GHSA-72VJ-PVM4-MM7X
CAPTCHA bypass on anonymous question submission via store=now parameter
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-72VJ-PVM4-MM7X divulgada · CVSS 6.9 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
> Authorized research notice: This vulnerability was discovered during authorized security research in an isolated lab environment against a local instance of phpMyFAQ (main @ 9435f34bd8fcaaeee02a9f679192e46b1b5fedcf, 4.2.0-alpha.2; issues cross-checked against the 4.1 stable branch where applicable). No production systems or third-party data were accessed. I am reporting under coordinated disclosure and will not publish details for 90 days from this report to allow a fix. Please confirm receipt within 7 days.
Summary
The open-question submission endpoint validates the anti-spam CAPTCHA only when the request does not contain `"store": "now"`. The parameter exists for the two-phase "smart answer first, then confirm to store" UX, but the server never verifies that phase one happened — any anonymous client can submit with `store=now` directly and skip the CAPTCHA entirely. The endpoint also lacks the CSRF token check its sibling frontend endpoints perform. Result: unauthenticated, fully automated open-question flooding, with a notification email triggered per submission (mail-relay side effect through the site's configured SMTP account).
Affected configuration: `main.enableAskQuestions=true` (a supported public feature) with `records.allowQuestionsForGuests=true` (default).
Credit: Ahmed Ibrahim (@skeletonsec)
Affected versions
- Verified on `main` @ `9435f34` (4.2.0-alpha.2 nightly): `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/QuestionController.php:121`.
- Same defect verified on the `4.1` stable branch (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/QuestionController.php:72`), affecting the latest stable release line.
Root cause
if ($storeNow !== 'now' && !$this->captchaCodeIsValid($request)) { ... reject ... }When `$storeNow === 'now'`, captcha validation is skipped unconditionally; no server-side record of a prior captcha-validated phase-one request is consulted.
Proof of concept
- ```
- Control: the same request without `store` → 400 `{"error":"Please enter the captcha code"}`.
- The row lands in `faqquestions`; N repeated submissions add N rows (scripted flood demo: 5/5 accepted and stored).
Impact
Unauthenticated spam/abuse channel: arbitrary-volume forged open questions in the admin queue (database pollution, admin workload) and per-submission outgoing mail to attacker-chosen addresses — the site acts as an unauthenticated mail relay.
Suggested remediation
Always validate the captcha (or tie the skip to a one-time server-side nonce issued only after a captcha-validated phase-one request), and add the standard session CSRF token check used by sibling endpoints. Rate-limit the endpoint per IP.
CWE
CWE-799: Improper Control of Interaction Frequency
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistphpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-72vj-pvm4-mm7xLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
