llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub

GHSA-633X-9X77-77GF

D - Channel RBAC deny overrides bypassed by bundle promotion API

Sin parche publicado
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
8.1
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición71 dDesde la divulgación, 9 sept 2026, 1:08 a. m.
Detección70 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
9 sept 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
9 sept 26
27 sept 26
15 oct 26
2 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-633X-9X77-77GF divulgada · CVSS 8.1 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Channel RBAC deny overrides bypassed by bundle promotion API

Summary

Capgo's channel RBAC override model lets admins set per-channel allow/deny rules for `channel.promote_bundle`, but the API-key bundle promotion endpoint checks that permission at app scope only. Because `channel_id` is omitted from the permission check, `rbac_check_permission_direct` never enables channel-scope override evaluation and a principal with app-level `channel.promote_bundle` can promote a bundle to a channel where that principal is explicitly denied.

This is a source-local finding against `Cap-go/capgo` commit `de66fa51e7ff2f50283cc1455c3d80ab3eb0ae43`. No live Capgo, Supabase, R2, TUS, or customer systems were tested.

Affected Components

  • `supabase/functions/_backend/public/bundle/index.ts:28-31`: `PUT /bundle` is exposed to `all`/`write` API keys and dispatches to `setChannel`.
  • `supabase/functions/_backend/public/bundle/set_channel.ts:25-28`: `setChannel` authorizes with `checkPermission(c, 'channel.promote_bundle', { appId: body.app_id })`, omitting `body.channel_id`.
  • `supabase/functions/_backend/public/bundle/set_channel.ts:55-66`: the target channel is only validated after authorization.
  • `supabase/functions/_backend/public/bundle/set_channel.ts:89-97`: the handler updates `public.channels.version` for the supplied `channel_id`.
  • `supabase/functions/_backend/utils/rbac.ts:226-269`: omitted scope fields are passed as SQL `NULL`, so omitting `channelId` calls `rbac_check_permission_direct(..., p_channel_id := NULL, ...)`.
  • `supabase/migrations/20260427144331_restore_rbac_apikey_mismatch_and_bindings_priority.sql:52-54`: channel override evaluation is gated by `p_channel_id IS NOT NULL AND p_permission_key LIKE 'channel.%'`.
  • `supabase/migrations/20260427144331_restore_rbac_apikey_mismatch_and_bindings_priority.sql:260-300`: user and group channel overrides are applied only when that channel-scope gate is true.
  • `supabase/migrations/20260427144331_restore_rbac_apikey_mismatch_and_bindings_priority.sql:314-325`: API-key channel overrides are also applied only when that channel-scope gate is true.

Security Boundary

The repository treats channel permission overrides as an intended RBAC boundary:

  • `supabase/migrations/20260204181424_add_channel_permission_overrides.sql:20-24` documents `channel_permission_overrides` as delta-only overrides for channel-scoped permissions.
  • `src/components/tables/AccessTable.vue:76-80` includes `channel.promote_bundle` in the per-channel override UI.
  • `src/components/tables/AccessTable.vue:274-328` persists per-principal `allow`/`deny` rows for a specific `channel_id` and permission.
  • `supabase/migrations/20251222140030_rbac_system.sql:747-752` defines `channel.promote_bundle` as channel-scoped.
  • `supabase/migrations/20251222140030_rbac_system.sql:875-883` gives app developers app-level channel promotion by default; `supabase/migrations/20260204181424_add_channel_permission_overrides.sql:95-108` later extends `app_uploader` defaults with channel promotion too.

Source-Only Proof of Concept

  1. In an RBAC-enabled org, grant user `U` app-level `app_developer` or `app_uploader` on app `com.example.app`.
  2. Create channel `production` with `id = 123` and bundle version `456` under the same app.
  3. As an app access admin, create a deny override:
INSERT INTO public.channel_permission_overrides
  (principal_type, principal_id, channel_id, permission_key, is_allowed)
VALUES
  ('user', '<U uuid>', 123, 'channel.promote_bundle', false);
  1. A correct channel-scoped check should deny:
SELECT public.rbac_check_permission_direct(
  'channel.promote_bundle',
  '<U uuid>',
  NULL,
  NULL,
  123,
  NULL
);
-- expected: false because the channel override is evaluated
  1. User `U` creates a write/all API key. The API-key creation endpoint accepts JWT callers and takes the requested mode from the body (`supabase/functions/_backend/public/apikey/post.ts:10-14`, `42-52`, `99-110`).
  2. With that key, call the bundle promotion endpoint:
PUT /bundle
capgkey: <U write key>
content-type: application/json

{
  "app_id": "com.example.app",
  "version_id": 456,
  "channel_id": 123
}

The route accepts `write` keys (`bundle/index.ts:28-31`). `setChannel` then checks `channel.promote_bundle` with `{ appId }` only (`set_channel.ts:25-28`). In SQL, `p_channel_id` is `NULL`, so `v_channel_scope` remains false and the deny override is skipped. The handler then updates `channels.version` for channel `123`.

Impact

A user or API key that is intentionally denied promotion rights on a protected channel can still deploy a bundle to that channel through the API-key promotion path. For OTA update systems, this is a high-impact authorization bypass: a restricted developer/uploader can push arbitrary web assets to production/stable devices despite an explicit per-channel deny.

This is especially relevant because the same role families that are natural uploaders can hold app-level `channel.promote_bundle`; channel overrides are the only visible control intended to block a specific production channel without removing broader app access.

Suggested Fix

Authorize the exact target channel before updating it:

if (!(await checkPermission(c, 'channel.promote_bundle', {
  appId: body.app_id,
  channelId: body.channel_id,
}))) {
  throw simpleError('cannot_access_app', "You can't access this app", { app_id: body.app_id })
}

Also audit other promotion/write paths that check channel permissions with only `appId` or that update `channels.version` through legacy app-scope RLS. In particular, frontend paths use app-scoped checks in `src/pages/app/[app].bundle.[bundle].vue:74-78` and `src/components/dashboard/DeploymentBanner.vue:97-101`; these can mislead the UI even if the backend endpoint is fixed.

Validation Notes

This packet is based on static source review only. I did not execute Capgo cloud requests, Supabase queries against a live project, R2/TUS traffic, or customer-device tests.

Reporter

Francesco Sabiu

Safety

This report is source-local only. I did not test live Capgo, Supabase, R2, TUS, customer, or device infrastructure.

---

Fix PR (merged)

Intentional fix already on main:
- https://github.com/Cap-go/capgo.app/pull/2067 (merged 2026-05-10) — backend + DB trigger + integration tests
- https://github.com/Cap-go/capgo.app/pull/2093 (merged 2026-05-10) — transaction-scoped `checkPermissionPg` with `channelId`

Re-verified 2026-08-26 on current main: `setChannel` / `PUT /bundle` and other promote paths pass `channelId`; channel deny overrides apply. Regression tests present (`bundle-set-channel-rbac.unit.test.ts`, `[PUT] /bundle RBAC channel overrides`).

Reporter: please verify on current production. Bounty/credit is due only after that verification, per Capgo bounty policy.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

La fuente no informa paquetes ni versiones corregidas.

Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/Cap-go/capgo.app/security/advisories/GHSA-633x-9x77-77gf

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.