llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · hickory-proto

GHSA-624W-VVWW-XVPW

ancestor-delegation NSEC3 accepted as proof of nonexistence at and below the zone cut

Sin parche publicado
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición78 dDesde la divulgación, 3 sept 2026, 3:41 p. m.
Detección76 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 0.26.2
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
3 sept 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
3 sept 26
23 sept 26
12 oct 26
1 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-624W-VVWW-XVPW divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Remediación Parche 0.26.2 hickory-net · 0 d desde divulgación
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

The validating recursor's NSEC3 handler does not implement the RFC 6840 §4.1 / RFC 5155 §8.3 "ancestor delegation" exclusion. The closest-encloser match in the NXDOMAIN proof selects an NSEC3 by hash equality alone, never inspecting the type bitmap, so a parent-side NSEC3 at a zone cut (NS set, SOA clear) is accepted as the closest encloser for any name strictly below the cut. Combined with covering NSEC3s for the next-closer and wildcard hashes. all three records being entries the parent legitimately publishes and signs, the implementation returns `Proof::Secure` and the resolver serves NXDOMAIN AD=1 for names that legitimately exist in the child zone.

The NODATA direct-match arm has the same defect: it checks only that QTYPE and CNAME are absent from the bitmap, so the same parent-side NSEC3 also authenticates the absence of any non-DS type at the cut owner itself, in violation of §4.1 which permits an ancestor-delegation NSEC3 to authenticate only the absence of DS at its owner. An NSEC3 whose bitmap asserts a DNAME at the owner is treated identically by §4.1 and is affected by the same two defects.

The forged response uses only records that are genuinely signed and publicly retrievable from the parent (the parent already serves the matching NSEC3 on child./DS queries), so no key compromise is required; an attacker only needs to deliver one such response (on-path, via a rogue parent nameserver, by winning a port+TXID race, or simply as a misbehaving authoritative). Because the recursor caches the resulting negative under the (child., NS) key during its delegation walk, every subsequent client query for any name strictly below the cut, and every non-DS apex query at the cut, short-circuits to the cached denial for up to the negative TTL.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
hickory-prototodas
hickory-net< 0.26.2
0.26.2
0.26.3
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iohickory-proto
Sin parche — — 0.26.3 afectada
crates.iohickory-net
Corregida 0.26.2 0 d 0.26.3 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.26.2
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-624w-vvww-xvpw

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.