GHSA-6MG2-RH62-RR3G
MFA required by role is skipped for users who hold that role through the AD group mapping
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-6MG2-RH62-RR3G divulgada · CVSS 6.8 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
When MFA is requested for users in Roles limits multi-factor authentication to some roles,
TeamPass only looked at the roles assigned in the user form. A user who held one of those roles
only through the LDAP / Active Directory group mapping was never asked for a second factor:
their directory password alone opened a session.
Details
At login, `identifyDoInitialChecks()` (and its recomputation after the LDAP checks) precompute
`mfa_auth_requested_roles` from `users.fonction_id`, which holds the manually assigned roles only.
`userNeedsMfa()` returns that precomputed value. The roles inherited from AD groups
(`users_roles` rows with `source = 'ad'` in 3.2.x, `users.roles_from_ad_groups` before) are merged
into the user's role list later in the login flow, after the MFA decision. They were therefore
ignored by the MFA role check, although they grant folder access as usual.
The issue was partly masked: saving the user form while every role it displayed came from AD
stored those roles as manual roles, so such a user was asked for MFA afterwards — but then kept
the role, and its folder access, after being removed from the AD group.
The vulnerable configuration needs all of:
- LDAP authentication with AD user roles mapped with their AD groups enabled;
- at least one MFA method enabled (Google Authenticator, Duo or Yubico);
- MFA is requested for users in Roles set to a non-empty list;
- a non-administrator user who holds a listed role only through an AD group, with MFA enabled
Administrators are not affected: their MFA requirement is a separate setting.
Impact
An attacker who obtains such a user's directory password (phishing, password reuse, a leak)
signs in to TeamPass without the second factor the administrator required, and reaches every item
that user can read — and modify, where the user's rights allow it.
Patches
Fixed in 3.2.2.7. The MFA role check now counts both the manually assigned roles and the roles
inherited from AD groups, and the user form no longer stores AD roles as manual roles, so they
keep following the group membership.
After upgrading, the users concerned are asked for an MFA code at their next sign-in, and must
enroll first if they never did.
Workarounds
Until the upgrade, either:
- leave MFA is requested for users in Roles empty, which requires MFA from every user; or
- also assign the MFA role manually, in the user form, to every user who holds it through AD —
References
- Release notes: https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/releases/tag/3.2.2.7
- Documentation: https://documentation.teampass.net/#/features/authentication (MFA section)
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistnilsteampassnet/teampass |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/security/advisories/GHSA-6mg2-rh62-rr3gLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
