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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav-plugin-login

GHSA-69VF-MJXW-X79J

sendInvitationEmail() is missing the untrusted-Host-header protection the other three security-sensitive email links have, and require_trusted_host only enforces one of four flows

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CVSS
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low
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición101 dDesde la divulgación, 10 ago 2026, 12:06 p. m.
Detección100 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
10 ago 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
10 ago 26
5 sept 26
30 sept 26
26 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-69VF-MJXW-X79J divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

classes/Email.php's sendActivationEmail(), sendResetPasswordEmail(), and
sendMagicLoginEmail() all call warnIfUntrustedHost() before building their
token-bearing links via Utils::url(), a detection mechanism added for
GHSA-46jp-rc59-w2gc (spoofable-Host-header link poisoning in this exact class).
sendInvitationEmail() builds an equally sensitive, token-bearing link the same way but
never calls warnIfUntrustedHost(). Separately, the stronger require_trusted_host
enforcement (which refuses to send rather than just logging a warning) is wired up for
only one of these four flows.

Part 1: sendInvitationEmail() has no warning at all

// classes/Email.php
public static function sendInvitationEmail(Invitation $invitation, ...): void
{
...
$invitationLink = Utils::url("{$inviteRoute}/{$param_sep}{$invitation->token}", true, true);
// no warnIfUntrustedHost() call anywhere in this function
...
}

Compare with the other three:

grep -n "function send\|warnIfUntrustedHost\|Utils::url(" classes/Email.php

sendActivationEmail(): warnIfUntrustedHost('account activation'); then Utils::url(...)
sendResetPasswordEmail(): warnIfUntrustedHost('password reset'); then Utils::url(...)
sendMagicLoginEmail(): warnIfUntrustedHost('magic login'); then Utils::url(...)
sendInvitationEmail(): Utils::url(...) with no warnIfUntrustedHost() call at all

Part 2: require_trusted_host enforcement only covers the password-reset-request flow

grep -rn "require_trusted_host" classes/ login.php

classes/Controller.php:365:
if ($config->get('plugins.login.require_trusted_host', false) && !Email::isTrustedHostConfigured()) {
$this->grav['log']->error('login: password reset refused because require_trusted_host is enabled ...');

This is the only call site. The other two usages of isTrustedHostConfigured() found in
login.php (lines 1639, 1666) are admin dashboard notice banners, not request-blocking
enforcement. A site administrator who enables require_trusted_host, reasonably
expecting it to protect account activation, magic-login, and invitations given the
setting's name, gets protection for password reset only.

Live, end-to-end Proof of Concept

Built a real Grav bootstrap (config, streams, locator, language), registered the real
Login and accounts services, and called the actual, unmodified sendActivationEmail(),
sendResetPasswordEmail(), sendMagicLoginEmail(), and sendInvitationEmail() functions
under an identical simulated untrusted-host condition (plugins.login.site_host and
system.custom_base_url both empty), capturing all logger output via a real Monolog
TestHandler.

poc.php:

<?php
define('GRAV_CLI', true);
chdir('/path/to/grav');
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
require '/path/to/grav-plugin-login/vendor/autoload.php';
spl_autoload_register(function ($class) {
$prefix = 'Grav\\Plugin\\Login\\';
if (str_starts_with($class, $prefix)) {
$rel = substr($class, strlen($prefix));
$path = '/path/to/grav-plugin-login/classes/' . str_replace('\\', '/', $rel) . '.php';
if (file_exists($path)) require $path;
}
});

use Grav\Common\Grav;
use Grav\Common\User\DataUser\User;
use Grav\Common\User\DataUser\UserCollection;
use Grav\Plugin\Login\Email;
use Grav\Plugin\Login\Invitations\Invitation;
use Monolog\Logger;
use Monolog\Handler\TestHandler;

// no-op stand-in for the separate Email plugin's mail-transport class,
// only invoked AFTER the link-construction code under test
require __DIR__ . '/email_stub.php';

$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] = 'attacker-controlled.example';
$_SERVER['SERVER_NAME'] = 'attacker-controlled.example';
$_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'] = '/';
$_SERVER['SERVER_PORT'] = '80';

