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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · nilsteampassnet/teampass

GHSA-6RQ2-HF9C-CXH2

user_only_personal_items_encryption trusts a client-supplied user id: any authenticated user can wipe another user's personal item keys

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS 3.1
7.1
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición51 dDesde la divulgación, 1 oct 2026, 1:06 a. m.
Detección49 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Revisa tus logs de la semana con la lupa.Mis orejas detectan algo raro por aquí.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
1 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
1 oct 26
14 oct 26
27 oct 26
8 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-6RQ2-HF9C-CXH2 divulgada · CVSS 7.1 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

After a user's encryption keys are regenerated, TeamPass may ask them to re-encrypt their personal items. That dialog posts to `user_only_personal_items_encryption` in `app/sources/main.queries.php`, and the handler read the target account from the `userId` field of the request payload. The authorization guard in `keyHandler()` only inspects a field named `user_id`, so `userId` was never checked against the session: any authenticated user could run the action against any other account.

Impact

The action has two branches:

  • "I no longer remember my previous password" (3.1.4.41 – 3.2.2.5): no secret is required. Every sharekey the targeted user holds on their personal items is overwritten with an empty value. So is a subset of their sharekeys on attachments and custom fields, selected through a join on the wrong identifier, which can also hit shared objects. The user's personal passwords then display as empty, and the account's pending status is reset. User ids are sequential integers, so every account can be targeted in turn.
  • Re-encryption from a previous password (3.1.4.40 – 3.2.2.5): requires a former password of the targeted user. It queues a re-encryption of that user's personal items and resets some of their account status flags.

Nothing is disclosed to the caller in either case, and the action writes no log entry.

Whether the damage can be undone depends on the item:

  • Personal items created in TeamPass 3.x normally also carry a sharekey for the internal recovery account (TP_USER). After upgrading, generating new encryption keys for the affected user (from the user menu, or by an administrator) re-keys them from it.
  • Personal items that only ever had the owner's sharekey, notably items converted from TeamPass 2.x with the personal saltkey dialog, can only be restored from a database backup of the user's `sharekeys_items` rows taken before the attack.

Patches

Fixed in 3.2.2.6: the action now always targets the user resolved by `keyHandler()`, that is, the session user. The same release restricts the "I no longer remember" reset to the sharekeys a key generation could not re-key, and fixes the identifiers used for attachments and custom fields.

Workarounds

None short of upgrading. Blocking, at a reverse proxy, the POST requests to `sources/main.queries.php` whose `type` is `user_only_personal_items_encryption` disables the dialog for every user, legitimate use included.

The accounts whose personal items were emptied can be listed with the query below (`teampass_` is the default table prefix). A legitimate use of the "I no longer remember my previous password" option leaves the same state, so a match is not proof of an attack.

SELECT s.user_id, COUNT(*) AS emptied_sharekeys
FROM teampass_sharekeys_items AS s
INNER JOIN teampass_items AS i ON i.id = s.object_id
WHERE i.perso = 1 AND s.share_key = ''
GROUP BY s.user_id;
Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
nilsteampassnet/teampass≥ 3.1.4.40 ≤ 3.2.2.5
3.1.4.40
3.2.2.5
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistnilsteampassnet/teampass
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/security/advisories/GHSA-6rq2-hf9c-cxh2

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.