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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · nilsteampassnet/teampass

GHSA-6QG7-W2P8-7RW4

send_email share_this_item emails restricted-item label/path/link to any attacker-chosen address

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
4.3
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión3.2.4.5
Exposición48 minDesde la divulgación, 21 nov 2026, 12:27 p. m.
Detección23 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Se arregla en el próximo ciclo. Sin estrés.Tranqui, pero que no se quede en el olvido.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
12:27 p. m.
01:16 p. m.
12:27 p. m.
12:40 p. m.
12:52 p. m.
01:04 p. m.
01:16 p. m.
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-6QG7-W2P8-7RW4 divulgada · CVSS 4.3 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The `send_email` action of `app/sources/items.queries.php` ignored the per-item restrictions. Its `share_this_item` branch checked only that the caller could open the item's folder, so a folder member excluded from an item, by user or by role, could email that item's label, folder path and direct link to any address. A second branch, `request_access_to_author`, had no access check at all: any signed-in account that is not read-only could have the label and folder path of any item emailed to any user, itself included.

Details

Paths and line numbers are those of 3.2.4.4.

  1. `send_email` (`:7156`) checks the session key and the account-wide read-only flag, then dispatches on the posted `cat`.
  2. `share_this_item` (`:7229`) is gated by `accessToItemIsGranted()` (`app/sources/main.functions.php:5736`). That function checks that the item's folder is in the caller's accessible folders, and nothing else: it never reads `restricted_to` or `restriction_to_roles`. The paths that release item data (item view, password read, history, exports) resolve the caller's rights with `getCurrentAccessRights()`, which applies both restrictions.
  3. `request_access_to_author` (`:7195`) reads an item id and a user id from the `content` POST field, which it parses whenever a `name` field is posted, and emails that user the item's label and readable folder path. It checks neither the item nor the user. No page of 3.2.4.4 sends this request.
  4. Item ids are sequential and the recipient can be the caller's own address, so a caller can list the labels of the items they are excluded from by stepping through ids. Through `request_access_to_author`, that extends to every item of the instance, other users' personal folders included.

The per-item restriction has never been checked on these paths. The folder check of `share_this_item` was added in 3.2.0.0; before that, the branch had no check either.

Proof of concept

Fixture: folder `Shared` (id 1) shared with role `TeamA`; users `owner` and `attacker`, both in `TeamA`; item 2 `SECRET-ROLE-XYZ` restricted to role `Finance`, with *restricted to roles* enabled.

  1. Control: as `attacker`, `show_details_item` on item 2 returns `show_details: 0` and `get_item_password` returns an empty password. The restriction holds.
  2. As `attacker`, post `type=send_email` to `sources/items.queries.php` with `{"id": 2, "receipt": "victim@example.local", "cat": "share_this_item"}`. The answer is `{'error': False, 'message': ''}`.
  3. The queued `send_email` task, addressed to `victim@example.local`, reads: "attacker has shared with you the password item SECRET-ROLE-XYZ (Shared). Click this link to access the item."
Impact

The label, folder path and link of an item leave the instance, by email, to an address the caller chooses. That item is one the caller was excluded from, or, through `request_access_to_author`, any item of the instance. The recipient cannot open the item through the link. No password and no other encrypted field is part of either email.

Sending a shared item to any address is intended, since sharing by email is meant to reach people outside TeamPass. The defect is which items could be shared.

Patches

Fixed in 3.2.4.5:

  • `share_this_item` refuses a deleted or missing item and requires read access to it through `getCurrentAccessRights()`. That covers folder scope, personal folders and the user and role restrictions;
  • `request_access_to_author` is removed, together with its *Access request to an item* email template, and `send_email` refuses any category other than `share_this_item`.
Workarounds

None short of upgrading.

Credits

Reported by Aditay Kumar (`adityasunny06help-coder`). The maintainer found the `request_access_to_author` branch while checking the fix.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
nilsteampassnet/teampass≥ 3.0.0.0 < 3.2.4.5
3.0.0.0
3.2.4.5
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistnilsteampassnet/teampass
Corregida 3.2.4.5 — —
Versiones corregidas3.2.4.5
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/security/advisories/GHSA-6qg7-w2p8-7rw4

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.