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Advisory · GitHub · npm · directus

GHSA-6HPW-RHHQ-6XQ3

Unauthenticated telemetry submission and settings write via pre-authorization side effects on the project owner endpoint

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
5.3
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -35 d de la divulgación
Exposición107 dDesde la divulgación, 5 ago 2026, 11:15 a. m.
Detección105 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 12.1.0
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
1 jul 26
5 ago 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
1 jul 26
6 ago 26
11 sept 26
16 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 12.1.0 directus · -35 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-6HPW-RHHQ-6XQ3 divulgada · CVSS 5.3 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

The `POST /settings/owner` endpoint derives its authorization from the settings singleton write it performs, which
passes through the permission layer. In affected versions two side effects ran before that write: an outbound owner
report to the configured compliance intake endpoint containing request-supplied fields, and, if that report failed, a
direct database write setting `directus_settings.project_status` to `pending`. Directus populates accountability
globally but does not reject unauthenticated requests at the middleware layer, so an unauthenticated caller received
`403 Forbidden` while both side effects had already been dispatched.

Details

The route has no per-route authorization guard. The outbound report was issued ahead of the settings write and was
intentionally not awaited, so it continued to settle after the outer request had already failed with a permission error.

The report is a POST to the configured compliance endpoint (`COMPLIANCE_URL`, default `compliance.directus.io`) whose
body is assembled from the request payload (`project_owner`, `org_name`, `project_usage`, `product_updates`) together
with the instance's `project_id` and version. Every payload field is caller-supplied and none are validated before the
report is sent. The destination is fixed by configuration and is not influenced by the request.

The rejection handler attached to that call performed a direct query-builder update of
`directus_settings.project_status`, bypassing the permission layer entirely. This path is reached only when the outbound
report fails, which is the standing condition on deployments with restricted outbound network access.
`project_status = 'pending'` is the flag read by the daily project status job, which re-sends the stored owner
information and then clears the flag.

An unauthenticated read of `project_id` from the settings table also preceded the check. That value is not returned to
the caller and is not disclosed.

Both side effects require `PROJECT_OWNER_ENABLED`, which is enabled by default. With it disabled the reporting helper
returns before issuing any request, and neither side effect occurs.

Impact

An unauthenticated caller able to reach the API could:

  • Cause the instance to submit caller-controlled strings to the configured compliance intake endpoint, from the
  • On deployments where the outbound report fails, set `directus_settings.project_status` to `pending`. The written value

The stored owner information itself is not modified, nothing is disclosed to the caller, and no privilege escalation or
access to other collections follows. The persistent effect on the instance is limited to a single non-security settings
field.

Workarounds

For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately:

  • Set `PROJECT_OWNER_ENABLED=false` if the project owner and compliance reporting flow is not in use. Neither side
  • Block `POST /settings/owner` at a reverse proxy in front of Directus, or restrict it to authenticated requests.
  • If the flag has already been flipped, clearing `directus_settings.project_status` returns the instance to its prior

Credit

Reported by @Paincakess

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
directus≥ 11.13.0 < 12.1.0
11.13.0
12.1.0
12.6.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmdirectus
Corregida 12.1.0 -35 d 12.6.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas12.1.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-6hpw-rhhq-6xq3

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.