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Advisory · GitHub · npm · tooljet

GHSA-69P8-5H7M-23CM

Authenticated users can fetch cross-workspace File rows by known UUID

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CVSS 3.1
3.5
Baja
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición12 dDesde la divulgación, 9 nov 2026, 3:54 a. m.
Detección11 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Ni el pentester más aburrido usaría esto.Te ganaste un descanso. Esta no es urgente.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
9 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
9 nov 26
12 nov 26
15 nov 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-69P8-5H7M-23CM divulgada · CVSS 3.5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

In ToolJet CE `v3.20.188-lts` and `v3.20.189-lts`, any authenticated user can request
`GET /api/files/:id` with a global File row UUID and receive the stored file
bytes. The route grants the file read feature to authenticated users, looks up
the `files` row only by id, and streams the file data without checking the
parent resource, owner, user, plugin, or workspace that references the file.

The attached local Docker PoC demonstrates a Workspace A user fetching a
Workspace B user's avatar file bytes when the victim File UUID is known.

Details

Tested version:

  • ToolJet CE Docker images: `tooljet/tooljet-ce:v3.20.188-lts` and `tooljet/tooljet-ce:v3.20.189-lts`
  • Latest LTS tags tested locally: `v3.20.188-lts` and `v3.20.189-lts`
  • Local-only Docker environment
  • No ToolJet Cloud, public ToolJet instance, customer system, or third-party

Relevant code path:

  • `server/src/modules/files/controller.ts`
  • exposes `GET /files/:id`
  • `server/src/modules/files/ability/index.ts`
  • grants `FEATURE_KEY.GET` to authenticated users
  • contains a TODO indicating the intended permission model should be narrower
  • `server/src/modules/files/repository.ts`
  • `getOne(id)` queries `File` only by `{ id }`
  • `server/src/modules/files/service.ts`
  • streams `file.data` and filename directly

Expected behavior:

  • A user should only fetch a file if they are allowed to access the parent

Actual behavior:

  • Any authenticated user can fetch an existing global File row by UUID.
PoC

I used only a local ToolJet Docker environment and a harmless marker avatar
file. No public ToolJet instance, ToolJet Cloud tenant, external service,
customer data, arbitrary filesystem read, RCE, persistence, or destructive
payload was used.

Attachment:

  • `file-object-idor-20260629.zip`
  • SHA-256:

Attachment root:

  • `file-object-idor-20260629/`

Key files:

  • `file-object-idor-20260629/runtime/run_http_poc.sh`
  • `file-object-idor-20260629/runtime/out/summary.json`
  • `file-object-idor-20260629/runtime/out/attacker_get_victim_file.bin`
  • `file-object-idor-20260629/runtime/out/attacker_get_missing_file.status`
  • `file-object-idor-20260629/runtime/out/attacker_profile.json`
  • `file-object-idor-20260629/runtime/out/attacker_list_users_a.json`
  • `file-object-idor-20260629/evidence-index.md`

High-level reproduction:

  1. Start local ToolJet CE `v3.20.188-lts` or `v3.20.189-lts`.
  2. Create a victim user in Workspace B.
  3. Upload a marker avatar file for the victim user.
  4. Capture the resulting victim File UUID in the local test database/output.
  5. Confirm the Workspace A attacker profile does not expose the victim file id.
  6. Confirm the Workspace A user list does not expose the victim user.
  7. Request `GET /api/files/<victim_file_uuid>` as the Workspace A attacker.
  8. Observe `200` and marker bytes from the victim file.
  9. Request a missing UUID and observe `404`.

Important evidence:

{
  "controls": {
    "attacker_profile_contains_victim_file_id": false,
    "attacker_workspace_user_list_contains_victim": false
  },
  "positive": {
    "attacker_file_response_contains_marker": true
  },
  "statuses": {
    "attacker_get_victim_file": "200",
    "attacker_get_missing_file": "404"
  },
  "confirmed": true
}
Impact

An authenticated user can read stored ToolJet File row bytes outside their
workspace/object authorization scope when the target File UUID is known.

The runtime proof uses a victim avatar file. The vulnerable endpoint is generic
and serves global `files` rows used by file-backed resources, so the broken
invariant is broader than avatars. However, the PoC does not prove UUID
enumeration or a direct UUID leak chain.

Non-claims:

  • No public ToolJet target was tested.
  • No ToolJet Cloud tenant was tested.
  • No third-party service was contacted.
  • No arbitrary filesystem read is claimed.
  • No numeric enumeration is claimed; runtime File ids are UUIDs.
  • No RCE, persistence, credential access, or destructive action is claimed.

Relationship to known issues:

I did not find a direct public ToolJet issue or GHSA covering
`GET /api/files/:id` cross-workspace File row access. This report is scoped to
known-UUID File row authorization bypass.

Suggested fix:

  • Treat `GET /api/files/:id` as a parent-resource authorization operation, not
  • Bind File rows to their parent user/plugin/resource/workspace before
  • Add regression tests where a Workspace A user attempts to fetch a Workspace B

file-object-idor-20260629.zip https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29499131/file-object-idor-20260629.zip

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
6.3/ 10Medio
Vector 6.3 (fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
tooljettodas
0.0.1-security.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmtooljet
Sin parche — — 0.0.1-security.1 afectada
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/ToolJet/ToolJet/security/advisories/GHSA-69p8-5h7m-23cm

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.