GHSA-62CJ-9J72-MFRH
OIDC interactive login accepts the literal "undefined"/"null" as the password for accounts that have none
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-62CJ-9J72-MFRH divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
The embedded OpenID Connect provider's interactive login compared the submitted password against `String(user.password)`. For a `settings.users` account with no `password` property that produced the literal string `"undefined"`, and for `"password": null` the literal `"null"`. Submitting that literal logged the account in and issued an OIDC token. With the default `authenticationMethod: "sso"`, the HTTP API then accepts the resulting JWT, including its `admin: true` claim when the account is an admin.
The sibling HTTP Basic path in `webaccess.ts` already fails closed on a nullish password (see the existing "login fails if password is nullish" spec); the OIDC interaction path did not.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker who knows a username can obtain a token for any account that has no usable password, and use it for HTTP API actions gated on the `admin` claim.
Accounts without a usable password arise in practice:
- the official container image leaves `password` null when `ADMIN_PASSWORD` is unset, with the well-known username `admin`;
- an `ep_hash_auth` entry replaces `password` with `hash`, leaving no `password` property.
This is not a takeover of a default install: `requireAuthentication` defaults to false, so pads are already anonymous, and `/admin` uses the Basic path, which fails closed. The impact is the extra HTTP API surface gated on `admin`.
Preconditions
- `authenticationMethod: "sso"` (the default) with configured SSO clients
- a `settings.users` account whose `password` is missing or JSON null
- a known username
Patch
The credential check moved into `verifyInteractiveLogin` in `src/node/security/OidcProviderSecurity.ts`, which refuses any account without a real string password rather than coercing a missing secret to a literal. Accounts that authenticate through the `authenticate` hook (such as `ep_hash_auth` hash-only entries) are refused on this path, which does not consult that hook. Unit tests cover missing, null and hash-only accounts, and inherited properties such as `__proto__`.
Workaround
Give every `settings.users` entry a real password, or set `authenticationMethod` to something other than `sso`.
Credit
Reported by Wenhao Wu (Southeast University), who supplied a full working proof of concept and an accurate independent severity assessment (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N, 6.5).
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npmep_etherpad-lite |
Sin parche | — | — | 1.8.14 afectada |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/ether/etherpad/security/advisories/GHSA-62cj-9j72-mfrhLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