Grav::resetInstance();
$grav = Grav::instance();
$grav['config']->init();
$grav['config']->set('system.languages.supported', ['en']);
$grav['config']->set('system.languages.default_lang', 'en');
$grav['config']->set('plugins.login.site_host', '');
$grav['config']->set('system.custom_base_url', '');
$grav['config']->set('plugins.login.route_activate', '/activate');
$grav['config']->set('plugins.login.route_reset', '/reset_password');
$grav['config']->set('plugins.login.route_magic', '/magic_login');
$grav['config']->set('plugins.login.route_magic_login', '/magic_login');
$grav['config']->set('plugins.login.route_register', '/register');

foreach (array_keys($grav['setup']->getStreams()) as $stream) {
@stream_wrapper_unregister($stream);
}
$grav['streams'];
$grav['uri']->init();
$grav['config']->set('system.cache.enabled', false);
$grav['accounts'] = new UserCollection(User::class);
$grav['language']->init();

$login = new \Grav\Plugin\Login\Login($grav);
$grav['login'] = $login;
$grav['user'] = new User([]);
$grav['Email'] = new \Grav\Plugin\Email\Email();

$testHandler = new TestHandler();
$grav['log'] = new Logger('test', [$testHandler]);

$user = $grav['accounts']->load('pocuser');
$user->update(['username' => 'pocuser', 'email' => 'poc@example.com', 'password' => 'Password123!', 'state' => 'enabled']);
$user->set('activation_token', 'abc123::' . (time() + 3600));

function countWarnings(TestHandler $h, string $needle): int {
$c = 0;
foreach ($h->getRecords() as $r) {
$msg = is_array($r) ? ($r['message'] ?? '') : $r->message;
if (str_contains($msg, $needle)) $c++;
}
return $c;
}

$testHandler->clear();
Email::sendActivationEmail($user);
echo "sendActivationEmail: " . (countWarnings($testHandler, 'account activation') > 0 ? 'YES' : 'no') . "\n";

$user->set('reset', 'def456::' . (time() + 3600));
$testHandler->clear();
Email::sendResetPasswordEmail($user);
echo "sendResetPasswordEmail: " . (countWarnings($testHandler, 'password reset') > 0 ? 'YES' : 'no') . "\n";

$testHandler->clear();
Email::sendMagicLoginEmail($user, 'magictoken123');
echo "sendMagicLoginEmail: " . (countWarnings($testHandler, 'magic login') > 0 ? 'YES' : 'no') . "\n";

$invitation = new Invitation('invitetoken123', ['email' => 'victim@example.com', 'created_by' => 'pocuser']);
$testHandler->clear();
Email::sendInvitationEmail($invitation);
echo "sendInvitationEmail: " . (count($testHandler->getRecords()) > 0 ? 'YES' : 'NO WARNING LOGGED') . "\n";

email_stub.php:

<?php
namespace Grav\Plugin\Email;
class Email {
public function send($message, &$failedRecipients = null) { return true; }
}

Run: php poc.php

Real output:

sendActivationEmail: YES
sendResetPasswordEmail: YES
sendMagicLoginEmail: YES
sendInvitationEmail: NO WARNING LOGGED

All four functions ran to completion. The mail-transport stub is only ever invoked
after the link-construction and warnIfUntrustedHost code under test, so it has no
bearing on this result. The three functions with the protection correctly log a
warning under the vulnerable condition; sendInvitationEmail does not.

Impact

On a site that has not configured plugins.login.site_host or system.custom_base_url,
an attacker who can influence the request's Host header (a well-documented technique,
especially behind misconfigured reverse proxies) can cause account-activation,
magic-login, and invitation links to point to an attacker-controlled domain instead of
the real site, the GHSA-46jp-rc59-w2gc class of link-poisoning attack, on three of the
four affected flows, even with require_trusted_host enabled, since that setting only
blocks the password-reset-request flow.

Suggested fix

Add warnIfUntrustedHost('invitation') to sendInvitationEmail(), matching the other
three. Move the require_trusted_host enforcement into Email.php itself, as a shared
guard called from all four send*Email() functions, rather than duplicating a
Controller-level check for password reset only, so future email flows cannot
reintroduce this gap by omission.

Affected component

  • classes/Email.php, sendInvitationEmail()
  • classes/Controller.php, require_trusted_host enforcement (password-reset-request

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav-plugin-login≤ 3.9.1
3.9.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav-plugin-login
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-69vf-mjxw-x79j

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.