GHSA-69P8-5H7M-23CM
Authenticated users can fetch cross-workspace File rows by known UUID
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-69P8-5H7M-23CM divulgada · CVSS 3.5 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
In ToolJet CE `v3.20.188-lts` and `v3.20.189-lts`, any authenticated user can request
`GET /api/files/:id` with a global File row UUID and receive the stored file
bytes. The route grants the file read feature to authenticated users, looks up
the `files` row only by id, and streams the file data without checking the
parent resource, owner, user, plugin, or workspace that references the file.
The attached local Docker PoC demonstrates a Workspace A user fetching a
Workspace B user's avatar file bytes when the victim File UUID is known.
Details
Tested version:
- ToolJet CE Docker images: `tooljet/tooljet-ce:v3.20.188-lts` and `tooljet/tooljet-ce:v3.20.189-lts`
- Latest LTS tags tested locally: `v3.20.188-lts` and `v3.20.189-lts`
- Local-only Docker environment
- No ToolJet Cloud, public ToolJet instance, customer system, or third-party
Relevant code path:
- `server/src/modules/files/controller.ts`
- exposes `GET /files/:id`
- `server/src/modules/files/ability/index.ts`
- grants `FEATURE_KEY.GET` to authenticated users
- contains a TODO indicating the intended permission model should be narrower
- `server/src/modules/files/repository.ts`
- `getOne(id)` queries `File` only by `{ id }`
- `server/src/modules/files/service.ts`
- streams `file.data` and filename directly
Expected behavior:
- A user should only fetch a file if they are allowed to access the parent
Actual behavior:
- Any authenticated user can fetch an existing global File row by UUID.
PoC
I used only a local ToolJet Docker environment and a harmless marker avatar
file. No public ToolJet instance, ToolJet Cloud tenant, external service,
customer data, arbitrary filesystem read, RCE, persistence, or destructive
payload was used.
Attachment:
- `file-object-idor-20260629.zip`
- SHA-256:
Attachment root:
- `file-object-idor-20260629/`
Key files:
- `file-object-idor-20260629/runtime/run_http_poc.sh`
- `file-object-idor-20260629/runtime/out/summary.json`
- `file-object-idor-20260629/runtime/out/attacker_get_victim_file.bin`
- `file-object-idor-20260629/runtime/out/attacker_get_missing_file.status`
- `file-object-idor-20260629/runtime/out/attacker_profile.json`
- `file-object-idor-20260629/runtime/out/attacker_list_users_a.json`
- `file-object-idor-20260629/evidence-index.md`
High-level reproduction:
- Start local ToolJet CE `v3.20.188-lts` or `v3.20.189-lts`.
- Create a victim user in Workspace B.
- Upload a marker avatar file for the victim user.
- Capture the resulting victim File UUID in the local test database/output.
- Confirm the Workspace A attacker profile does not expose the victim file id.
- Confirm the Workspace A user list does not expose the victim user.
- Request `GET /api/files/<victim_file_uuid>` as the Workspace A attacker.
- Observe `200` and marker bytes from the victim file.
- Request a missing UUID and observe `404`.
Important evidence:
{
"controls": {
"attacker_profile_contains_victim_file_id": false,
"attacker_workspace_user_list_contains_victim": false
},
"positive": {
"attacker_file_response_contains_marker": true
},
"statuses": {
"attacker_get_victim_file": "200",
"attacker_get_missing_file": "404"
},
"confirmed": true
}Impact
An authenticated user can read stored ToolJet File row bytes outside their
workspace/object authorization scope when the target File UUID is known.
The runtime proof uses a victim avatar file. The vulnerable endpoint is generic
and serves global `files` rows used by file-backed resources, so the broken
invariant is broader than avatars. However, the PoC does not prove UUID
enumeration or a direct UUID leak chain.
Non-claims:
- No public ToolJet target was tested.
- No ToolJet Cloud tenant was tested.
- No third-party service was contacted.
- No arbitrary filesystem read is claimed.
- No numeric enumeration is claimed; runtime File ids are UUIDs.
- No RCE, persistence, credential access, or destructive action is claimed.
Relationship to known issues:
I did not find a direct public ToolJet issue or GHSA covering
`GET /api/files/:id` cross-workspace File row access. This report is scoped to
known-UUID File row authorization bypass.
Suggested fix:
- Treat `GET /api/files/:id` as a parent-resource authorization operation, not
- Bind File rows to their parent user/plugin/resource/workspace before
- Add regression tests where a Workspace A user attempts to fetch a Workspace B
file-object-idor-20260629.zip https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29499131/file-object-idor-20260629.zip
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npmtooljet |
Sin parche | — | — | 0.0.1-security.1 afectada |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/ToolJet/ToolJet/security/advisories/GHSA-69p8-5h7m-23cmLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
