GHSA-6FWV-3H4C-37J9
UI-fallback deny list covers /mcp-connect/ but not /mcp-connect-composite/, reopening the GHSA-vw82 authorization bypass
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche v0.24.2 | github.com/obot-platform/obot · -22 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-6FWV-3H4C-37J9 divulgada · CVSS 8.1 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
The fix for GHSA-vw82-7fv8-r6gp added `/mcp-connect/` to the UI-fallback deny list. The composite route is `/mcp-connect-composite/{mcp_id}`, which does not carry that prefix, so `checkUI` falls through to its final `return true` and `Authorize` short-circuits on the UI branch.
Where it is
`pkg/api/authz/authz.go`, the composition:
return a.authorizeAPIResources(req, user) || a.checkOAuthClient(req) || a.checkUI(req, user)`checkUI` is an `||` term, so a `true` from it authorizes the request whatever the API-resource check concluded.
`pkg/api/authz/ui.go`, the deny list and the fallback:
func (a *Authorizer) checkUI(req *http.Request, user User) bool {
// Reject direct access to non-UI routes except for /api/image/{id}.
if req.URL.Path == "/api" || req.URL.Path == "/v0.1" || hasAnyPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/.well-known/", "/mcp-connect/", "/oauth/", "/debug/", "/tunnel/", "/v0.1/") || (strings.HasPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/api/") && !strings.HasPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/api/image/")) {
return false
}
...
// did not hit any above conditions, so allow access
// incorrect routes will handled by SvelteKit error page
return true
}The prefix is `/mcp-connect/`, with a trailing slash, so it does not cover the composite path:
path: /mcp-connect-composite/abc123
HasPrefix(path, "/mcp-connect/") = false
path: /mcp-connect/abc123
HasPrefix(path, "/mcp-connect/") = trueBoth routes go to the same handler. `pkg/api/router/router.go`:
mux.HandleFunc("/mcp-connect/{mcp_id}", mcpGateway.Proxy)
mux.HandleFunc("/mcp-connect/{mcp_id}/{rest...}", mcpGateway.Proxy)
...
mux.HandleFunc("/mcp-connect-composite/{mcp_id}", mcpGateway.Proxy)So the guarded and unguarded paths reach `mcpGateway.Proxy` alike.
Confirmed on `main` at HEAD `e6e6002`.
Attacker model
Any authenticated Obot user, Basic role included, who has or can obtain a composite MCP ID. Identical to the anchor advisory, which is what makes this its residual rather than a new class.
Impact
Same as GHSA-vw82-7fv8-r6gp: connecting to and using MCP servers through the gateway without the Access Control Rules that were meant to gate them, including tool calls, regardless of registry membership.
The anchor's own summary puts it as "any User can fully use MCP servers that the administrator believed were restricted to specific groups". That statement is still true through the composite route.
Verification
Code-traced at HEAD, plus the prefix comparison above, which I ran because the whole finding turns on whether `/mcp-connect/` covers `/mcp-connect-composite/` and I did not want to assert that from reading.
I did not stand up Obot, authenticate as a Basic user and proxy a tool call through a composite ID, so there is no captured session. The chain is three files and each link is quoted: the route exists and reaches the same handler, the deny list does not match it, and `checkUI` returning true is sufficient for `Authorize`.
Suggested fix
Widen the prefix so both routes are covered:
hasAnyPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/.well-known/", "/mcp-connect", "/oauth/", "/debug/", "/tunnel/", "/v0.1/")Dropping the trailing slash covers `/mcp-connect/`, `/mcp-connect-composite/` and anything else added later with that stem, which is the failure mode here.
The deeper issue is that `checkUI` ends in an allow. A route added to the mux without a matching entry in `uiResources` is authorized by default, and stays that way until somebody remembers to deny it. Ending in `return false` and listing the UI paths that are allowed, which `uiResources` already enumerates, would make a newly added route fail closed. That is a larger change but it removes this whole category rather than the current instance.
A test asserting `checkUI` returns false for every path that `router.go` maps to `mcpGateway.Proxy` would pin the immediate case.
Severity
`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N`, about 8.1, matching the anchor's shape. `PR:L` for any authenticated user, and both confidentiality and integrity are high because MCP tool calls read and act.
CWE-863, with CWE-1289 for the prefix-matching gap.
Why I do not think this is a duplicate
GHSA-vw82-7fv8-r6gp is `/mcp-connect/{id}` and its fix is the deny-list entry quoted above, which works: that path returns false from `checkUI`. This is the sibling route the entry does not match. The repository's other advisories cover OAuth dynamic client registration, the unauthenticated registry API, SSRF via remote MCP server URL, and the quickstart Docker exposure, none of which touch the UI fallback.
How I found it and a note on tooling
A fix expressed as a string prefix is worth testing against the actual route table, since routes that share a stem but not a separator slip past. Listing every `mux.HandleFunc` that reaches the gateway handler and checking each against the deny list took one pass and turned up one uncovered path. I used AI assistance while investigating and drafting; the code was read at HEAD, the prefix output above is from a program I ran, and the verification limits are stated in their own section.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/obot-platform/obot |
Corregida | v0.24.2 | -22 d | v0.28.1 no afectada |
v0.24.2Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/obot-platform/obot/security/advisories/GHSA-6fwv-3h4c-37j9Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
