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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · pyload-ng

GHSA-68W4-83FH-F2W8

pyload-ng: getUserData/get_userdata exposed at Perms.ANY allow any authenticated account to brute-force the administrator password

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición42 dDesde la divulgación, 9 oct 2026, 12:09 p. m.
Detección38 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
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Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (alta) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
9 oct 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
9 oct 26
20 oct 26
31 oct 26
10 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-68W4-83FH-F2W8 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

`Api.getUserData` (legacy) and `Api.get_userdata` are declared with `@permission(Perms.ANY)` and are reachable at `/api/getUserData` and `/api/get_userdata`. Because `Perms.ANY == 0` and pyLoad's permission check is a bitmask AND, that gate is a no-op: every authenticated account passes, including one holding zero permission bits.

Both methods are thin wrappers around `check_auth()`, which the maintainers deliberately restricted to administrators by omitting `@permission` (no entry in `perm_map`, so `is_authorized()` returns `False` for non-admins). The wrappers undo that protection.

An attacker holding the lowest-privileged account in the system therefore has a clean binary oracle on the administrator password, with no account lockout anywhere in the codebase, and with the 100 req/min rate limiter bypassable by rotating `X-Forwarded-For`.

Affected code

`src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:1446` and `:1464`

    #: Old API
    @permission(Perms.ANY)
    @get
    def getUserData(self, username: str, password: str) -> OldUserData:
        """
        similar to `check_auth` but returns UserData type.
        """
        user = self.check_auth(username, password)
        ...

    @permission(Perms.ANY)
    @get
    def get_userdata(self, username: str, password: str) -> UserData:
        user = self.check_auth(username, password)
        ...

Root cause

`src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:57`

class Perms(IntFlag):
    ANY = 0  #: requires no permission, but login

`src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:108`

def has_permission(user_perms: Perms, required_perms: Perms):
    return required_perms == (user_perms & required_perms)

For `required_perms == 0` this evaluates to `0 == (user_perms & 0)` → `0 == 0` → always `True`. The `@permission(Perms.ANY)` gate therefore admits every authenticated principal regardless of which permission bits they hold.

Contrast with the intended admin-only primitive, `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:1396`:

    @legacy("checkAuth")
    @get
    def check_auth(self, username: str, password: str) -> dict[str, Any]:

`check_auth` has no `@permission`; `is_authorized()` at `api/__init__.py:1430` returns `False` for non-admins. The two wrappers carry `Perms.ANY` and restore access for everyone.

Because both wrappers also carry `@get`, they are placed in `method_map` and are directly routable via `/api/<func>`.

Amplifiers

1. No lockout. There is no failed-login counter, delay, or ban anywhere in the codebase. A failed guess costs the attacker only one PBKDF2 computation.

2. Rate limiting is bypassable. `/api/*` applies `rate_limit(count=100, period=60)` (`src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/api_blueprint.py:25`), which buckets on a fully client-controlled header (`src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:446`):

client_ip = flask.request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For", "").split(",")[0].strip() \
    or flask.request.remote_addr

Rotating `X-Forwarded-For` per request yields a fresh bucket each time. Notably, `is_loopback_request()` in the same file (`helpers.py:288-294`) explicitly treats the presence of `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` / `Forwarded` as untrustworthy — the same guard was evidently not applied inside `rate_limit()`.

Impact

Online brute force of the administrator account leading to full administrative takeover. A successful response additionally discloses the target account's `id`, `name`, `email`, `role`, and `permission` bits.

Proof of concept

Verified against 0.5.0b3, commit `a5b008958`.

Setup: stock instance with admin `pyload`, plus a non-admin user `bob` created with `role=USER` and `permission=0`.

Step 1 — establish that `bob` is genuinely unprivileged:

GET /api/checkAuth?username=pyload&password=pyload   ->  401 {"error": "Access denied"}
GET /api/getAllUserData                              ->  401 {"error": "Access denied"}

Step 2 — the flaw. Same user, same session, `Perms.ANY` gate:

GET /api/getUserData?username=pyload&password=WRONG
  -> 200 {"name": null, "email": null, "role": null, "permission": null, "template_name": null}

GET /api/getUserData?username=pyload&password=pyload
  -> 200 {"name": "pyload", "email": "", "role": 0, "permission": 0, "template_name": "default"}

`role: 0` is `Role.ADMIN`. `get_userdata` behaves identically. This is a perfect yes/no oracle.

Step 3 — measured brute force and recovery. Run as `bob` (`permission = 0`), admin password set to a 2-character value, `X-Forwarded-For` rotated on every request:

attempts         : 667
elapsed          : 39.7s   (16.8 guesses/sec)
429 rate-limits  : 0
account lockout  : NONE - same session authenticated throughout
RECOVERED SECRET : 'zq'   (true value 'zq')   match=True

Step 4 — full takeover with the recovered secret:

POST /login as pyload/<recovered>       ->  HTTP 302  (authenticated as admin)
GET  /api/getAllUserData (admin-only)  ->  HTTP 200  (full user dump)

Measured throughput is 17-47 guesses/sec/thread. The only bound is PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 at 100,000 iterations in `src/pyload/core/database/user_database.py:14`, not any rate limit.

Suggested remediation

  • Remove `@permission(Perms.ANY)` from `getUserData` and `get_userdata`, or drop them entirely — they are legacy compatibility shims, and modern callers already use the admin-only `check_auth`.
  • Structurally: `Perms.ANY = 0` makes `has_permission()` vacuous, so any method decorated `@permission(Perms.ANY)` silently becomes public to every logged-in user. Give `ANY` a real bit value, or handle it explicitly in `has_permission()` as "requires an authenticated session".
  • Do not trust `X-Forwarded-For` unless a trusted-proxy deployment is explicitly configured. Otherwise bucket `rate_limit()` on `request.remote_addr`, or add the same guard `is_loopback_request()` already uses.
  • Add per-account failed-authentication throttling or lockout.
  • Consider `hmac.compare_digest()` in `_check_password()` (`src/pyload/core/database/user_database.py:61` uses a plain `==` on the derived hash, contradicting the "always use compare_digest" guidance two files away).

Notes for triage

There is no `0.5.0b3` release on PyPI. The `develop` branch auto-publishes dev builds (`setup.py:86` appends `.dev<build>` to the `VERSION` file); the newest at time of testing was `0.5.0b3.dev101`. The `Perms.ANY = 0` design is long-standing, but only the `0.5.0b3.dev*` line was verified here — please confirm whether `0.5.0b2.*` and `0.4.x` are affected before finalizing the version range.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
pyload-ng≥ 0.5.0b3.dev1 ≤ 0.5.0b3.dev101
0.5.0b3.dev1
0.5.0b3.dev101
0.5.0b3.dev102
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypipyload-ng
Sin parche — — 0.5.0b3.dev102 no afectada
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-68w4-83fh-f2w8
Otrahttps://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/b99d2a2f06135363ceb0aab16aac5025f138e658
Otrahttps://github.com/pyload/pyload

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