GHSA-624W-VVWW-XVPW
ancestor-delegation NSEC3 accepted as proof of nonexistence at and below the zone cut
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-624W-VVWW-XVPW divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Remediación | Parche 0.26.2 | hickory-net · 0 d desde divulgación | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
The validating recursor's NSEC3 handler does not implement the RFC 6840 §4.1 / RFC 5155 §8.3 "ancestor delegation" exclusion. The closest-encloser match in the NXDOMAIN proof selects an NSEC3 by hash equality alone, never inspecting the type bitmap, so a parent-side NSEC3 at a zone cut (NS set, SOA clear) is accepted as the closest encloser for any name strictly below the cut. Combined with covering NSEC3s for the next-closer and wildcard hashes. all three records being entries the parent legitimately publishes and signs, the implementation returns `Proof::Secure` and the resolver serves NXDOMAIN AD=1 for names that legitimately exist in the child zone.
The NODATA direct-match arm has the same defect: it checks only that QTYPE and CNAME are absent from the bitmap, so the same parent-side NSEC3 also authenticates the absence of any non-DS type at the cut owner itself, in violation of §4.1 which permits an ancestor-delegation NSEC3 to authenticate only the absence of DS at its owner. An NSEC3 whose bitmap asserts a DNAME at the owner is treated identically by §4.1 and is affected by the same two defects.
The forged response uses only records that are genuinely signed and publicly retrievable from the parent (the parent already serves the matching NSEC3 on child./DS queries), so no key compromise is required; an attacker only needs to deliver one such response (on-path, via a rogue parent nameserver, by winning a port+TXID race, or simply as a misbehaving authoritative). Because the recursor caches the resulting negative under the (child., NS) key during its delegation walk, every subsequent client query for any name strictly below the cut, and every non-DS apex query at the cut, short-circuits to the cached denial for up to the negative TTL.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
crates.iohickory-proto |
Sin parche | — | — | 0.26.3 afectada |
crates.iohickory-net |
Corregida | 0.26.2 | 0 d | 0.26.3 no afectada |
0.26.2Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-624w-vvww-xvpwLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
