GHSA-69R6-7HV4-H9F2
Apollo Router forwards @inaccessible input-object fields and enum values supplied through GraphQL variables
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-69R6-7HV4-H9F2 divulgada · CVSS 5.3 (GitHub) | |
| Remediación | Parche 2.10.5 | apollo-router · 0 d desde divulgación | |
| Remediación | Parche 2.16.1 | apollo-router · 0 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Apollo Router validates GraphQL variable values during coercion against the internal supergraph schema rather than the client-facing API schema. The API schema is the supergraph schema with `@inaccessible` elements removed, and is the schema operation documents are validated against. Because coercion used the supergraph schema, a client could reference an `@inaccessible` input-object field or supply an `@inaccessible` enum value through a variable and have it accepted and forwarded to the responsible subgraph — even though the same reference written directly in the operation document is rejected. This bypasses the access-control boundary that `@inaccessible` is intended to enforce on operation inputs.
### Impact
Operation documents are validated against the API schema, so an inline reference to an `@inaccessible` input field or enum value is correctly rejected. Variable coercion resolved input-object and enum type definitions from the supergraph schema, which still contains `@inaccessible` elements, so variable-supplied values were checked against a superset of the public schema.
A client issuing an otherwise-permitted operation could set an `@inaccessible` input-object field or provide an `@inaccessible` enum value by passing it through a variable. The value passed coercion and was forwarded to the subgraph for execution. The concrete impact depends on what the hidden field or enum value does in the subgraph (e.g. writing internal state, selecting a privileged code path).
Scope: Limited to inputs. `@inaccessible` output fields are filtered on the response path separately and are not exposed by this issue. Deployments that do not use `@inaccessible` on input-object fields or enum values are not affected.
`strict_variable_validation` does not mitigate this issue. Before the fix, affected `@inaccessible` input-object fields were treated as known because they existed in the supergraph schema, so `enforce` mode did not reject them as unknown fields. Affected enum values were likewise accepted during coercion against the supergraph schema.
### Patches
Organizations should upgrade to one of the following releases or later:
* 2.16.1 (latest release line and current LTS)
* 2.10.5 (LTS with support ending September 2026)
### Workarounds
No configuration-only workaround fully mitigates the issue prior to upgrading. Defense in depth for affected graphs:
- Do not rely on `@inaccessible` alone as a security control for settable inputs. Where feasible, enforce authorization or application-level value validation in the subgraph before using an affected input-object field or enum value.
- If a field must never be settable by clients, remove it from the input type in the subgraph schema rather than only marking it `@inaccessible`.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
crates.ioapollo-router |
Corregida | 2.10.5, 2.16.1 | 0 d · 0 d | 2.19.0 no afectada |
2.10.52.16.1Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/apollographql/router/security/advisories/GHSA-69r6-7hv4-h9f2Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
