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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/obot-platform/obot

GHSA-6FWV-3H4C-37J9

UI-fallback deny list covers /mcp-connect/ but not /mcp-connect-composite/, reopening the GHSA-vw82 authorization bypass

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
8.1
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -22 d de la divulgación
Exposición65 dDesde la divulgación, 16 sept 2026, 9:20 p. m.
Detección63 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Tu yo del futuro te agradecerá revisarla hoy.Hoy es tranquila, pero podría madrugarte.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v0.24.2
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
26 ago 26
17 sept 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
26 ago 26
17 sept 26
9 oct 26
30 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche v0.24.2 github.com/obot-platform/obot · -22 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-6FWV-3H4C-37J9 divulgada · CVSS 8.1 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

The fix for GHSA-vw82-7fv8-r6gp added `/mcp-connect/` to the UI-fallback deny list. The composite route is `/mcp-connect-composite/{mcp_id}`, which does not carry that prefix, so `checkUI` falls through to its final `return true` and `Authorize` short-circuits on the UI branch.

Where it is

`pkg/api/authz/authz.go`, the composition:

return a.authorizeAPIResources(req, user) || a.checkOAuthClient(req) || a.checkUI(req, user)

`checkUI` is an `||` term, so a `true` from it authorizes the request whatever the API-resource check concluded.

`pkg/api/authz/ui.go`, the deny list and the fallback:

func (a *Authorizer) checkUI(req *http.Request, user User) bool {
	// Reject direct access to non-UI routes except for /api/image/{id}.
	if req.URL.Path == "/api" || req.URL.Path == "/v0.1" || hasAnyPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/.well-known/", "/mcp-connect/", "/oauth/", "/debug/", "/tunnel/", "/v0.1/") || (strings.HasPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/api/") && !strings.HasPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/api/image/")) {
		return false
	}
	...
	// did not hit any above conditions, so allow access
	// incorrect routes will handled by SvelteKit error page
	return true
}

The prefix is `/mcp-connect/`, with a trailing slash, so it does not cover the composite path:

path: /mcp-connect-composite/abc123
HasPrefix(path, "/mcp-connect/") = false
path: /mcp-connect/abc123
HasPrefix(path, "/mcp-connect/") = true

Both routes go to the same handler. `pkg/api/router/router.go`:

mux.HandleFunc("/mcp-connect/{mcp_id}", mcpGateway.Proxy)
mux.HandleFunc("/mcp-connect/{mcp_id}/{rest...}", mcpGateway.Proxy)
...
mux.HandleFunc("/mcp-connect-composite/{mcp_id}", mcpGateway.Proxy)

So the guarded and unguarded paths reach `mcpGateway.Proxy` alike.

Confirmed on `main` at HEAD `e6e6002`.

Attacker model

Any authenticated Obot user, Basic role included, who has or can obtain a composite MCP ID. Identical to the anchor advisory, which is what makes this its residual rather than a new class.

Impact

Same as GHSA-vw82-7fv8-r6gp: connecting to and using MCP servers through the gateway without the Access Control Rules that were meant to gate them, including tool calls, regardless of registry membership.

The anchor's own summary puts it as "any User can fully use MCP servers that the administrator believed were restricted to specific groups". That statement is still true through the composite route.

Verification

Code-traced at HEAD, plus the prefix comparison above, which I ran because the whole finding turns on whether `/mcp-connect/` covers `/mcp-connect-composite/` and I did not want to assert that from reading.

I did not stand up Obot, authenticate as a Basic user and proxy a tool call through a composite ID, so there is no captured session. The chain is three files and each link is quoted: the route exists and reaches the same handler, the deny list does not match it, and `checkUI` returning true is sufficient for `Authorize`.

Suggested fix

Widen the prefix so both routes are covered:

hasAnyPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/.well-known/", "/mcp-connect", "/oauth/", "/debug/", "/tunnel/", "/v0.1/")

Dropping the trailing slash covers `/mcp-connect/`, `/mcp-connect-composite/` and anything else added later with that stem, which is the failure mode here.

The deeper issue is that `checkUI` ends in an allow. A route added to the mux without a matching entry in `uiResources` is authorized by default, and stays that way until somebody remembers to deny it. Ending in `return false` and listing the UI paths that are allowed, which `uiResources` already enumerates, would make a newly added route fail closed. That is a larger change but it removes this whole category rather than the current instance.

A test asserting `checkUI` returns false for every path that `router.go` maps to `mcpGateway.Proxy` would pin the immediate case.

Severity

`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N`, about 8.1, matching the anchor's shape. `PR:L` for any authenticated user, and both confidentiality and integrity are high because MCP tool calls read and act.

CWE-863, with CWE-1289 for the prefix-matching gap.

Why I do not think this is a duplicate

GHSA-vw82-7fv8-r6gp is `/mcp-connect/{id}` and its fix is the deny-list entry quoted above, which works: that path returns false from `checkUI`. This is the sibling route the entry does not match. The repository's other advisories cover OAuth dynamic client registration, the unauthenticated registry API, SSRF via remote MCP server URL, and the quickstart Docker exposure, none of which touch the UI fallback.

How I found it and a note on tooling

A fix expressed as a string prefix is worth testing against the actual route table, since routes that share a stem but not a separator slip past. Listing every `mux.HandleFunc` that reaches the gateway handler and checking each against the deny list took one pass and turned up one uncovered path. I used AI assistance while investigating and drafting; the code was read at HEAD, the prefix output above is from a program I ran, and the verification limits are stated in their own section.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/obot-platform/obot≥ 0.21.1 ≤ 0.24.1
0.21.1
0.24.1
v0.28.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/obot-platform/obot
Corregida v0.24.2 -22 d v0.28.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidasv0.24.2
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/obot-platform/obot/security/advisories/GHSA-6fwv-3h4c-37j9

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.