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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav

GHSA-679V-CH4Q-94QM

Accounts with list access can delete Flex objects and take over the site

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión2.2.18
Exposición21 dDesde la divulgación, 31 oct 2026, 4:05 p. m.
Detección18 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (alta) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
31 oct 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
31 oct 26
6 nov 26
11 nov 26
16 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-679V-CH4Q-94QM divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Sorting a Flex collection by the field name `delete` deletes the objects being sorted. An account that may only list user accounts (`api.access` plus `admin.users.list`) can delete every user account, super admins included, with two `GET /api/v1/flex-objects/user-accounts?sort=delete` requests. Once `user/accounts` is empty, the API plugin's first-run setup accepts an unauthenticated request and creates a new super admin. The same field resolution is reachable from page content through the Flex Objects shortcode.

Affected versions

Grav 2.x from 2.0.0 up to and including 2.2.17. The bare-name accessor was introduced in Grav 1.5.0-beta.2 and is present in Grav 1.7. The demonstrated takeover chain runs on Grav 2 with the API plugin, and no qualifying 1.7 reproduction was established, so no 1.7 release is part of this advisory.

Details

`ObjectExpressionVisitor::getObjectFieldValue()` resolves a sort or filter field by trying the accessor prefixes `''`, `get` and `is`. A field that is not a property is therefore first called as a public method under its own bare name. `FlexObject::delete()` checks no permission, so the user object's own refusal to let non-super users delete super accounts is never consulted. The request ends in a 500 after the first comparison, by which point both compared objects are already deleted, and the endpoint's `filters[key][]` parameter lets the caller choose which two are removed. The Flex Objects API accepts the sort field after only a `list` check on the directory. All comparison operators in the visitor use the same resolver, including wrapped fields such as `lower(delete)`.

The reproducer on the demo site shows the list-only account refused by both delete endpoints with 403, then removing all four account files with the two sorted listings, after which setup without credentials returns 200 with `super_admin = True`. The Flex Objects shortcode also passes content-authored `sort=` values into the resolver. A publisher with no Flex permission can delete two objects per page view from any Flex directory shown on the site, and user accounts are only deleted that way when a super admin who is logged in on the front end views the page.

Impact

An account granted only list access on a Flex directory can delete data outside that grant. Against the accounts directory this removes every account, and the reopened first-run setup then gives the attacker a super-admin account. Every path needs a login, and the list-only account has to be granted by a super admin. Without the final setup step the outcome is still the loss of every account.

Patches

Fixed in Grav 2.2.18. Sort and filter fields are resolved as properties first and then through `get*` and `is*` getters, so a field name is never called as a method of its own. Page fields that only exist as read-only methods (such as `route`, `url`, `rawRoute`, `path`, `modified`, `id`, `home`, `root`, `active`, `activeChild`, `permalink` and `filePath`) are mapped explicitly so sorting and filtering by them keeps working. The shortcode route is closed by the same change in core.

Credits

Discovered by Anthropic's OSS Scanner (ANT-2026-PJPOY9MC).

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav≥ 2.0.0 < 2.2.18
2.0.0
2.2.18
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav
Corregida 2.2.18 — —
Versiones corregidas2.2.18
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-679v-ch4q-94qm

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.