GHSA-6PG3-CHWQ-WGQC
Adminer SQLite Database-List Drop Arbitrary File Deletion
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-6PG3-CHWQ-WGQC divulgada · CVSS 8.1 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Adminer SQLite Database-List Drop Arbitrary File Deletion
Summary
Adminer 5.4.3-dev allows an authenticated SQLite-mode user to delete arbitrary files writable by the PHP process through the database-list drop action. The SQLite driver validates file extensions when creating or renaming databases, but the database-list drop path passes submitted `db[]` values directly to `unlink()`.
Impact
An authenticated Adminer SQLite user with a valid CSRF token can submit an arbitrary relative file path in the database-list `db[]` field. If the PHP process can delete that path, Adminer unlinks it even when the file is not a SQLite database.
Root Cause
The database-list page accepts selected database names from the POST body and calls `drop_databases()`:
if ($_POST["db"] && !$error) {
queries_redirect(substr(ME, 0, -1), lang('Databases have been dropped.'), drop_databases($_POST["db"]));
}In SQLite mode, `drop_databases()` attaches an in-memory database and unlinks each submitted path directly:
function drop_databases($databases) {
connection()->attach(":memory:", '', '');
foreach ($databases as $db) {
if (!@unlink($db)) {
connection()->error = lang('File exists.');
return false;
}
}
return true;
}The same SQLite driver protects create and rename operations with `check_sqlite_name()`, which requires a `.db`, `.sdb`, or `.sqlite` extension:
function check_sqlite_name($name) {
$extensions = "db|sdb|sqlite";
if (!preg_match("~^[^\0]*\.($extensions)$~", $name)) {
connection()->error = lang('Please use one of the extensions %s.', str_replace("|", ", ", $extensions));
return false;
}
return true;
}The drop path does not apply an equivalent extension check or bind the submitted path to a known listed SQLite database.
POC
1. Start a complete Adminer application
Build and start Adminer from the audited source using the official standalone Docker image shape. The validation image copies the audited source tree into `/var/www/html` and starts PHP's built-in web server as the official `adminer:standalone` image does.
Log in through the SQLite entry point using a SQLite database path.
<img width="1440" height="1000" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2df3a429-031c-4309-a8f3-04fd7153b203" />
2. Prepare a writable target file
Place a non-database file under a location writable by the Adminer PHP process. The validation used:
adminer/workspace/poc-delete-target.txtThe same directory also contained a SQLite database:
adminer/workspace/poc.sqlite3. Submit the database-list drop request
Use the authenticated session and live CSRF token, but submit the non-database path as the selected database:
POST /adminer/sqlite.php?sqlite=&username= HTTP/1.1
Host: <adminer-host>
Cookie: <authenticated-session>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
db[]=workspace/poc-delete-target.txt&all=&drop=Drop&token=<live-csrf-token>The request reaches `drop_databases($_POST["db"])`, and SQLite `drop_databases()` calls `unlink()` on the submitted non-database path.
After the request, the `poc-delete-target.txt` was deleted.
Suggested Fix
Apply the same target validation used by SQLite create/rename before deleting database files. At minimum:
- Reject paths whose basename does not end in `.db`, `.sdb`, or `.sqlite`.
- Bind `db[]` values to databases returned by Adminer's database listing instead of trusting submitted paths.
- Resolve paths before deletion and reject traversal outside the expected SQLite database directory.
- Consider requiring the current selected database path for delete operations instead of accepting arbitrary submitted file paths.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistvrana/adminer |
Corregida | 5.4.3 | — | — |
5.4.3Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-6pg3-chwq-wgqcLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
