intended to be produced and sanitized exclusively by the bundled custom-server.js layer from the TCP socket address. In deployment modes where requests reach Next.js directly (the header is never stripped/regenerated), a remote, unauthenticated attacker can simply send X-9r-Real-Ip: 127.0.0.1 and be treated as a local client. This bypasses the API-key requirement on the public LLM API (/api/v1/*), granting unauthenticated access to the instance owner's configured provider resources.
Affected Component
- src/dashboardGuard.js
- isLocalRequest() — trusts the client-supplied X-9r-Real-Ip header to decide loopback origin
- canAccessPublicLlmApi() — grants access to /api/v1/* when isLocalRequest() returns true, skipping API-key validation
- Verified affected route: GET /api/v1/models
- Product version tested: 9router-app 0.5.4 (Next.js 16.2.9)
## Root Cause
The authorization layer makes a security decision based on a client-controllable HTTP header. isLocalRequest() reads X-9r-Real-Ip and, if its value is a loopback address (127.0.0.1), classifies the request as local. The design assumes this header can only be set by the trusted custom-server.js wrapper (which derives it from the unspoofable socket address and strips any inbound copy). When the application is served without that wrapper, Next.js passes the attacker-supplied header through unchanged, so the trust assumption is violated:
Untrusted Client Input
↓
X-9r-Real-Ip: 127.0.0.1
↓
isLocalRequest() → true
↓
canAccessPublicLlmApi() → allowed (API key not required)
↓
200 OKAttack Scenario
- The instance is deployed in a mode that does not use custom-server.js, and the LLM API is reachable by the attacker (the default bind is 0.0.0.0).
- The attacker sends a normal request to /api/v1/models and receives 401 Unauthorized (API key required for remote access).
- The attacker re-sends the identical request with the single added header X-9r-Real-Ip: 127.0.0.1.
- The request is classified as local, the API-key check is skipped, and the attacker receives 200 OK with the owner's model catalog and ongoing access to the LLM API.
Proof of Concept
### Baseline Request
<img width="1211" height="402" alt="Screenshot 2026-06-19 174727" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/170b635f-1bd6-4dfd-ad85-30a03a9f6f72" />
Exploit Request
<img width="1207" height="816" alt="Screenshot 2026-06-19 174844" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b7b4efde-c071-4aa2-ab13-9bde7c88a7b8" />
The only difference between the two requests is the addition of X-9r-Real-Ip: 127.0.0.1.
## Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach the service can bypass API-key enforcement on the public LLM API and act as a trusted local client. Consequences include:
- Unauthorized use of the owner's configured LLM provider connections
- Consumption of paid API credits / financial loss to the instance owner
- Abuse of upstream provider accounts via the proxy
- Enumeration of configured providers and available models
Remediation
- Do not trust X-9r-Real-Ip (or any X-9r-* header) when received directly from clients.
- Derive the client address for authorization from a trusted transport-level source, e.g. req.socket.remoteAddress, rather than a request header.
- If custom-server.js is required for the security model, fail closed when its trusted marker is absent, and explicitly strip/reject any inbound client-supplied X-9r-* headers at the edge.
- Document supported, secure startup modes so the application is not run in a configuration where the header is attacker-controllable.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npm9router |
Corregida | 0.5.8 | -93 d | 0.5.119 no afectada |
0.5.8Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/decolua/9router/security/advisories/GHSA-5mj8-gf6m-fhw8https://github.com/decolua/9router/commit/efd20be8d81ef2e256a7037f3aa78e6b567b5fd3https://github.com/decolua/9routerhttps://github.com/decolua/9router/releases/tag/v0.5.6Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
