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Advisory · GitHub · npm · tooljet

GHSA-6C72-FXVV-XP9F

OAuth URL generation can disclose plaintext workspace secret constants across workspaces

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CVSS 3.1
5.2
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición12 dDesde la divulgación, 9 nov 2026, 6:17 a. m.
Detección11 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Calma, café y gestión de vulnerabilidades.Hoy toca orden, no heroísmo.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
9 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
9 nov 26
12 nov 26
15 nov 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-6C72-FXVV-XP9F divulgada · CVSS 5.2 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

In ToolJet CE `v3.20.188-lts`, any authenticated user can call
`POST /api/data-sources/fetch-oauth2-base-url` and supply request-body
`organization_id`, `environment_id`, and OAuth `source_options` containing
`{{secrets.*}}`. ToolJet resolves the secret constant using the body-supplied
workspace/environment ids and returns the plaintext value inside the generated
OAuth authorization URL.

The local Docker PoC also demonstrates cross-workspace impact. A Workspace A
attacker who cannot switch to Workspace B and does not see Workspace B in the
organization list can still supply Workspace B ids in the request body and
receive a Workspace B secret marker in the returned OAuth URL.

This is not a bypass of the fixed datasource decrypt endpoint. The source is
OAuth URL generation plus organization secret-constant resolution, and the sink
is the returned OAuth authorization URL.

Details

Tested version:

  • ToolJet CE Docker image: `tooljet/tooljet-ce:v3.20.188-lts`
  • Latest LTS tag tested locally: `v3.20.188-lts`
  • Local-only Docker environment
  • No ToolJet Cloud, public ToolJet instance, customer system, or third-party

Relevant code path:

  • `server/src/modules/data-sources/controller.ts`
  • exposes `POST /data-sources/fetch-oauth2-base-url`
  • route is authenticated and feature-gated, but does not bind body
  • `server/src/modules/data-sources/ability/index.ts`
  • grants `GET_OAUTH2_BASE_URL` to authenticated users
  • `server/src/modules/data-sources/util.service.ts`
  • `getAuthUrl()` resolves `{{constants.*}}` / `{{secrets.*}}` using
  • organization constants utility
  • decrypts the matched secret constant value
  • OAuth plugin helpers such as Slack
  • place resolved `client_id` values into the returned authorization URL

Expected behavior:

  • A non-admin or low-privilege user should not receive plaintext secret
  • A caller authorized in Workspace A should not be able to resolve Workspace B

Actual behavior:

  • `{{secrets.NAME}}` in OAuth source options is resolved server-side and
  • The body-supplied `organization_id` and `environment_id` drive the secret
PoC

I used only a local ToolJet Docker environment and marker secrets. No public
ToolJet instance, ToolJet Cloud tenant, external service, real credential,
customer data, persistence, reverse shell, or destructive payload was used.

Attachment:

  • `oauth-secret-constant-leak-20260629.zip`
  • SHA-256:

Attachment root:

  • `oauth-secret-constant-leak-20260629/`

Key files:

  • `oauth-secret-constant-leak-20260629/runtime/run_http_poc.sh`
  • `oauth-secret-constant-leak-20260629/runtime/run_cross_workspace_probe.sh`
  • `oauth-secret-constant-leak-20260629/runtime/out/summary.json`
  • `oauth-secret-constant-leak-20260629/runtime/out-cross-workspace/summary.json`
  • `oauth-secret-constant-leak-20260629/source-semantic-probe/probe-results.json`
  • `oauth-secret-constant-leak-20260629/evidence-index.md`

High-level reproduction:

  1. Start local ToolJet CE `v3.20.188-lts`.
  2. Create an admin and a low-privilege end-user.
  3. Create a secret constant named `TJ_SECRET_MARKER_20260629` with value
  4. As the low-privilege user, confirm the normal constants endpoint returns a
  5. As the same user, confirm the decrypted constants endpoint returns `403`.
  6. As the same user, call `POST /api/data-sources/fetch-oauth2-base-url` with:
{
  "provider": "slack",
  "organization_id": "<workspace-id>",
  "environment_id": "<environment-id>",
  "source_options": {
    "credential_source": { "value": "from_datasource_configuration" },
    "client_id": { "value": "{{secrets.TJ_SECRET_MARKER_20260629}}" },
    "client_secret": { "value": "unused" }
  }
}
  1. Observe the returned URL contains
  2. For the cross-workspace probe, create a victim Workspace B secret and use a
  3. Confirm the attacker cannot switch to Workspace B (`401`) and Workspace B is
  4. Submit the OAuth helper request with Workspace B ids in the body and observe

Important same-workspace evidence:

{
  "statuses": {
    "attacker_masked_constants": "200",
    "attacker_decrypted_constants": "403",
    "oauth_no_org_env": "201",
    "oauth_wrong_env": "201",
    "oauth_missing_secret": "201",
    "oauth_leak": "201"
  },
  "controls": {
    "masked_constants_contains_plain_secret": false,
    "oauth_without_org_env_contains_plain_secret": false,
    "oauth_wrong_env_contains_plain_secret": false,
    "oauth_missing_secret_contains_plain_secret": false
  },
  "positive": {
    "oauth_with_org_env_contains_plain_secret": true
  },
  "confirmed": true
}

Important cross-workspace evidence:

{
  "statuses": {
    "attacker_org_list": "200",
    "attacker_switch_victim": "401",
    "oauth_cross_workspace": "201"
  },
  "controls": {
    "attacker_org_list_contains_victim_workspace": false,
    "attacker_switch_victim_status": "401"
  },
  "positive": {
    "oauth_cross_workspace_contains_victim_secret": true
  },
  "confirmed": true
}
Impact

A low-privilege authenticated user can recover plaintext workspace secret
constants through OAuth URL generation. The local PoC also shows
cross-workspace disclosure when the victim organization id, environment id, and
secret name are known.

This can expose secrets that are otherwise encrypted at rest, masked in normal
constant-list APIs, and blocked by the decrypted constants endpoint for the
same user.

Non-claims:

  • No public ToolJet target was tested.
  • No ToolJet Cloud tenant was tested.
  • No third-party service was contacted.
  • No RCE, SSRF bypass, credential-id decrypt endpoint bypass, persistence, or
  • The cross-workspace variant requires victim organization/environment ids and

Relationship to known issues:

This is adjacent to prior datasource credential decrypt issues, but this report
does not use the removed/fixed decrypt endpoint and does not use
`credential_id`. The affected path is OAuth URL generation plus organization
secret constants, with the plaintext returned in an OAuth authorization URL.

Suggested fix:

  • Do not allow caller-controlled `organization_id` / `environment_id` to drive
  • Bind OAuth URL secret resolution to the authenticated user's active
  • Do not return resolved secret values in client-visible OAuth URL fields.
  • Add regression tests for low-privilege callers, masked/decrypted constants

oauth-secret-constant-leak-20260629.zip https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29491488/oauth-secret-constant-leak-20260629.zip

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:L
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
6.7/ 10Medio
Vector 6.7 (fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
tooljettodas
0.0.1-security.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmtooljet
Sin parche — — 0.0.1-security.1 afectada
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/ToolJet/ToolJet/security/advisories/GHSA-6c72-fxvv-xp9f

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.